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ABSTRACT 
ARBITRATION IN MERGER AND ACQUISITION 
TRANSACTIONS 
PROBLEM OF CONSENT IN PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE 
TRANSFER OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION ARBITRATIONS 
(Thesis for Doctorate of Philosophy) 
Cahit AGAOGLU 
Merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions have increased dramatically both in 
number and volume around the world in the last decades. Further to these increases, 
disputes regarding M&A transactions are often referred to arbitration as a consensual 
and private mechanism which is flexible, given the freedom of the parties to select 
arbitrators and to adjust the process according to their needs. This study undertakes 
to address and examine the long and complex processes in merger and acquisition 
transactions in light of the emerging preference for utilising arbitration in disputes 
arising therein. Therefore, M&A arbitration faces certain difficulties in coping with 
every dispute during the transaction, a number of which the author seeks to 
underline. In the thesis, two main problems of arbitration in M&A Transactions have 
been covered. Firstly, the problem of consent in consolidation of parallel proceedings 
during M&A transactions, and, secondly, parties consent validating arbitration 
agreements/clauses in “assignment” or “succession” after M&A transactions have 
been completed. The very approach of the thesis proposes whether academic analysis 
of the subject matter can be best conducted by separation along the many phases of 
the long and complex process of M&A and whether it is fruitful to examine these 
phases individually to obtain the greatest insight. Following the dissection of the 
different phases of M&A transactions, the nature and operation of arbitration in 
possible disputes arising out of different phases of M&A has been studied. It is also 
argued that the utilisation of arbitration will and should provide some ideas toward 
clarifying the content of consent of parties to a transaction. In demarcating the phases 
and critical stages in M&A transactions, perspective of the problems posed by 
parallel proceedings is enhanced. Developing on this rich background, argument 
develops the idea that the logic of consolidation in arbitration and can have 
pragmatic application to different alternative dispute resolution (ADR) clauses too. 
The expansive application of consent in M&A arbitration will be tested against those 
different ADR methods which do not have a binding effect. On the subject of 
consolidation in M&A transactions, it will be argued that it is necessary not only to 
focus on the intention of parties, but it is also unavoidable to concentrate on 
surrounding relevant facts arising in different phases of M&A transactions, given the 
recent doctrinal developments in academia and practice. Diverging views which have 
emerged in order to determine consent are explored alongside their respective 
theories of consent. The specific importance of consent in the transfer of arbitration 
agreements has been examined in respect of assignment and succession. The existing 
rules and approaches outlined in many publications will be challenged, and 
arguments against their automatic application in M&A transactions will be presented 
in favour of an expansive approach paying attention to the fluency of facts, similar to 
that employed in consolidation of parallel proceedings. In examining whether current 
regulation is suitable given the popular emergence of M&A arbitration, the author 
will propose how deficiencies and inconsistencies in the area can be rectified looking 
forward in the form of guidelines. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis will examine the problems of consent in merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transactions. Two different aspects of this theme are examined in particular: Firstly, 
the “consolidation of parallel proceedings” during M&A transactions; and second the 
problem of consent in “assignment” and “succession” after M&A transactions.   
 
Dramatic increase of M&A transactions around the world  
 
During a conference in 1969, T Wilson, referencing the report of the Monopolies 
Commission, announced that the number of mergers ranged from 939 in 1964 to 598 
in 1968 but may appear to be so by the vast rise in sums expended from £502 million 
to £ 1,653 million in the same period, which is equivalent to about 8 per cent of the 
book value of the assets of manufacturing industry
1
. It is relevant to observe that 
there has also been a dramatic increase of mergers in the US, where legislation 
against restrictive practices is no new thing. Moreover, the Federal Trade 
Commission keeps a sharp eye on horizontal and vertical mergers that would be the 
natural response to the ending of restrictive practices, and in 1968 conglomerate 
mergers accounted for 84 per cent of US Mergers and 89 per cent of the money 
expended
2
. Starting in the early 1980s it is seen that the vast majority of transactions 
have larger amounts. As stated by Mr. Rock,  
 
“by the mid 1980s, the practice of mergers and acquisitions had become fine 
business art, if not a science, a well planed, deftly executed business 
manoeuvre that stands in marked contrast to the legendary but often 
haphazard approach to corporate buying and selling of bygone years”3.  
 
Until 2000, national and international markets for mergers and acquisitions reached 
an estimated volume of 2,800 billion Euros world-wide in 1999 with a European 
market of 1,200 billion
4
, in which Germany was the biggest
5
. The value of European 
                                                          
1
 International Conference on Monopolies, Mergers, and Restrictive Practices, Department of Trade and 
Industry, papers and reports Cambridge 1969, edited by J B Heath, p.63. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 The Mergers and Acquisitions Handbook, Milton L. Rock, 1987, p. XV.  
4
 The figures of Securities Data Corporation: Frankfurter Allgemeine, 12 November 1999, p. 25. 
5
 Germany has had an M&A transaction volume of 500 billion euro in 1999, Böhmert, Börsenzeitung, 12 
February 2000, p.9.  
14 
 
deals peaked in 1999, when it equalled 38% of the total global M&A deal value
6
. 
The important role of Europe in the M&A market is underscored by the fact that the 
largest deal in history was the $213 billion acquisition of Mannesmann AG by 
Vodafone Airtouch PLC in June 2000. The value of this deal was more than double 
the next largest European transaction, which was the $82 billion acquisition of 
Telecom Italia SPA by Deutsche Telekom AG
7
.  
 
Global merger and acquisition activity reached unprecedented levels in 2005, with a 
total volume of approximately $2.9 trillion, up by 38% from 2004. This prolonged 
surge in activity has been result of several factors, including the general return of 
stable equity markets, accompanied by steady earnings growth, and a corresponding 
boost in corporate confidence in the United States (US), Asia and Europe. Strong US 
corporate governance and accountability reforms have come fully into effect in 2003, 
and while patience and caution still rule the boardroom, more companies are now 
willing to do deals
8
.  
 
According to the bulletin of the Office for National Statistics, in United Kingdom 
published on 7
th
 June 2011, in the first quarter of 2011, the statistics, value of 
acquisitions abroad by UK companies rose to £18.3 billion in the first quarter of 
2011 from £3.8 billion in the fourth quarter of 2010. This is the highest reported 
value for outward investment since the fourth quarter of 2007
9
. 
 
In 2010 Global M&A activity witnessed a strong comeback with aggregate volume 
and deal count figures surpassing 2009 levels. As of the end of November 2010, over 
21,000 deals were announced with more than $1.9 trillion in total volume. That year 
this represented a 12% increase from 2009 volume levels, and marked a sharp 
reversal in the two-year decline of deal making activity that began in 2008. Deal 
making opportunities are expanding beyond domestic borders, with over 8,100 cross-
border deals worth roughly $945 billion announced in 2010, a 41% increase in 
volume on the previous year. On average, targets of cross border transactions are 
                                                          
6
 Patrick A. Gaughan, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, 4
th
 Ed., 2007, John Wiley & 
Sons Inc., p. 3. 
7
 Ibid, p. 6.  
8
 See website of Strategic Research Institute, available at www.srinstitute.com  
9
 Statistical Bulletin published in http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/ma0611.pdf  
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receiving slightly higher premiums, 24% on average compared to the 22% for all 
deals. Roughly 52% of all cross border volume is in the form of a company takeover, 
with 22% in asset sales, 14% in minority stake purchase, and 9% in majority stake 
purchases. Tender offers comprise 8% of cross border deals in 2010
10
. 
 
The Asia Pacific region experienced significant growth in M&A activity, reporting 
over 8,700 deals that involved an Asian company as the target, seller, or buyer, 
eclipsing Europe as the second most active region following North America. Fuelling 
this growth is acquisition opportunities in China, with approximately 2,500 deals 
worth $110 billion, a 29% increase in deal activity and 15% increase in volume from 
2009, and a staggering 108% increase in deal volume since 2005. China’s appetite 
for buying opportunities is also increasing, with $145 billion worth of deals 
announced in 2010, a 453% increase from 2005 levels
11
. 
 
The North and South Americas region announced over $1.1 trillion in transaction 
volume in 2010. This represented a 12% increase from 2009. Company takeovers 
(61.57% in 2010 and 62.2% in 2009), cross border deals (45.68% in 2010, compared 
to 39.88% in 2009) & asset sales (24.45% compared to 23.5% in 2009) remain the 
top three M&A transaction types
12
. 
 
The EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa) region reported over $787 billion in 
transaction volume in 2010. This represented an 18% increase from 2009, a total of 
$662 billion
13
. The European region kept most of its capital within the region, paying 
$295 billion for other European targets in 2010. While the Middle East / Africa 
region acquired targets in North America for a total of $2 billion. European targets 
were the second most pursued targets, attracting $45 billion in 311 deals in 2010
14
. 
 
 
Why arbitration in M&A Transactions? 
                                                          
10
 The results of the Bloomberg Global Pool of over 1000 financial market professionals published in 
http://about.bloomberg.com/pdf/manda.pdf, p. 4. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid, p. 16. 
13
 Ibid, p. 24. 
14
 Ibid, p. 25. 
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Arbitration, and in particular commercial arbitration, is a consensual and private 
mechanism for dispute resolution which leads to an enforceable arbitral award. The 
contractual foundations of arbitration constitute the fundamental difference between 
arbitration and litigation. These contractual foundations refer to “consent” depending 
on the basis of contract law. Therefore, consent is the common point for M&A 
transactions and arbitration. In both mechanisms, parties arrange the conduct 
regarding to their consent. This flexibility is the main reason for disputes regarding 
M&A transactions are often referred to arbitration. 
 
As many statistics disclose, the rising amount of M&A transactions, naturally 
disputes arising out of such transactions increase. These disputes are typically 
referred to arbitration, with or without other alternative dispute resolution methods. 
Arbitration is more flexible, given the freedom of the parties to select arbitrators 
regarding the criteria such as language, familiarity with the industry or commercial 
experience and to adjust the process according to their needs which are essential for 
M&A transactions. As Watch and Mocks mention this creates scope for tactical 
manoeuvre which, if skilfully handled, can contribute significantly to the successful 
outcome of a dispute for a party
15
.  
 
Literature Review 
 
In spite of the existence of many problems during the M&A transactions, the 
interrelation between arbitration and M&A transactions remains largely under-
researched. For instance, research shows there is only one book printed from the 
special ASA conference held in 2005 concerning Arbitration in M&A transactions
16
. 
Another study by an international team of lawyers titled “Tactics in M&A 
Arbitration”17 has also been reviewed. Of these two texts the ASA Conference book 
was utilised as a primary source, whereas Tactics in M&A arbitrations lacked depth 
in M&A transactions, focusing merely on arbitration generally. The ASA Conference 
publication was beneficial given that it focused on material issues, many of which 
                                                          
15
 Dr. Karl J.T. Wach/ Frank Meckes (eds), Tactics in M&A Arbitration, German Law Publishers, 2008, 
p. VII. 
16
 ASA Conference “Arbitration of Merger and Acquisition Disputes” on 21 January 2005 printed as a 
book ASA Special Series No. 24, 2005, Edited by prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Alexandra 
Johnson, hereinafter ASA Special Series No. 24, 2005.  
17
 See supra note 15. 
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are discussed in the first part of the thesis. The book also gives practical insight to 
expert determination.  
 
Aside from the primary text, the remainder of the author’s research of academic 
publications focus mainly on articles on specific subjects or practical problems of 
M&A transactions. While the number of studies is not large, these were by far the 
most beneficial academic writings available.  
 
Given the lack of source material specific to arbitration in M&A transactions, each 
respective issue arising was examined using texts on broader subjects, with the 
approach of tackling target issues.  
 
With regard to case law, parallel to literature, the publication of cases concerning 
M&A arbitration is very rare. Therefore, the author, with the assistance of Prof. 
Mistelis wrote to arbitration practitioners around the world seeking copies of awards. 
A number of “terms of reference” from French, American, English and Italian 
practitioners were received, but not awards thus analysis of the tribunals 
determination could not be made for these cases. However the benefit of long and 
advantageous discussions with professors and with practitioners contributed to the 
progress of the thesis.  
 
Recent published cases from the ICC were sourced and are analysed in the last 
chapter. Unpublished cases are obtained from various books and articles written by 
many academics and practitioners. They are cited directly from summaries made in 
books or articles.  
 
Problems focused on M&A Arbitration 
 
M&A transactions are long and complex processes. The various phases outlined in 
the first chapter. Depending on the complexity of the transactions there are many 
disputes. These disputes are typically referred to arbitration. However, in cases 
where there are many proceedings in the different phases of M&A transactions it 
seems that arbitration faces difficulties in coping. Therefore, in spite of limited 
publication on M&A arbitration, the focus is mainly on consolidation of parallel 
18 
 
proceedings and the problem of succession and assignment which are the most 
pervasive problems currently in M&A arbitrations.  
 
The subject gives rise to questions both during the M&A transaction and after the 
M&A transaction has been completed:  
 
- How the consolidation of parallel proceedings, including multi-step 
proceedings, can arise in M&A transactions, and what is the effect of consent 
in order to deal with this problem?   
 
- What is the role and importance of different phases of M&A transactions, in 
finding a solution for the problem of consent in M&A Arbitration?   
 
- Are M&A arbitrations typical examples of multi-party, multi-contract 
arbitration? Is it possible to directly apply “consolidation” rules to M&A 
arbitration?  
 
- If there are different proceedings on the same dispute which will be 
applied? What are the risks of multiple or parallel proceedings? 
 
- What are the issues with the problem of consent of the parties concerning 
the liability of the obligations and responsibilities of the successor arising 
after the M&A transactions? 
 
- Does current arbitration law and practice adequately deal with the 
challenges M&A disputes pose to arbitration? If not, are there any specific 
rules or specially drafted arbitration clauses that may evidence consent? 
 
- How may coordination or synergy have some practical application on the 
basis of existing law? Do we need new rules? 
 
There are many factors affecting the discussion of these problems, and in the 
author’s opinion the absence of a definition of terms is a main factor. 
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Terminology 
 
Merger and acquisition as notions are frequently used together. It seems these 
notions are the same. It is remarked that the terms consolidation and takeover are 
used with merger. The main reason for this “traffic of notions” is the different 
aspects of merger. Further, merger has an effect in many different branches of law. 
The merger process utilises company law, tax law, capital markets law, and 
competition law under the title of “merger control”.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are commonly used to describe an acquisition of an 
important portion or all of the operational assets of an enterprise, or an acquisition of 
an important portion or all of the shares of a legal entity operating an enterprise, or 
subscription for the newly issued shares of such a legal entity as a result of capital 
increase. Clearly, mergers and acquisitions are here to stay: the buying and selling of 
companies’ remains a common option for many companies. Yet, it cannot be 
emphasized enough how complex and risky the merger process can be
18
. Therefore, 
it seems better to try to give a definition of merger with a background in underlying 
fundamentals and to clarify the distinction between similar notions. 
 
The first critical factor relates to inconsistency in the use of the terms and the 
different scope of the terms. For instance, the terms “merger” and “acquisition” are 
regularly used interchangeably. However, they have different meanings and scope. 
Other notions, such as “takeover” or “consolidation”, are also used with merger and 
acquisition.  
 
- Merger:  
 
According to Reed, merger has a strictly legal meaning and has nothing to do with 
how the combined companies are to be operated in the future
19
. A merger occurs 
when one corporation is combined with and disappears into another corporation. All 
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mergers are statutory mergers, since all mergers occur as specific formal transactions 
in accordance with the laws of the states or countries where they are incorporated
20
.   
 
In contrast, OECD separate statutory mergers and subsidiary mergers give different 
definitions for them. A merger is the combination of two or more companies to 
achieve common objectives by pooling their resources into a single business. If the 
acquiring company assumes the assets and liabilities of the merged company and the 
merged company ceases to exist, it is called statutory merger. On the other hand, if 
the acquired company becomes a 100% subsidiary of the parent company, it is called 
subsidiary merger
21
.  
 
Another definition proposed by Gaughan is different from consolidation. He asserts 
that  
 
“a merger differs from a consolidation, it is a business combination 
whereby two or more companies join to form an entirely new company. In a 
consolidation, the original companies cease to exist and their stockholders 
become stockholders of the new company. A simple equation can be given to 
clarify the difference between a merger and a consolidation. In a merger, A 
+ B = A, where company B is merged into company A. In a consolidation, A 
+ B = C, where C is an entirely new company. Despite the differences 
between them, however, the terms merger and consolidation are generally 
used interchangeably in practice”22.  
 
 
According to Prof. Horn, the term merger is used in a board and in a narrow sense. In 
a broad sense, a merger can be defined as any business transaction by which several 
independent companies come under one and the same direct or indirect control
23
. 
Such common control is in the hands of the shareholders of the acquiring company. 
This can be achieved through an acquisition or a take-over, or through a “merger 
among equals”. In a merger among equals, the shareholders of both participating 
companies are, in theory, equally offered shares of the new parent or holding 
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company. The official goal of such an even-handed distribution of new shares is that 
both groups of shareholders should have common and evenly distributed control over 
the new company or group of companies at the conclusion of the transaction. In 
many cases, the decision-makers are satisfied with corporate control based on 
shareholding and wish to continue the legal existence of the acquired company. The 
result of the transaction is a group or enlarged group of companies
24
. Therefore, 
distinction between merger and consolidation is important. 
 
In a narrower sense, a merger is a transaction by which one or more participating 
companies cease to exist as separate legal entities. A merger in this narrower sense 
results in only one surviving company. All other participating companies are merged 
into the surviving company, which may have been newly founded for that purpose or 
which may have been one of the participating companies (the acquiring or the target 
company)
25
. Both scenarios are usually referred to as a statutory merger. A statutory 
merger is often a step or part of a merger in the broader sense.  
 
The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines merger as “An amalgamation between 
companies of similar size in which either the members of the merging companies 
exchange their shares for shares in a new company or the members of some of the 
merging companies exchange their shares for shares in another merging company”26. 
Larousse Encyclopaedia states that “merger is the group of two or more independent 
companies to assembling les “biens sociaux” (assets) of the first ones”27.  
 
National legal systems give different definitions of merger and regulate it in different 
aspects. For instance in the US, merger is defined as a procedure in which two or 
more ‘constituent corporations’ merge with and into a single corporation that is also 
one of the participating ‘constituent corporations’. The terms merger, ‘Constituent 
Corporation’ and ‘surviving corporation’ have generally accepted meanings. Some 
individual state merger statutes define these terms
28
. The Delaware General 
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Corporation Law
29
 does not define these terms, but uses them with their generally 
accepted meaning. In this regard Henn and Alexander describe the meaning of 
various merger terminologies
30
. For example, while remarking the difference 
between merger and consolidation, they state that “the traditional distinction between 
a merger and consolidation is that in the case of a merger, one or more constituent 
corporations merge into another constituent corporation and cease to exist but such 
other corporation continues as the surviving corporation, whereas in the case of a 
consolidation, two or more constituent corporations consolidate to form a new 
consolidated corporation and cease to exist”31. The constituent corporation into 
which the other corporations are merged survives the merger, therefore it is termed 
the surviving corporation.  
 
On the other hand, a merger in the UK has been defined as “an arrangement whereby 
the assets of two companies become vested in, or under the control of, one company 
(which may or may not be one of the original two companies), which has as its 
shareholders all, or substantially all, the shareholders of the two companies
32
. The 
arrangement may be effected by the shareholders of one or both of the merging 
companies exchanging their shares (voluntarily or as a result of operation of law) for 
shares in the other company or in a third company, by a take-over bid by one of the 
companies for the shares of the other, or by a take-over bid by a third company for 
the shares of both companies
33
.    
 
Mergers in EU are governed firstly by the Third Directive of the Council of the 
European Communities
34
. Only mergers of public limited liability companies are 
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covered by the Directive. Two types of merger come within the Directive. These are 
the acquisition of assets and liabilities of one company by another company (and the 
issue of shares to shareholders of the company being acquired) and the winding up of 
several companies together with the transfer of all their assets and liabilities to a 
newly created company (and again the issue of shares to shareholders of the 
companies wound up). The merger defined is a total merger, involving the transfer of 
all assets and liabilities of the Transferor Company or companies to another 
company. Therefore, the definition does not embrace mergers as the term is generally 
understood in UK, that is, as the acquisition of shares of the one company by another 
but without a subsequent transfer of assets and liabilities from one company to the 
other. 
  
The principle in the definition of a totality of transfer (of assets and liabilities) is 
important, for it assures continuation of business activity. It is not necessary, for 
example, to substitute a new debtor company for the old company. Thus, the 
provisions of the Directive serve to protect not only shareholders, but also creditors 
and employees. 
 
For instance M&A transactions can take several forms, the most common of which 
are: 
 
 Cash tender offers in which an acquirer offers cash to target shareholders in 
exchange for shares of target stock. 
 
 Exchange offers in which acquirer offers securities of the acquirer to target 
shareholders in exchange for shares of target stock.  
 
 Cash mergers or other business combinations in which the target is merged (A 
merger is a legal combination of a target company with an acquiring company that 
results in one surviving entity) or is otherwise combined with the acquirer or more 
typically, a subsidiary of the acquirer and the target shareholders receive cash. 
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 Stock for stock mergers in which the target is merged with the acquirer or more 
typically a subsidiary of the acquirer and target shareholders receive shares of stock 
in the acquirer. 
 
 Negotiated share purchases in which the acquirer purchases shares of stock in the 
target for cash or other consideration pursuant to a negotiated agreement. 
 
Negotiated asset purchases in which the acquirer purchases all or substantially all of 
the assets of the target for cash or other consideration pursuant to a negotiated 
agreement. 
  
- Acquisition 
 
Black’s Law dictionary defines acquisition as a gaining of possession or control over 
something
35
. Furthermore, Beyer defines acquisition as an act whereby a business 
entity acquires the common stock of another business enterprise for cash or an 
exchange of its own common stock
36
. 
 
According to Prof. Horn, the acquisition of a company is the purchase of all its assets 
or all its shares from its sole or main owner. A purchase of a company’s shares may 
also be termed a take-over. Typically, however, take-overs refer to acquisitions 
where a listed company
37
 is the target and its shareholders are approached through a 
public take-over bid issued by a bidder, who attempts to induce them to sell their 
shares to him
38
. 
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An acquisition may be friendly or hostile. In the former case, the companies 
cooperate in negotiations. In the latter case, the takeover target is unwilling to be 
bought, or the target's board has no prior knowledge of the offer. Acquisition usually 
refers to a purchase of a smaller firm by a larger one. Sometimes, however, a smaller 
firm will acquire management control of a larger or longer established company and 
keep its name for the combined entity. This is known as a reverse takeover. Another 
type of acquisition is a reverse merger, a deal which enables a private company to be 
publicly listed in a short time period. A reverse merger occurs when a private 
company that has strong prospects and is eager to raise financing, buys a publicly 
listed shell company, usually one with no business and limited assets. Achieving 
acquisition success has proven to be very difficult; various studies have showed that 
50% of acquisitions attempted were unsuccessful. The acquisition process is very 
complex, with many dimensions influencing its outcome. 
 
The decisive step for an acquisition (as well for the merger), in the broad sense, is 
obtaining a majority of a target company’s voting shares. The success of this goal 
depends on the free, personal decision of individual shareholders. A sufficient 
number of shareholders of the target company must be included to either to sell these 
shares or trade them for shares of the acquiring company. This can be achieved 
through direct negotiations with one or several large shareholders in a block deal, or 
through a public take-over bid. If the acquiring company is successful, it obtains 
corporate control based on majority voting power and becomes the parent company 
of the target company. Ultimately, it is the shareholders of the acquiring company 
that obtain corporate control of both companies through the direct holding of shares 
in the acquiring company and the indirect holding of shares in the target company.  
 
- Takeover 
 
Takeover is defined as “the acquisition of control by one company over another, 
usually smaller, company (the target company). This is usually achieved by buying 
shares in the target company with the agreement of all its members (if they are few) 
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or of only its controller; by purchases on the stock exchange or by means of a 
takeover bid”39. 
 
Additionally, takeover is the acquisition of ownership or control of a corporation. A 
takeover is typically accomplished by a purchase of shares or assets, a tender offer, 
or a merger
40
. Beyer defines takeover as an acquisition of a corporation by another 
entity by purchasing a large amount of the target company’s common stock, or 
through a cash purchase.  The target may be dissolved and its assets merged with 
those of the acquiring firm or it may be operated as a subsidiary of the new owner
41
. 
 
Furthermore, a takeover occurs where a financial or industrial company makes a 
successful offer (or “bid”) to purchase the entire share capital of another company 
(the “target”). The bid is addressed directly to the shareholders of the target 
company; if the target’s board does not recommend the bid to shareholders, it is 
termed “hostile”. The bidder offers cash (which may be borrowed, in which case the 
takeover is said to be “leveraged”) or shares in itself, or a combination of both, in 
return for the shares
42
. 
   
- A working definition of merger, acquisition, and takeover  
 
According to the definitions given it could be held that there are some common 
points that can help us in developing a definition. For instance, it is clear that merger 
can occur in two ways. One way is that, during the merger process, one or more 
companies come under one company which is also one of the existing companies. 
Adding to this definition “to take the control” can change the definition and 
implicates the definition of takeover. Because all the mergers are not concluded to 
take the control.   
 
The second way is that one or more companies are also participating as one 
company, but in this case they cease to exist as separate legal entities. So, in the end 
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there is only one surviving company. The author believes that all the participating 
companies are merged into the surviving company, which should be one of the 
participating companies. When it is proposed that this surviving company can also be 
newly founded, the main problem arises. This is also the definition of 
“consolidation”. “Consolidate” has been defined in Oxford English dictionary “as to 
combine into a single unit”. In Black’s Law Dictionary consolidation has been 
defined as “The unification of two or more corporations by dissolving the existing 
ones and creating a single new corporation
43
. Therefore, the main point in 
consolidation is that the surviving company is different from the participating 
company or companies. On the other hand, in merger, the surviving company is one 
of the participating companies. Therefore, the definition of merger and the distinction 
between merger and consolidation in US Law seems preferable to explain the 
difference. It is noteworthy to mention that in this regard, “consolidation” should be 
considered as a type of merger and should be accepted that in terms of the 
terminology, there is no difference between a statutory merger and consolidation.   
 
The complex structure and diversity of merger tends to increase the similarities with 
other notions. For instance, a reverse merger that was classified as a similar notion to 
merger appeared as a type of acquisition. As aforementioned, a reverse merger 
occurs when a private company that has strong prospects and is eager to raise 
financing, buys a publicly listed shell company, usually one with no business and 
limited assets. In this case, it should be asked whether acquisition is the reverse of 
merger. According to comparative law the common answer to this question is 
negative. All the national laws studied regulated acquisition as a “method” of 
merger. Therefore, the term acquisition is commonly accepted as a “method” of 
merger. However, all acquisitions are not concluded as a merger. Thus, acquisition 
can be defined as the purchase of all assets or shares of the owner company. It can be 
concluded as a merger, but not necessarily so. This conclusion does not effect the 
definition of merger.  
 
Attention must be paid to the term “control” in the definition of acquisition; 
otherwise it can be confused with the definition of takeover. Takeover is also a 
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“way” or “method” of merger. What is the difference between takeover and 
acquisition? For a takeover it is necessary to acquire the control of the corporation. In 
this regard acquisition seems larger than takeover. In other words, every takeover is 
an acquisition; however, every acquisition is not a takeover.   
 
Working Hypothesis  
 
The working hypothesis of the thesis relies on the questions below: 
 
1) Examining whether there is a deficit in existing arbitration rules as 
applicable to M&A transactions 
 
Coordination or cooperation of parallel proceedings in M&A transactions is 
undoubtedly necessary in order to avoid contradictory decisions. There are no 
specific rules for the coordination of parallel proceedings in much of the existing 
national legislation or institutional rules. Therefore, the “consent” of parties and its 
interpretation is crucial in M&A transactions. There are many different methods for 
interpretation of consent of parties which could be the subject of another study. 
However, with respect to these methods, the author does not believe that there 
currently is a unique irrevocable method which can be used in M&A transactions, 
because in order to interpret and limit the consent of parties it is absolutely necessary 
to understand notions used and focus not only on the current process but on all 
processes in M&A transactions. In examining the subject matter, M&A arbitration 
guidelines are proposed in order to decrease the complexity of M&A arbitrations and 
simultaneously limit the intervention of national courts in parallel proceedings. 
 
2) How the transitory definition of consent significantly effects M&A 
arbitration?    
 
The term consent is not fixed, but in constant development. A modern approach to 
consent is more concentrated on varied issues, such as general facts, parties’ 
intention, business practice, economic reality, and trade usages. Therefore, working 
guidelines which reflect the contemporary thinking are becoming necessary. Existing 
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rules for multi-party, multi-contract and consolidation cannot be applied effectively 
to the demands of M&A transactions, as examined in Chapter Three. 
 
Moreover, it will be shown that affecting and assisting the interpretation of consent 
or intention of parties will also have a positive effect on “succession” or 
“assignment” after a merger or acquisition has been completed. Therefore, especially 
in M&A transactions the author will investigate whether the general rules of 
“succession” or “assignment” will impose an arbitration clause automatically. 
Attention will be paid to the fluency of facts in examining all the phases of the 
transaction.  
 
Furthermore, it will be explored whether it is necessary to search for clear rules 
and/or clear arbitration agreements or guidelines in order to reveal “consent” in 
M&A transactions. Research will be focused on the areas which necessitate specific 
rules and/or specific guidelines in order to clarify M&A arbitration clauses or 
agreements. Technical analysis of the relation for direct or probable cause between 
specially drafted arbitration clauses and/or agreements, and evidence to consent will 
be conducted.  
 
There is a lack of research in academia and practice specifically focusing on the area 
and current discussion in the field of arbitration concerning consolidation of 
arbitration clauses and “consent” issues in M&A arbitrations. Moreover, it is not 
uncommon that the parties’ consent establishes different dispute resolution 
mechanisms in different phases of M&A transaction. The subject gives rise to 
significant theoretical and practical questions arising at the stage of commencement 
of arbitration procedure. 
 
3) If there are different proceedings in different phases of M&A transaction 
concerning the same dispute which one will be applied? What are the risks of 
multiple or parallel proceedings?   
 
If the arbitration agreement in the pre-closing phase (letter of intent, due diligence) is 
different from that of the signing phase (purchase agreement), how will the 
coordination be assured? It will be explored how, in practice generally, parties do not 
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precise the scope of arbitration clauses; once the parties’ consent to arbitrate has been 
established, the arbitration agreement is deemed to cover all disputes between the 
parties. 
 
When interpreting the scope of an arbitration agreement, the thesis necessarily 
considers the applicable law, including the proper approaches to interpretation. It has 
long been recognized that under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement 
may have a different applicable law to the balance of any contract within which it is 
found
44
. If several documents contain arbitration clauses, they should be coordinated 
or consolidated so as not to conflict one another. Earlier clauses should be replaced 
by subsequent ones with an extended scope. Where the M&A agreement contains an 
“Entire-Agreement Clause”, the arbitration clause must be drafted carefully to 
compromise all possible disputes related to the transaction.  
 
4) Are M&A arbitrations typical examples of multi-party or multi-contract 
arbitrations? If not, how “consolidation” may be applied to related disputes in 
M&A Arbitrations? How “connection” is beneficial in decreasing the 
complexity of M&A Arbitrations? 
 
On reviewing the arbitration institutions’’ rules it is remarked that there are only 
multi-party and/or multi-contract and consolidation rules. Using the foundation of the 
different stages of M&A transactions, the current operations of the institutional rules 
and the related problems analysed. Especially the problems related to “connection” 
between the contracts in spite of the absence of definition of “connection”, parallel 
proceedings concerning the same or related disputes and the similar lack of rules 
concerning same, and finally the paramount issue of confidentiality. 
 
Study reveals the gravity of the problems listed above, and how it is not convenient 
to directly apply existing institutional rules to M&A arbitration, by questioning 
whether there is automatic “connection” between the agreements signed in different 
stages of M&A transactions.  
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Further technical analysis will probe specific issues in parallel proceedings, and the 
mechanisms of lis pendens and res judicata. While analysing these mechanisms one 
must assume the “same legal grounds” exist in both proceedings, which can be 
problematic for M&A arbitration. Another problem in these mechanisms is that the 
earlier and final adjudication by a court or arbitration tribunal is considered 
conclusive in subsequent proceedings, which is not suitable for direct application in 
M&A arbitration.  
  
5) Given the issue of parallel proceedings can hybrid staged process 
involving ADR with arbitration serve as a practical mechanism in M&A 
arbitration? 
 
The development of various ADR methods, which have proved successful in M&A 
dispute resolutions, can assist cooperatively with the arbitral process. The thesis will 
examine the flexibility of these ADR methods and how they can be effective at 
different stages of M&A transactions. The non-binding nature of these methods, 
however, necessitates a staged process which culminates in arbitration which is both 
binding and enforceable, should disputes not be resolved by ADR methods alone. In 
this case, an overview of the interrelation of ADR and arbitration and their respective 
competence will be made and the need of an interface will be explored through the 
proposed M&A arbitration guidelines.  
 
6) Do we need guidelines specific to M&A Arbitration which can 
accommodate the complexities involved? 
   
This study aims to significantly contribute to discussion and research on this subject 
matter both as an academic opinion and as an insight for practitioners. As a means of 
review at the close of each chapter, reform guidelines are proposed by the author as a 
practical solution to the variety of the problems uncovered throughout the research.    
 
 
Methodology 
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In order to achieve its objectives, the thesis employs research and qualitative analysis 
of primary and secondary legal sources; these include national and international laws 
and rules, and the case law of national courts and arbitral tribunals, in addition 
academic publications.  
 
This work further analyses and compares existing law and practice in the specialised 
area of arbitration concerning M&A transactions. All major arbitration conventions, 
many laws and rules, the practice of the main arbitration institutions, and of various 
national courts, as well as the views of several commentators are critically assessed. 
Moreover, the topic is dynamic, as it concentrates on an area of commercial 
arbitration practice that has seen rapid expansion in recent years, despite lacking a 
cohesive international framework. Given this reality the thesis pragmatically focuses 
on practical solutions over theories, relying on the fundamentals of existing and 
continuing practice over hypotheticals. Therefore, case law has been used 
extensively to provide a more beneficial alignment to current practices in the areas of 
commercial arbitration and M&A transaction, at both national and international 
levels.  
 
In tackling the working hypothesis, practical considerations were addressed generally 
at the outset and particularly narrowed to problems in M&A arbitration, which are 
notably discussed under the title “Problems Focused in M&A Arbitration”. 
 
Particularly, British and US lawyers who progressed earlier than Continental Europe 
on institutionalization of enterprises, played a significant role in establishing the 
legal structures of mergers and acquisitions with their experience that they carry on 
from the past
45
. In comparative studies, the terminology of US and UK Law took 
priority in this study, not excluding civil law systems such as Switzerland, France 
and other countries. The choice of countries where greater attention focused in the 
thesis thus permits a comparison between jurisdictions with a civil  law (France, 
Switzerland) and common law (England, US) legal background. 
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Moreover, other countries are considered when they are of particular interest to the 
analysis of the consensual nature of arbitration. For instance, when discussing 
consolidation in M&A transactions it is also other countries such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Netherlands, and Belgium are noted, because these jurisdictions have 
interesting solutions when dealing with this procedural mechanism.  
 
The essential groundwork of researching the practical operation of M&A 
transactions across different countries is important to address the working 
hypothesis. The complex phases in M&A arbitration and their interface with 
arbitration were necessarily scrutinised in order to address the questions of 
cooperation and coordination and consent central to the thesis. 
 
With respect to the arbitration institutions and their rules, research also targeted 
institutions based in the aforementioned countries, and institutions which have 
published their cases relating to M&A transactions. The ICC is the most used 
institution in this thesis because of their facility of making recent case publications 
available, unlike other institutions. Cases concerning the issues of consent, parallel 
proceedings, and M&A transactions where, naturally, particularly sought out.   
 
In researching cases, the author principally relied on the ICC publication of their 
recent court reports, in addition to this, Swiss cases are also used because they are 
published. Many resources for case law proved fruitless regarding the subject matter 
given the highly confidential nature of M&A arbitration. Reports were often limited 
to terms of reference, which offer little insight. Given the aim of the thesis to address 
commercial reality in the area of M&A arbitration, together with Prof. Loukas 
Mistelis, this author surveyed and questioned practitioners, met with law firms and 
wrote to professors working in the area, in addition to drawing from experiences of 
the author and supervisor in commercial practice.    
 
Research was conducted using the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies in Russell 
Square in London, which provided ample electronic and paper based resources. The 
author also travelled to Cambridge and Oxford to use library facilities. Additionally, 
the author travelled to Paris to avail of the library facilities of ICC and Paris I and II 
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and also travelled to Lausanne for use of the library of Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law. 
 
During the research, recent amendments have been considered carefully. For instance 
amendments in the 2011 Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance and amendments made 
in 2010 to the UNCITRAL Rules have been analysed extensively. Furthermore, the 
amendments to ICC Rules in 2012 have been analysed.  
 
Pragmatic and dynamic methodology of study was required throughout the research, 
given the limited materials specific to the subject. Primarily focusing on the most 
significant common and civil law jurisdictions proved necessary in examining the 
fundamental principles of contract law which form the basis of consent as understood 
in recent ICC Cases. Further research and attendance to the Freshfields Lecture 
Series in 2010, presented by Prof. Bernard Hanotiau presented the concept that a 
transitory definition of consent was emerging. Thus, it was necessary to revise 
findings accordingly, trace this development, and incorporate such findings in the 
thesis. 
 
Indeed, paying close attention to conferences in the areas of M&A transactions and 
arbitration was required to obtain emerging ideas on the subject. While conference 
papers are often general and lack sufficient depth, they were highly beneficial in 
observing the landscape and emerging developments in the area.   
 
Finally, a comparison of the different applications in the field of arbitration is of 
paramount importance in order to understand the varying operation various legal 
systems employ and the distinct problems faced in the different systems. From this 
analysis, it was examined which systems provide solutions to the problems of 
consent and parallel proceedings. Comparative assessment features throughout the 
study, from theoretical foundations to practical solutions. 
 
Delimitation of the subject 
 
Arbitration in M&A transactions covers a wide range of issues. Therefore, it is 
beneficial to indicate the scope of the thesis. M&A transaction is a long and complex 
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process and it concerns different fields of law: competition law, company law, law of 
obligation, tax law, capital market law etc. Therefore, arbitration as a means of 
dispute resolution in M&A transactions may have many effects in different fields. 
Reflections on competition law and capital market law are not examined with 
particular emphasis, but pointed to briefly where necessary.   
 
The process of M&A has been regulated in the law of obligations and company law. 
However, this thesis is not a commercial law thesis. The definitions are necessary 
only in order to limit the scope of every notion and to clarify the differences of every 
notion from each other. In practice, the cooperation and collaboration of companies, 
the domination of one of the companies by others and allotting all facilities to the 
dominant or in the case of transfer of assets of enterprises, it is not possible to 
mention that all these transactions are mergers. Therefore in the author’s opinion it is 
beneficial to clarify the stages of M&A transactions.  
 
Research principally focuses on main problems of arbitration in M&A transactions; 
firstly, the problem of consolidation of parallel proceedings. Parallel proceedings 
may result before different arbitral tribunals (or between national court and an 
arbitral tribunal), with a resulting risk of conflicting decisions and awards
46
. 
Secondly, the “sovereignty” of the arbitration clause in the problem of “assignment” 
and “succession” after the merger and/or acquisition has been completed and the role 
of “consent” in the resolution of these problems is addressed.   
 
Structure of the thesis  
 
There are two main parts in the thesis. The two chapters in the first part focus on the 
theoretical foundations of merger and acquisition and arbitration. The first chapter 
proves that M&A transactions are long and complex processes, by examining the 
process of merger and acquisition in a chronological order and clarifying the process 
and the relation of the different phases of merger and acquisition transaction.  
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 Bernardo M. Cremades, Ignacio Madalena, Parallel Procedings in International Arbitration, Arb. Int., 
Kluwer Law International 2008, Vol. 24, Issue 4, p. 507 (hereinafter Cremades, Madalena) 
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In Chapter Two, parallel to the chronological order  focused on in the first chapter, a 
series of potential and common disputes which arise during M&A transaction where 
arbitration can be used are listed. 
 
The second part of the thesis titled “Challenges and Practical Solutions” focuses on 
the problems of arbitration, and discusses the potential risks of multiple and/or 
parallel proceedings in different phases of merger and acquisition transactions, 
alongside the possible solutions which can be provided. The second part consists of 
three chapters. Chapter Three focuses on the cooperation and coordination of arbitral 
proceedings in M&A transactions.  
 
Adhering to the working hypothesis, parallel proceedings in M&A transactions are 
focused on in respect to multi-contract and group of contract issues. Research 
showed that the same dispute, or two closely related disputes, may result in parallel 
proceedings before different arbitral tribunals (or between a national court and an 
arbitral tribunal), often resulting in conflicting decisions and awards
47
. Doctrines of 
lis pendens and res judicata
48
 and their function of avoiding or mitigating the 
undesirable effects of conflicting decisions are examined, alongside their effects in 
M&A arbitration.  
 
Parallel proceedings can occur where multiple contracts exist between two or more 
parties, without reference to one single dispute resolution agreement. In such 
situation, it is advised by doctrine that those drafting arbitration international 
agreements should ordinarily ensure that a single, unitary dispute resolution 
mechanism governs all of the parties’ various relations49. Numerous national 
courts
50
, and arbitral tribunals
51
, have nonetheless been willing to conclude in 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid, p. 508. 
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 Gary Born, International Arbitration and Forum Selection Agreements: Drafting and Enforcing, 3rd 
Ed., 2010, p. 40 (hereinafter Born, Drafting and Enforcing); Philippe Leboulanger, Multi-Contract 
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 See, e.g., Judgment of 31 May 2001, UNI-KOD sarl v. Ouralkali, XXVI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 1136 (Paris 
Cour d'appel) (2001) (arbitration clause in joint venture agreement applied to contracts implementing 
joint venture); Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Building Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (disputes 
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principle that, disputes under one contract are arbitrable under an arbitration 
provision of a different contract. This is the commercially sensible result, which 
typically effectuates the true intentions of reasonable parties. Nonetheless, the extent 
to which this result will apply in particular cases depends on the parties’ agreements 
and the nature of their dispute
52
. 
 
If there is not a single, unitary dispute resolution mechanism chosen, solutions are 
proposed by doctrine and case law from different jurisdictions, including arbitration 
institutions for joinder of Parallel Proceedings, and these are studied in the Section 3. 
The common solution proposed is “consolidation” of the proceedings. This solution 
has undoubted advantages, however, there are also disadvantages, such as 
confidential issues. Therefore, while using the consolidation of parallel proceedings 
in M&A transactions, all the facts of the transaction and the intention of the parties 
should be taken into consideration. In the author’s opinion automatic application of 
consolidation is not suitable for M&A arbitrations. It will be asked that how synergy 
will be created on the basis of existing law?  
 
Consolidation of parallel proceedings in M&A transactions is not easy. There are 
many factors affecting it. Therefore, sometimes it is and it should be conceivable to 
carry out consolidation in a single arbitration (Section 4), which is once more related 
to the consent of parties. Intervention by the courts in this respect should be limited. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
under one agreement are arbitrable, at least in part, under arbitration clause in second agreement; 
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Any consolidation must entirely depend on the consent of the parties involved in 
order to solve their disputes in the most efficient way in order to avoid the potential 
disadvantages of the consolidation and unconformity with party autonomy. 
 
Chapter Three examines the problems arising from convergent decisions. 
Conversely, Chapter Four explores the second option open to parties of M&A 
transactions, alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
53
. Section One focuses on multi-
step processes in M&A transactions. In conformity with the view of consolidation, 
multi-step processes concentrate on the interaction between different ADR 
Procedures and arbitration in M&A Transactions. Discussion concerns the most used 
ADR procedures such as conciliation, mediation, med-arb or arb-med, and expert 
determination. Expert determination is the most used in M&A transactions. Unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties; experts have the power to make binding 
determinations regarding a particular fact
54
. However, as a rule, expert 
determinations do not result in an enforceable decision, in contrast to the situation 
with an arbitration award
55
. Thus, confusion can arise when separate documents in a 
single transaction make reference to both expert determinations and arbitration 
without clarifying how their relationship interacts. There are no harmonized rules 
regarding the proceedings, the power of the expert, and the proceedings to the 
challenge of the expert. Therefore, referring to Chapter Three, it is essential to focus 
on the intent of the parties, rather than applying court intervention. However, it will 
be noted that like “consolidation” the main disadvantage of multi-step processes is 
confidentiality.  
 
Throughout Chapters Three and Four, it is remarked that for the resolution of 
problems occurring during interaction between parallel proceedings and/or between 
ADR and arbitration, respect for the consent of parties conflicts with intervention of 
the courts. 
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The last and largest chapter (Chapter Five) of this thesis focused on “Consent” in 
M&A arbitration. Chapter Five’s the first section focuses on the identification and 
manifestation of consent in M&A transactions. The second section focuses on the 
consent in the transfer of the arbitration agreement. Relying on the previous chapters’ 
findings concerning the transfer of arbitration agreements, “assignment” concerning 
consolidation of parallel proceedings and “succession” are concentrated on. This was 
in order to study the situation of the arbitration agreement after merger or acquisition 
or takeover of companies has been completed.  
 
Research for Chapter Five focuses mainly on “assignment” and “succession” on the 
transfer of the arbitration agreement, despite many books which study novation, 
subrogation, etc., alongside the transfer of arbitration agreements
56
. 
 
Based on practical M&A arbitration examples, “incorporation by reference” is the 
focus-point regarding the identification of consent, and also whether consent to an 
underlying contract constitutes consent to an arbitration agreement. Furthermore, 
related to the consolidation of the arbitration agreements in different phases of M&A 
transactions, consent in related agreements is highlighted. Additionally, the defects 
of consent, such as fraud and mistake, as seen in recent ICC Case No. 11961 of 
2009
57
, are explored.  
 
Chapter Five analyses implied and/or tacit consent in M&A arbitration. In practice, 
depending on different cases there is also another aspect of proving consent without 
any written document – presumed intent. It may be presumed that specially drafted 
arbitration clauses and/or agreements may be evidence of parties’ consent, but it is 
not a mandatory written document in order to prove consent. This point is also 
analysed in terms of the different phases of M&A Transactions. This highlights the 
importance of the different stages of M&A transactions in M&A arbitration, because 
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while determining consent of the parties, their activities, or their position taken in the 
previous phases, should be taken into consideration. 
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PART I: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
The first part of the thesis discusses the theoretical foundations of M&A transactions. 
As seen from ascertaining the working definition in the introduction, merger, 
acquisition, and takeover have differences from each other and address different 
issues. As mergers and acquisitions are long and complex processes, analysis has 
been separated into different phases for a practical view (Chapter I). Disputes arising 
during these different phases are in majority resolved by arbitration. After the 
examination of the chorological order of M&A transactions, the relation between 
arbitration and M&A disputes will be reviewed (Chapter II).   
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CHAPTER I: CHRONOLOGICAL PHASES OF MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION TRANSACTIONS 
 
A) Introduction 
 
The last decades have witnessed an ever-increasing amount of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), as companies worldwide are seeking to enhance their competitive positions in 
their respective business systems. The prevailing mantra is that mergers and 
acquisitions remain wrath with high failure rates
58
. Since the mid-1980s a large 
literature on M&A has emerged, dealing with M&A from different theoretical 
perspectives, including strategy, finance, organizational theory, communication, and 
gender. Despite the advances made in our knowledge of M&A, over the last years, calls 
have been made for merger and acquisition researchers to develop sounder theories and 
more robust research on the phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions, especially as 
regards their challenges in cross-border contexts
59
. 
 
It is the author’s opinion to revisit established M&A theories in order to prove the 
complexity of an M&A process. Due to the existence of some empirical findings, 
which suggest that mergers under-perform the market, this literature has been 
divided into two broad schools – the value increasing, efficient market school, and 
value decreasing agency schools.  
 
The Value-Increrasing Theories 
 
According to the value increasing school, mergers occur, broadly, because mergers 
generate “synergies” between the acquirer and the target, and synergies, in turn, 
increases the value of the firm
60
.  
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 King, D. R, D.R. Dalton, C.M., Daily, and J.G. Covin, J.G., Meta-analyses of post-acquisition  
performance: Indications of unidentified moderators. Strategic Management Journal, 25, p.  189 et seq. 
59
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The theory of efficiency suggests, in fact, that mergers will only occur when they are 
expected to generate enough realisable synergies to make the deal beneficial to both 
parties; it is the symmetric expectations of gains which results in a “friendly” merger 
being proposed and accepted. If the gain in value to the target was not positive, it is 
suggested, the target firm’s owners would not sell or submit to the acquisition, and if 
the gains were negative to the bidders’ owners, the bidder would not complete the 
deal.  Hence, if we observe a merger deal, efficiency theory predicts value creation 
with positive returns to both the acquirer and the target. Banerjee and Eckard
61
 and 
Klein
62
 evidence this suggestion
63
.  
 
Most of the recent literature concludes that operating synergies are the more 
significant source of gain
64
, although it does also suggest that market power theory 
remains a valid merger motive. Increased “allocative” synergies is said to offer the 
firm positive and significant sprivate benefits because, ceteris paribus, firms with  
greater market power charge higher prices and earn greater margins through the 
appropriation of consumer surplus. Indeed, a number of studies find increased profits 
and decreased sales after many mergers – a finding which has been interpreted by 
many as evidence of increasing market power and allocative synergy gains
65
. 
 
In an efficient merger market the theory of corporate control provides a third 
justification, beyond simply synergistic gains, for why mergers must create value. It 
suggests that there is always another firm or management team willing to acquire an 
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underperforming firm, to remove those managers who have failed to capitalise on the 
opportunities to create synergies, and thus to improve the performance of its assets
66
. 
 
From the bidder’s perspective, the theory of corporate control is partially based on 
efficiency theory, although there are two important differences. First, it does not 
assume, per se, the existence of synergies between the corporate assets of both firms, 
but rather between the bidder’s managerial capabilities and the target assets. Hence, 
corporate control predicts managerial efficiencies from the re-allocation of under-
utilized assets. Second, it implies that the target’s management team is likely to resist 
takeover attempts, as the team itself and its managerial inefficiency is the main 
obstacle to an improved utilization of assets
67
.  
 
The Value (Decreasing or) Destroying Theories 
 
Value – Destroying Theories can be divided into two groups: the first assumes that 
the bidder’s management is “boundedly rational”, and thus makes mistakes and 
incurs losses due to informational constraints despite what are generally value-
increasing intentions. The second assumes rational but self-serving managers, who 
maximise a private utility function, which at least fails to positively affect firm value.  
 
Within the first category, the theory of managerial hubris suggests that managers 
may have good intentions in increasing their firm’s value but, being over-confident, 
they over-estimate their abilities to create synergies. Over-confidence increases the 
probability of overpaying
68
, and may leave the winning bidder in the situation of a 
winner’s curse69 which dramatically increases the chances of failure70. Empirically 
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speaking, Berkovitch and Narayanan
71
 find strong evidence of hubris in US 
takeovers and Goergen and Renneboog
72
 find the same in a European context. The 
latter estimate that about one third of the large takeovers in the 1990s suffered from 
some form of hubris. Malmeinder and Tate
73
 show that overly optimistic managers, 
who voluntarily retain in-the-money stock options in their own firms, more 
frequently engage in less profitable diversifying mergers, and Rau and Vermaelen
74
 
find that hubris is more likely to be seen amongst low book-to-market raito firms – 
that is, amongst the so-called “glamour firms” – than amongst high book-to-market 
ratio “value firms”.   
 
Jensen’s theory of managerial discretion claims that it is not over-confidence that 
drives unproductive acquisitions, but rather the presence of excess liquidity, of free 
cash flow (FCF). Firms whose internal funds are in excess of the investments 
required to fund positive net present value projects, it is suggested, are more likely to 
make quşck strategic decisions, and are more likely to engage in large-scale strategic 
actions with  less analysis than their cash-strapped peers. High levels of liquidity 
increase managerial discretion, making it increasingly possible for managers to 
choose poor acquisitions when they run out of good ones
75
. Indeed, several empirical 
studies demonstrate that the abnormal share price reaction to takeover 
announcements by cash-rich bidders is negative and decreasing in the amount of FCF 
held by the bidder. Moreover, it is suggested that the other stakeholders in the firm 
will be more likely to give management the benefit of the doubt in such situations, 
and to approve acquisition plans on the basis of fuzzy and subjective concepts such 
as amangerial “instincts”, “gut feelings” and “intuition” based ob high past and 
current cash flows
76
. Thus like Hubris Theory, the Theory of FCF suggests that 
otherwise well-intentioned mangers make bad decisions, not out of malice, but 
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simply because the quality of their decisions are less challenged than they would be 
in the absence of excess liquidity
77
.  
 
It is generally agreed that managerial self-interest does play a role in M&A; research 
has shown that bidder returns are, for example, generally higher when the manager of 
the acquiring firm is a large shareholder
78
, and lower when management is not
79
. 
 
The theory of managerial entrenchment for example, claims that unsuccessful 
mergers occur because managers primarily make investments that minimise the risk 
of replacement. It suggests that managers pursue projects not in an effort to 
maximise enterprise value, but in an effort to entrench themselves by increasing their 
individual value to the firm. Entrenching managers will, accordingly, make manager 
–specific investments thatm kae it more costly for shareholders to replace them, and 
value will be reduced because free resources are invested in manager-specific assets 
rather than in a shareholder value-maximising alternative. Amihud and Lev 
empirically support this notion, and suggest that managers pursue diversifying 
mergers in order to decrease earnings volatility which, in turn, enhances corporate 
survival and protects their positions
80
.   
 
Entrenchment is not only pursued for job security itself, but also because entrenched 
managers may be able to extract more wealth, power, reputation and fame. While 
entrenchment theory primarily explains the processof how managers position 
themselves to achieve these objectives, the theory of empire-building and other 
related, well-tested theories provide both the motivations and evidence behind these 
objectives. According to empire theory, managers explicitly motivated to invest in 
                                                          
77
 Weitzel, Mc Carthy, supra note 63, p. 6. 
78
 Lewellen, W. C. Loderer, and A. Rosenfeld, Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Acquiring  
Firms, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 1985, p. 212 et seq. 
79
 Lang, L., R. Stulz, and R. Walkling, A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The cAse of Bidder  
Returns, Journal of Financial Economics, 29(2), 1991, p. 317 et seq. ; Harford, J., Corporate Cash   
Reserves and Acquisitioıns, Journal of Finance  54(6), 1999, p. 1977 et seq.  
80
 Shleifer and Vishny (1991) suggest that during the third merger wave risk diversification palyed a 
large role in M&A policy as prior to the 1980s managers had insuficient incentive to focus on 
shareholder concernws and it has been suggested that the rise of the conglomerate may be an outgrowth 
of this principle- agent problem (Martynova and Renneborg, 2008) quoted in Weitzel and McCarthy, 
supra note 63, p. 7. 
47 
 
the growth of their firm’s revenues (sales) or asset base, subject to a minimum profit 
requirement
81
.  
 
The merger theories described above have clearly demonstrated that merger is a 
complex process depending on the strategies of companies involved.  
 
Merger is a complex and long procedure which also mandates careful study of each 
step. In the first chapter, these steps are examined to clarify the process. These steps 
are examined in chronological order to lay a foundation to allow focus on the 
disputes arising at these different stages in the process and arbitration for the 
resolution of these disputes. 
 
Consent by the parties indicates their intent to submit their disputes to an agreed 
forum for dispute resolution. Consent is the central point for interrelation of 
arbitration clauses and/or agreements between the different phases in M&A 
transactions. Therefore it is important to analyse the phases of the process of M&A 
Transactions in order to find a solution for problems concerning consent in M&A 
Arbitration. 
 
This chapter will examine whether M&A transactions tend more to follow a 
standardised model, given that there is no codification, and whether they are subject 
to variations depending on the circumstances. According to H. Peter, who suggests 
that there is a standardised practice, this is simply the pragmatic outcome of a 
somewhat Darwinist evolution more than the result of dogmatic studies as to why 
such transactions should occur in this manner. Practitioners have thus progressively 
developed a process which provides a balance between the often conflicting interests 
of the seller and those of the buyer
82
.  
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According to Whalley and Semler, once the commercial decision has been taken to 
proceed, there are five clear stages in most international acquisitions
83
: 
 
 Initial identification of the target and negotiation of the broad terms of the deal, 
possibly leading to an exchange of heads of agreement or a letter of intent; 
 
 A “due diligence” examination of the target; either before or after the exchange of a 
formal agreement; 
 
 Negotiation and drafting of formal agreements; 
 
 Obtaining third party and government consents or licences; and 
 
 Finalization of the transaction (referred to variously as closing, completion or 
settlement) 
 
This chapter will follow the chronological order of the transaction stated above in its 
analysis and examination of the deficit in existing regulation. The first stage in an 
M&A transaction requires the buyer or its adviser to look at a number of major legal 
issues which are common to most jurisdictions throughout the world. Those issues 
determine the structure of the acquisition and whether there are any major 
impediments to it
84
.  
 
The first two stages are crucial to the buyer, because a decision to complete the 
transaction should only be made once a proper assessment has been made of the 
target and its business. During the first stage, the buyer needs to decide on the 
structure of the proposed deal, and identify any legal issues associated with the 
acquisition. Consent appears for the first time in the intent of the parties. In the 
second stage, the buyer needs to satisfy itself that everything which it has been told, 
or which it has assumed, about the target is correct
85
. Every phase of the process 
occurring in parties’ offer or negotiations contributes to the consent of parties. 
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Therefore, all actions taken by the parties will certainly have effects on arbitration 
regarding consent in the resolution of disputes. 
 
It is important to know and understand this process, keeping in mind that, over the 
years and sometimes questionably, practitioners have come to believe that there is no 
alternative to established practice. One can safely say that there is currently an 
opinion which necessitates respect to the standardised way of doing M&A deals
86
. In 
order to deal with coordination and cooperation problems in M&A transactions, it is 
absolutely necessary to focus on the entire process. Further discussion of this 
problem takes place in Chapter Three, however different arbitration clauses or 
parallel proceedings may occur throughout the process.  
 
Therefore, the management of the process is essential in order to prevent the problem 
of different arbitration clauses or parallel proceedings. In order to manage the 
process it is essential to determine each and every phase, beginning with the 
negotiation phase. 
 
 
1) Negotiation phase 
 
a) Preliminary Contacts 
 
The process usually starts when the management of one firm contacts the target 
company’s management. On the other hand it is common for third parties, such as 
investment or merchant banks of each firm, to be involved. Sometimes this process 
works smoothly and leads to a quick merger agreement. As Gaughan states “a good 
example of this was the 1995, $19 billion acquisition of Capital Cities/ABC Inc. by 
Walt Disney Co. In spite of the size of this deal, there was a quick meeting of minds 
by management of these two firms and a friendly deal was completed relatively 
quickly. … A quick deal may not be best. The AT&T acquisition of TCI is another 
good example of a friendly deal where the buyer did not do its homework and the 
seller did a good job of accommodating the buyer’s (AT&T’s) desire to do a quick 
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deal at a higher price. Speed may help ward off unwanted bidders but it may work 
against a close scrutiny of the transaction”87. Therefore “consent” becomes relevant 
as soon as preliminary contacts begin. 
 
During preliminary contacts, the selling process is a sensitive process with respect to 
the target and must therefore remain secret. A confidentiality agreement may be 
executed between the parties during the initial part of process. This confidentiality 
agreement allows the parties to exchange confidential information that may enable 
the parties to better understand the value of the deal
88
.  
 
Although most M&A agreements contain arbitration clauses, arbitration proceedings 
for pre-closing conflicts are still rather rare. The few that do occur are for reasons of 
confidentiality, and are seldom published
89
.   
 
Pre-closing disputes include all disputes related to M&A transactions which arise 
before the object of the transaction has been transferred and paid for. Disputes 
sometimes arise with respect to the breaches of pre-signing confidentiality or 
exclusivity provisions giving rise to important questions of proof of the breach and of 
the resulting damages. Compliance with confidentiality or exclusivity obligations can 
sometimes already be secured successfully through interim measures
90
. 
 
To prevent subsequent difficulties with regard to the substantiation and proof of 
damages caused by non compliance, it is preferable, with confidentiality and 
exclusivity obligations, to provide for contractual penalties or liquidated damages
91
. 
Damages generally include loss of profits (lucrum cessans), as well as a decrease of 
assets or increase of liabilities or expenses (damnum emergens). Further types of 
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damages that an arbitral tribunal might have to decide on include compensation for 
the loss or opportunity, or moral damages. According to Mr. Segesser in M&A 
transaction disputes, the difficulties which the parties normally encounter in 
substantiating and proving damages which go beyond costs incurred should not be 
underestimated
92
.  
 
A confidentiality clause in M&A agreements would generally also apply to dispute 
resolution proceedings arising under such agreements. However, parties are well 
advised to examine this aspect carefully, and to insert the appropriate language or 
reference into the agreement where needed
93
.  
 
Generally, the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings is cited as one of its important 
advantages in commercial disputes, and parties often presume confidentiality as 
given. However, some court decisions have made clear that confidentiality is not 
considered to be an inherent feature of arbitration in all jurisdictions
94
.   
 
Moreover, only a few national laws and some arbitration rules grant general 
confidentiality for arbitration proceeding
95
. Therefore, confidentiality agreements 
and confidentiality clauses in M&A agreements should be drafted in a way so as to 
cover the various aspects of confidentiality in arbitral proceedings. When choosing a 
set of arbitration rules, preference may be given to those that provide for a strict duty 
of confidentiality
96
.  
 
On the other hand, it is also possible that after preliminary discussions, the potential 
buyer depending on his bargaining power, may require from the seller an exclusive 
right to negotiate, at least for a certain time. Exclusivity arrangements would then 
also be made.  
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Unless, for any reason the negotiations collapse, the parties usually reach a stage 
where the seller has identified a purchaser with whom there exists a common intent 
to implement a specific deal. At that point the parties often deem it useful to execute 
a “letter of intent”, sometimes called “heads of agreement”, “memorandum of 
understanding”, or “term sheet”97. 
 
b) Letter of Intent 
 
With the increasing number of merger and acquisition transactions, the letter of 
intent, which precedes most forms of acquisitions of businesses, has become a 
widespread tool. Indeed it is often considered as a sine qua non condition of any 
merger or acquisition
98
.  
 
Many M&A transactions start with an invitation by the seller, or its investment 
banker, to potential buyers to submit their offers. In virtually all M&A transactions, 
parties then sign a preliminary document at the beginning of negotiations in the form 
of a letter of intent, or a memorandum of understanding. In this document, parties 
typically confirm their intention to continue, or begin, negotiations in good faith, and 
specify a set of provisions to govern the negotiation process
99
.   
 
The main characteristics of letter of intents are: 
 
- a letter of intent has no codified meaning, as such, neither with respect to its 
content nor to its nature or legal consequences. Caution should therefore 
prevail; what matters is the letter’s substance and the circumstances 
surrounding its execution; 
 
- in particular, the question as to whether a letter of intent has any binding effect 
depends on its content, and on the parties’ intentions (whether expressed or 
implied); 
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- usually the parties state that the only purpose of the letter of intent is to outline 
their intentions. They sometimes expressly state it shall have no binding effect 
and that it is “subject to contract”. However, this is usually untrue, at least in 
part. Most letters of intent probably do have legal implications; 
 
- Any letter of intent usually describes the deal’s subject matter (the “target”), the 
price range or at least the methods or parameters which will enable the 
determination of the price, the nature of the deal (a share deal, an asset deal, a 
merger, a spin-off, etc.); the parties’ intention to enter into the envisaged deal; 
the procedure that will be followed in order to implement the deal (due 
diligence, signing, closing, adjusting, etc.); as well as the relevant timetable. If 
the parties have not yet entered into confidentiality or exclusivity agreements, 
provisions governing these two aspects are usually included in the letter of 
intent
100
.    
 
In a letter of intent, rights and obligations are established to the extent intended by 
the parties. However, the core provisions of a letter of intent are frequently non-
binding in nature: the parties are not bound to conclude a transaction, but are merely 
expressing their intention to continue or commence negotiations. On the other hand, 
a letter of intent usually includes a number of “accessory” obligations, with regard to 
which the parties clearly intend to be bound. Because in international transactions, it 
is important to provide for the law which governs the letter of intent, and issues 
arising there under, as it is not always easy to determine which party is rendering the 
characteristic performance and laws of different jurisdictions may vary considerably 
in this area
101
. 
 
As the core of a letter of intent does not create a binding obligation to conclude a 
transaction, it is not possible to insist successfully on a continuation of the 
negotiations, nor to interfere when one side abandons the negotiations without giving 
valid reasons. Claims for costs caused by an undue prolongation of negotiations, or 
in cases of behaviour which violates the principle of good faith, are the only 
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remedies available based centrally on a letter of intent, and are rather seldom 
successfully pursued. In contrast, claims based on a violation of an “accessory” 
obligation are more frequent, e.g. for breach of confidentiality, or the exclusivity 
granted to the buyer. In a reported ICC arbitration, claimant sought to recover a 
contractual penalty, in the amount of 25 million USD, on the basis that the seller had 
breached an exclusivity clause stipulated in a letter of intent by selling the target 
company to a third party buyer
102
.  
 
Some of the “accessory” obligations include provisions which govern the negotiation 
process, or define a certain behaviour, which the parties, and in particular the seller, 
must follow during the negotiation process, up to the signing of a purchase contract, 
or even through the completion of the agreed transaction upon closing. Where such 
accessory obligations are violated the parties may consider an application for interim 
relief or preliminary measures to the court due to the time constraints and in order to 
safeguard the opportunity which the potential transaction represents.  
 
Letters of intent are usually executed between the end of the exploratory negotiations 
and the beginning of due diligence. Thus, they govern due diligence, but also the 
contractual negotiations which will flow, from and frequently overlap, the due 
diligence process, ultimately resulting in the acquisition contract
103
. The letter of 
intent has developed over the years into the appropriate instrument to satisfy both 
parties’ concerns. It plays a significant role from a psychological standpoint, by 
documenting the facts and reassuring the parties that the negotiations, which often 
involve considerable expenses and commitment, are based on a serious and shared 
intent.   
 
Hence, the letter of intent may be defined as a declaration of intent by one, or more, 
parties to conclude a transaction, in which certain fundamental aspects of the 
envisaged transaction, and of the procedure that should lead to its conclusion, are 
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recorded
104
. Letters of intent can portend any kind of deal, for instance the 
acquisition of shares, of assets, of a business, as well as a merger, or a joint venture. 
 
In the author’s opinion, this declaration of intent would be a way of coordination or 
synergy with next phases of M&A transactions. On this assumption, the letter of 
intent can be strengthened as an agreement and also a roadway for dispute resolution 
because, as mentioned in the next chapters, in order to reduce the complexity of 
arbitration problems during M&A transactions the binding effect of letter of intent is 
an important critical juncture. Therefore, the author believes that arbitration 
institution rules should recognise declaration in letter of intent as a binding 
arbitration clause. This can be one of the important clauses which can be pointed out 
in a guideline for M&A arbitration.  
 
b-1) Delimitations of the notion  
 
A first delimitation may be drawn between letters of intent and other instruments, 
known under the same name but pursuing a fundamentally different purpose. In fact, 
in French the term “letter of intent” is sometimes used to designate “comfort letters” 
(letter de comfort, letter de patronage, Patronatserklärung) i.e. letters issued by a 
party in favour of another, by which the issuer makes certain statements and/or 
supplies certain information, typically regarding its shareholding and the solvency of 
a subsidiary. Some authors consider that the use of “letter of intent” in the sense of 
“comfort letter” is improper105; while other authors however do acknowledge the 
double meaning of this expression
106
. 
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Although the boundaries are often unclear, other possible sources of confusion 
include instruments, at times improperly called “letters of intent”, which are actually 
gentlemen’s agreements107.  
 
b-2) Related Instruments 
 
Letters of intent have further to be distinguished from other instruments which 
pursue, at least in part, the same purpose, but perform a different function, such as 
option agreements or confidentiality agreements
108
.  
 
1) Options 
 
The option agreement has been defined as an agreement by which one of the parties 
grants the other a discretionary right to generate, by its sole declaration of intent, a 
given contract
109
. In order to determine the binding effect of “consent”, it is 
important to analyse the dispersion between parties just in the beginning of the M&A 
transaction. In the author’s opinion this discretionary right directly effects arbitration 
clauses too. It is very complicated to see the real consent of a party who gives 
discretionary rights to others. Therefore, as it is discussed in the next chapter, an 
arbitration clauses injected into different contracts are not direct evidence of 
“consent” of parties. 
 
2) Confidentiality Agreements 
 
The apprehensions with respect to confidentiality have to be dealt with at an early 
stage, usually before the parties are even ready to execute a letter of intent. This is 
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why, although the confidentiality provisions can be part of the letter of intent, they 
often take the form of a separate and preliminary document
110
. 
 
The key provisions of a confidentiality agreement generally are
111
: 
 
- Identity of the parties: These are usually the buyer and the seller. 
Occasionally, the target is also a party, so that it may directly claim performance or 
compensation in the event of breach. Third parties may be required to sign the 
confidentiality agreement, such as advisors, or managers of the parties, including 
sometimes those of the target. 
 
- Scope: The parties undertake to keep the confidential information secret and to 
use it strictly in compliance with the purpose of the agreement, i.e. the acquisition of 
the target. 
 
- Confidential information: The definition of what is deemed to be confidential 
is a key provision. The mere existence of negotiations between the parties is often 
expressly designated as confidential. 
 
- Abortion: The fate of the information, and the related documents, is usually 
provided for should the acquisition not ultimately take place. 
 
- Applicable law and dispute settlement: Applicable law and jurisdiction are, 
in most cases, specified. 
 
3) Variations in Terminology 
 
Several other expressions, such as memorandum of understanding, memorandum of 
agreement, heads of agreement, or term sheet, are encountered. The situation is no 
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clearer in other languages: “Punktuationen” in German, “protocole d’accord” in 
French, etc
112
.  
 
There seems to be no general understanding on whether these expressions represent 
substantially different instruments, or are only variations in terminology
113
.  
 
In any event, pursuant to a well-established national legislation of different countries, 
intent prevails over wording
114
. Thus, what matters is not the title of the document, 
but its actual content as construed taking into account the parties’ intentions115.  
 
4) Pre-Contractual Agreements and Promises to Contract  
 
Pre-contractual agreements are defined as agreements made between two or more 
negotiating parties, seeking to arrive at the conclusion of a final contract
116
.  
 
Promises to contract are regulated by art. 22 CO, pursuant to which the parties may 
contractually commit themselves in order to conclude a contract in the future
117
.   
 
5) Bilateral (or Multilateral) and Unilateral Letters of Intent 
 
Letters of intent are usually bilateral, i.e. they are executed by two parties the 
(potential) seller and the (potential) buyer. Occasionally, they may be signed by more 
parties, for instance by several companies, which are acting in concert or belong to 
the same group, or sometimes by the target, in which case the letter of intent may be 
described as multilateral
118
. 
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Less frequently, a letter of intent may be unilateral, i.e. emanate from only one party, 
either the seller or the buyer, expressing a party’s intent to sell or to buy119. 
 
b-3) Content 
 
For the content of letter of intent there is no standard pattern. Letters of intent vary 
considerably in form and substance. Certain basic provisions may, however, be 
identified and classified as “necessary” clauses, and all others as “optional” 
clauses
120
. 
 
1) Necessary Clauses 
 
Necessary clauses usually include the following items
121
:  
 
- identity of parties: who are the envisaged seller and the purchaser of the 
target; 
 
- object of the transaction: the business, or part thereof, the transaction relates 
to; 
 
- nature of the transaction: what kind of transaction do the parties envisage? A 
share deal, an asset deal, a capital increase, a spin off, a leveraged buy-out, the 
setting up of a joint-venture (e.g. whether corporate or contractual); 
 
- Process: how is the envisaged transaction going to be achieved? (a due 
diligence first, then the signing of a purchase agreement, thereafter the closing, 
etc.) what will the calendar be, etc. 
 
 
2) Optional  Clauses 
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Optional clauses may include the following items
122
: 
 
- sale price: (sometimes an exact figure, more often an estimate, or range, 
valuation principles, or the formula for determining the price, etc.)
123
; 
 
- Due diligence (scope, time schedule, and procedural or methodological issues); 
 
- Exclusivity (“lock in”124 and/or “lock out”125)126; 
 
- Non-inducement127; 
 
- Costs; 
 
- Confidentiality (if not the subject matter of a separate agreement); 
 
- Applicable law and dispute settlement , including forum; 
 
- Compulsory nature of the letter of intent (none/partial/total)128.  
 
3) Legal Nature  
 
The letter of intent is, as indicated by its very name, voluntary in nature. Whether it 
has binding effect is a delicate and often controversial issue. It will be discussed 
whether it can be considered a “full” contract, a promise to contract, or an offer129. 
 
3.1. Does the Letter of intent amount to a Contract? 
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It is usually considered that a letter of intent is not an agreement. This is due to the 
fact that, in a standard M&A pattern, letters of intent are meant to describe an 
envisaged transaction, not to confirm an agreed one. To dispel any doubts in this 
respect, this concept is often expressly indicated in the wording of letters of intent, 
by stating, for instance, that the deal is “subject to contract”. The parties thus only 
express intentions, not decisions. The intent is to negotiate and to possibly conclude a 
final contract, without prejudice to the parties’ discretionary right not to do so130.  
 
The answer is a question of interpretation for which the rules of good faith play a 
central role. Applying the “principle of trust”, the parties’ intent will be interpreted 
according to their actual understanding, with a particular view to that of the 
addressee, bearing in mind the overall circumstances
131
. 
 
In order to assess whether the letter of intent qualifies as a contract, a number of 
preliminary distinctions should be made with respect to its provisions. Firstly, the 
provisions typically contained in a letter of intent, as listed above, whether necessary 
or optional, can be divided into two categories: those which govern the negotiation of 
the final contract, irrespective of its outcome; and those which pertain to its actual 
implementation
132
.  
 
(i) The provisions belonging to the first category (negotiation) involve the way 
negotiations will be conducted and related issues. These are, in particular, 
description of the process, confidentiality, exclusivity, costs, applicable law 
and dispute settlement, and finally, non-inducement
133
. 
 
In most cases, such provisions are intended to be binding, and whether this is 
expressed or implied is not relevant. To this extent, the letter of intent is, therefore, 
an agreement
134
.   
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(ii) The second category (actual implementation) includes all clauses contained 
in the letter of intent which describe the actual (intended) deal, especially 
the envisaged target and the price. These provisions are not necessarily 
vague, and, on the contrary, sometimes the object and the price of the 
transaction, i.e. its essentialia negotii, are already quite clearly identified. 
What characterises a letter of intent is that the parties wish to preserve their 
discretionary right whether to complete the deal or not, at conditions which 
could be different from those initially envisaged
135
.  
   
The (yet to be performed) due diligence will play a fundamental role in that 
respect. Thus, the actual purchase agreement still has to be agreed on and 
stipulated. This is never a formality in M&A transactions, quite the 
opposite. Any practitioner who has experienced how fierce negotiations can 
be at this later stage, especially with regard to the representations, 
warranties, and indemnification provisions, to the extent that the author 
would suggest that, in M&A transactions, such clauses should be considered 
essentiala negotii
136
. 
 
Assuming that, in whole or in part, the contractual nature of a letter of intent 
has been assessed, a further question which might arise is the nature of the 
contractual relationship. Is it (i) synallagmatic, i.e. giving rise to an 
exchange of certain things (e.g. shares against cash), or rather (ii) something 
akin to a partnership, whereby it is considered that both parties are joining 
their efforts in order to achieve a common goal (e.g. setting up a joint 
venture)?
137
  
 
This author agrees with H. Peter and Liebeskind that, the answer will be 
fact-driven here also. If, for instance, the parties’ intention is to enter into a 
share purchase agreement, the nature of the relationship is undoubtedly 
synallagmatic
138
. If on the other hand, their purpose is to set up a 
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contractual joint venture, to the extent that a letter of intent is binding, if 
anything by analogy, it could be considered that the provisions governing 
partnerships apply
139
. This said, it would probably be wrong to consider that 
the simple fact that the parties are willing to achieve a common goal (a 
certain M&A transaction) means that they are joining efforts to achieve this 
common goal
140
 amounting to a quasi-partnership, or partnership. 
 
If a letter of intent is not considered a contract, in whole or in part, the question can 
arise as to whether it may qualify as a promise to contract
141
. 
  
3.2. Does the Letter of Intent amount to a Promise to Contract? 
 
Traditionally, the Swiss Federal Court has deemed that a promise to contract had to 
include all the “essentialiae” of the final contract142. A minority of scholars 
dissented, maintaining that a promise to contract may contain only part of the main 
elements of the final contract, or all of them but with a lesser degree of precision
143
. 
 
The Swiss Court, in a 1977 case, found that since the promise to contract contained 
all the main elements, it was equivalent to an enforceable final contract
144
. In obiter 
dictum, the Court cast serious doubts about the very purpose of promises to contract. 
Acknowledging the scholar’s criticisms, the Court stated the following alternative: 
either an agreement contains all essentialiae, and therefore is a final contract, not a 
mere promise to contract, or there is no agreement on all essentialiae, and therefore, 
the parties cannot be bound to execute a contract, the main content of which is not 
sufficiently clear. Even though the Court was cautious not to rule on such an 
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alternative, this jurisprudence can probably be regarded as voiding any practical 
substance in the promise to contract
145
. 
 
Accordingly, if a letter of intent contains a commitment to conclude the final contact, 
then the following distinction should be made: either the letter of intent contains all 
the essentialia negotii and might, therefore, qualify as a binding agreement, or it does 
not and is not a contract, and thus not binding
146
.  
 
3.3. Is the Letter of Intent an Offer? 
 
Conceivably, the letter of intent may express only the intent of its author. This 
happens when one party (usually the potential buyer) is invited by the seller to 
express the conditions at which it would be ready to acquire the target. This may 
occur at any point in time, usually in the initial phase of the process, often in a 
bidding context
147
.  
 
For a contract to be concluded, an offer has to be accepted. If the offer contains a 
deadline for its acceptance, the author is bound until the expiry thereof. Absent such 
a time limit, the offeror will be bound until he can, according to business usages, 
reasonably expect a reply. Tacit acceptance is only exceptionally admitted; it will 
however be excluded if it is customary, in the relevant business, to expect a written 
answer
148
, which is typically the case in the field of M&A
149
.  
 
Consequently, provided that all other conditions are met, a unilateral letter of intent 
may qualify as an offer. If the offer is accepted, and it contains all essential points 
and is not subject to other discretionary conditions, the letter of intent may give rise 
to a contract
150
. 
 
b-4) Legal Effects 
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Firstly, obligations derive from the rules of good faith on the basis of the principles 
elaborated by doctrine and case law with respect to culpa in contrahendo
151
. 
 
As soon as they start to negotiate, the parties must observe pre-contractual duties, i.e. 
each party must take utmost care to behave fairly and to avoid any undue damage to 
the other party. This is sometimes expressly indicated in clauses of the letters of 
intent stating that the parties shall “negotiate in good faith”, or “endeavour their best 
efforts”, to achieve the envisaged transaction152.  
 
The author suggests going further and considering that the letters of intent should be 
interpreted as a reinforced commitment of the parties to act and, in particular, to 
negotiate in good faith
153
. By signing a letter of intent, the parties create qualified 
expectations. This implies the need for qualified good faith in M&A cases
154
.  
 
There are two situations in which pre-contractual duties may arise: (i) during the 
negotiation of the letter of intent itself, and (ii) during the negotiation of the final 
agreement, following the execution of a letter of intent. If, however, the duty to 
negotiate in good faith is provided for by the letter of intent, it could also be treated 
as a contractual obligation, not as a pre-contractual duty
155
. 
 
According to the jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Court pre-contractual 
obligations include: 
 
- A duty to act honestly156: the parties should not negotiate without the genuine 
intent to conclude a final contract
157
. 
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- A prohibition to deceive: a party may not deceive the other party. A culpa in 
contrahendo would exist in the event a party alleges or implies that it is 
concluding parallel negotiations, where this is untrue. This behaviour 
sometimes occurs in an attempt to create a “fake auction” process in order to 
increase (or decrease) the price
158
.  
 
- A duty to inform: each party must inform the other of facts that the latter does 
not know
159
, which may recognisably have an impact on its decision to enter 
into the deal, or on the terms thereof
160
. Also, each party has a duty to inform 
the other whenever it has decided not to conclude the agreement. In the case of 
mergers and acquisitions, the reinforced requirement of good faith, noted 
above, would imply that the range of such information covers anything which 
significantly contributes to the decision making of the parties, unless the other 
party can be expected to obtain such information on its own
161
. 
 
Issues concerning the duty to inform in connection with a letter of intent 
frequently arise in the case of parallel negotiations
162
. Authors, however, 
diverge as to whether conducting parallel negotiations is admissible at all
163
, 
and if so, as to whether there is a duty to inform the other party and to what 
extent. Schlosser, for instance, believes that the parties to a letter of intent have 
a reinforced duty to inform their counterparty where parallel negotiations, arise 
i.e. not only of their existence, but even of the content of any offer
164
. 
 
The Swiss Federal Court has ruled that a subsidiary that negotiates for months 
without informing its counterparty that the final decision lies with a third party 
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(in this case it’s mother company) is liable in the event such a decision is 
ultimately negative and thereby causes prejudice to the other party
165
. On the 
contrary, the Court rejected a claim from the seller on the grounds that the 
buyer had not informed the seller of its intention to re-sell the company 
immediately after the (initial) acquisition
166
. 
 
- a duty to advise: particular knowledge held by one party must benefit the other. 
The duty to advise may be seen as a particular form of the duty to inform
167
.   
 
 
b-5) Contractual Interpretation and Completion  
 
Once the contractual nature of the letter of intent has been determined, the letter of 
intent will be interpreted whenever the parties are in disagreement as to the scope of 
their rights and obligations. The rules governing contractual interpretation and 
completion are a typical expression of the general principle of good faith
168
. 
 
When the parties’ intent is expressed but unclear, the parties and, as the case may be, 
the judge, will assess it. When such intent is not expressed and cannot be construed, 
and provided all essentialia negotii are agreed on
169
, the judge will complete the 
contract
170
. 
 
For instance, pursuant to article 18 §1 CO, the judge will seek the real and common 
intention of the parties. The judge will consider the overall circumstances 
surrounding the contract, its conclusion and performance. If the intent of the parties 
is neither expressed nor implied, the judge will have to decide the hypothetical intent 
of the parties, considering the nature of the deal (art. 2 §2 CO) and relying on the 
rules of good faith (art 2 §1 CC). In doing so, he will consider what is customary in 
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the field of M&A in general, taking into account the relevant transaction in 
particular
171
.  
  
Parties to a letter of intent are also liable if they breach their pre-contractual 
obligations. Unlike contractual liability, culpa in contrahendo entitles the parties to 
negative interest only
172
.  
 
Hence, the nature of the letter of intent is, in many ways, ambiguous. This derives 
from the fact that (i) it almost always combines binding and non-binding clauses, and 
(ii) it in any event triggers at least behavioural obligations. As such, it therefore does 
not enter into any particular category, as any determination of its nature is 
extensively fact driven. It often lies somewhere between legally non-existent and a 
legally binding instrument. Moreover, as put by Fontaine, anarchy in terminology 
still seems to be prevalent in this field
173
.  
 
Among the remedies theoretically available in case of non-performance, specific 
performance can be envisaged only in exceptional circumstances. Whenever a letter 
of intent produces binding effects, positive damages might be claimed. In all other 
cases, in view of the pre-contractual nature of its effects, only negative interests may 
be sought
174
. 
 
c) Due Diligence  
 
The “due diligence” process usually begins following the letter of intent being 
formalized. It amounts to a phase during which the potential buyer is given access to 
further information in order to decide whether to actually go through with the 
acquisition, and if so, under what conditions. This applies to all aspects of the 
target’s business (financial, tax, legal, environmental, intellectual property, real 
estate, etc.)
175
. 
 
                                                          
171
 Tercier, ibid, N. 866 et seq.  
172
 Peter, Liebeskind, supra note 99, p. 280. See also ATF 105 II 75 (1979), 81 = JdT 1980 I 67. 
173
 Fontaine, supra note 164,  p. 99. 
174
 Peter, Liebeskind, supra note 99, p. 280.  
175
 Peter, supra note 83, p.3. 
69 
 
In a due diligence procedure, the target company and its business will be examined 
by the prospective buyer. Due diligence covers a number of areas (business due 
diligence, legal due diligence, tax due diligence, financial due diligence etc.). For the 
purpose of documents and data are compiled and made available to the buyer. The 
question arises immediately whether the knowledge the buyer has gained from the 
due diligence can be held against him, i.e. that a buyer cannot bring a claim for 
breach of a warranty if such a breach has already been apparent from the due 
diligence. 
 
According to H. Peter, the term due diligence is derived from an obligation or at least 
incumbency of the buyer: during this particular and by essence preliminary phase, 
the buyer must display the diligence reasonably required from (or “due” by) any 
potential purchaser in investigating, understanding, and therefore, knowing, the 
“object” which he envisages to buy. … “Due diligence” is thus the part of the more 
global M&A process during which the potential buyer must be duly diligent about 
fully understanding the target, and is, or should be, put in the appropriate conditions 
to do so
176
.  
 
This explanation should help understand better the complex nature and multifaceted 
purpose of due diligence. In scope, it is broader than a plain audit. In effect, it aims to 
supply the buyer with information about the target that is not only of an objective 
nature (pure facts), but also a subjective nature, to help him understand the target and 
whether it will fit with his business, strategies, or even, intentions or tastes. A target 
that might seem perfect by auditing standards (whether financial, environmental, or 
tax) could very well be deemed to be subjectively inappropriate by the potential 
buyer after due diligence. Therefore, due diligence often includes direct contacts with 
the target’s management (“management meetings”) to enable the purchaser to get to 
know the target’s culture and understand how its management is likely to react, 
should the transaction be implemented
177
.  
 
To enable the buyer to perform due diligence, the seller often organises a “data 
room”. This is usually a room where all relevant data is put at the disposal of the 
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purchaser or his appointed agents. In view of the sometimes highly confidential 
nature of the process, this often takes place in a secret location, most likely a place 
which is known only to a few people and is totally outside the target’s or seller’s 
premises. With the new technology available, a data room can take the form of a CD 
Rom containing all relevant information or documents. In transactions of a certain 
complexity or importance the parties often draw up a protocol which governs issues, 
such as access to the data room and the right to copy documents
178
.  
 
By enabling the buyer to better understand the target, due diligence also inevitably 
has a direct effect on the terms and conditions of the purchase agreement. It is, in 
fact, only once he has better understood the subject matter of the deal that the 
purchaser and his advisors will be able to decide how the transaction should be 
structured and which conditions should be included in the agreement. This regards, 
in particular, the representations and warranties that the buyer will request. In many 
cases, the due diligence findings will, indeed, have a substantial influence on these 
provisions
179
.  
 
Sometimes, due diligence enables the parties to identify conditions that will have to 
be fulfilled before the execution, and/or completion, of the envisaged agreement can 
take place. These are sometimes called “signing”, or “completion”, conditions 
precedent
180
.  
 
In any event, due diligence often leads parties to start or intensify their negotiations 
regarding the content of the actual purchase agreement
181
.     
 
2) Signing Phase (Purchase Agreement) 
 
Where buyer decides to proceed with the transaction in view of what he has learned 
as a result of the due diligence, i.e. if the latter has proven “satisfactory” and 
provided the parties have managed to agree on all terms and conditions of the deal, 
the parties proceed to execute the “real” agreement: usually called the “purchase 
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agreement”, or “share purchase agreement” (“SPA”) in the case of share deal, as 
opposed to an asset deal. One also encounters “merger agreements” (in the case of a 
merger as opposed to a plain acquisition) or “share swap agreements” (if 
consideration is paid through shares of another entity)
182
.  
 
This is, in any event, the contractual instrument pursuant to which the parties, in a 
binding manner, implement, or agree to implement, the transaction, and list all terms 
and conditions thereof. It necessarily includes the subject matter of the deal (shares, 
whole or part of the business, only assets, etc.), as well as the price, or at least the 
way the price will be (objectively) determined (pricing formula), and the nature of 
the consideration (cash, shares or a combination thereof). It also comprises of 
provisions, governing the representations and warranties made by the seller, as well 
as detailed clauses on the buyer’s indemnification, should the “representations and 
warranties” prove inaccurate. It customarily contains “boilerplate clauses”183.  
 
In order to attenuate the obligations of the seller, deriving from its “reps and 
warranties”, and therefore, limit the rights of the buyer in such respect, it is not 
unusual for the seller to qualify them in the clauses themselves
184
, or to issue a 
“disclosure letter”, in which the seller outlines facts that will thereafter be considered 
as known to the buyer, to prevent the buyer from the later denying his awareness of 
them
185
. 
 
3) Closing Phase (Completion) 
 
In the vast majority of cases, the transaction is not actually implemented upon 
signing. There are many reasons for this, usually because the parties have provided 
for various kinds of “condition(s) precedent”. Some of the most common ones 
include
186
: 
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- in any deal of a certain size there will almost inevitably be competition law 
filing requirements, which will make it advisable, or necessary, to obtain 
clearance from the relevant authorities before the transaction can be completed; 
 
- sometimes the buyer, but more often the seller, will have to take steps in order 
to implement the deal. This can include restructuring the business, for instance 
by assigning some assets to or from the target, refinancing it, or taking out all or 
part of the available free cash; 
 
- the parties may recognise upon signing that the due diligence has not been 
completed and that it will be concluded thereafter. This can occur, for instance, 
when the buyer was deliberately not granted full access to very sensitive 
information before a truly binding agreement was executed. This is sometimes 
referred to as “satisfactory (post-signing) due diligence” condition precedent.  
 
- Under the “no material adverse change” (“MAC”) clause, the seller represents 
that, at closing, the business will not be materially different to that known to the 
buyer through the information memorandum, due diligence, and/or share 
purchase agreement; 
 
- The fact that all representations (and warranties) shall be true on the date of 
closing. 
 
If a condition precedent is not satisfied, not fulfilled in the agreed time, or if the 
parties have agreed that the buyer could step out after signing and before completion 
(discretionary walk-away right, the granting of which is relatively rare), the signed 
agreement will not be “closed”187. 
 
In a normal pattern of events, auditors often step in at this stage to assess the actual 
value of the target based on the agreed parameters (net asset value, discounted cash 
flow, turnover, EBIT, or EBIDTA, etc., multiplied by an agreed number if 
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appropriate). The result of this financial audit usually leads to the drawing up of 
“closing accounts”188. 
 
Whether or not an audit takes place, assuming that all conditions precedent, if any, 
have been satisfied (or waived), the deal is then actually completed (in French 
“exécuté”; in German “durchgeführt) and the closing occurs.  The transaction can be 
extremely simple (for instance cash against shares). It is often relatively complex due 
to numerous steps. A “closing agenda”, or “completion list”, might be useful in such 
cases. It describes what has to be done, by whom and when
189
.  
 
 
4) Post-Closing Phase 
 
Although many scenarios can be envisaged at this stage, the closing is usually not 
and sometimes by far the end of the transaction
190
. 
 
First of all, the amount which has been paid at closing is not necessarily the final 
price. In fact, it might be an approximation based on pro forma, or non-audited 
accounts. In such cases, in accordance with the purchase agreement, a post-closing 
audit is often performed in order to assess what the actual and final price will be. 
This leads to so called “post-closing adjustments” of the price191.   
 
“Earn-out clauses” do give rise to an inherent conflict of interest: in order to avoid, 
or limit, any price increase, the buyer might endeavour to reduce (or defer) the 
success of the target at least to the extent that this shall be reflected in its financial 
statements; on the other hand, the seller might try to artificially improve, or 
accelerate, the relevant financial results in order to benefit from the highest possible 
adjustment. The seller often plays, or can be suspected to play, an active role in this 
respect, if he continues to manage the business for a certain time following the 
closing
192
. 
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5) Representations, warranties and indemnification 
 
At this stage, the transaction is still far from over. Even when due diligence has been 
smoothly carried out and the purchase agreement well drafted, problems often arise 
because the target is not perfectly in line with the buyer’s expectations. This is when 
the representations and warranties come into play, an almost inevitable, and often 
unpleasant, phase which can sometimes start many years after closing, depending on 
the provisions of the purchase agreement or relevant statutes
193
. 
 
The purpose of this set of clauses is to ensure that, should the promised qualities of 
the target not exist, the buyer will be indemnified by the seller to the extent that he 
has suffered prejudice.  
 
 
B) Conclusion of Chapter I 
 
The complex structure of the M&A transactions provides many theories depending 
on different point of view for academicians. Therefore the author found necessary to 
revisit these theories in order to demonstrate that, focus purely on the theories is not 
satisfactory to understand and resolve problems during the M&A process; but it is 
also important to examine in details the entire process in practice. 
 
The entire process of an M&A transaction can last months and, sometimes, years or 
even decades, from the beginning of negotiations to the end of the time frame for 
making claims under representations and warranties clauses and the resolution of 
possible disputes.  
 
Advancing the third question framed in the hypothesis, research has found that 
depending on which phase the controversy arises in the process, the applicable rules 
(whether contractual, or statutory) might provide a different answer to the same 
question, such as whether or not specific performance can be successfully claimed by 
either of the parties, or whether they can terminate the contract for breach, error, or 
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fraud. Specific performance can assist an M&A transaction by spurring the parties on 
to complete the transaction; progressing to the forthcoming stages, in spite of a 
dispute arising at an early phase in a transaction. This matter will be highlighted in 
subsequent chapters which address the connection which links the transactional 
phases and the absence of a definition of this connection.  
 
Therefore, the importance of understanding and appreciating the phases and their 
impact on dispute resolution cannot be understated. Flowing from this reasoning, the 
notion and operation of M&A transactions across different countries was examined.  
 
From the analysis of many jurisdictions, it has been shown that a multitude of 
different phraseology and terminology has been employed in M&A transactions in 
these different jurisdictions. Very often, corresponding definitions for terms will be 
found, which can be hugely problematic for ever-increasing international M&A 
transactions. It has been shown for “merger” and “acquisition” that courts employ 
expansive definitions for such terms, allowing for the use of the broad term “M&A 
transaction” as a working definition.  
 
In spite of inconsistencies in the nuances of definitions, it is understand that the 
broad definition of a merger encompasses the more narrowly defined acquisitions 
and takeovers. One should bear in mind, however, that while all takeovers are 
acquisitions, the reverse in untrue. 
 
Difference in nomenclature, however, are not reflected in practice. In adhering to the 
working hypothesis, and examining the nature of M&A transactions in the absence of 
legal codification on the subject, similar practice methods can be traced across most 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the phases of M&A transactions are somewhat consistent.  
 
Further to the working hypothesis, examining whether there is a deficit in existing 
arbitration rules as applicable to M&A transactions, research indeed found there to 
be such a deficit, which itself is central to the raison d’être of this thesis. In facing 
this deficit, it can be useful to distinguish the different phases in M&A transactions 
for various reasons, including inter alia, the fundamentally different legal regime that 
applies to each of them. 
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In order to clarify the resolution of the disputes with arbitration in M&A 
transactions, it is necessary to clarify the process and the relation of different phases 
of M&A transaction. There are no codified rules for the process, however 
practitioners have developed a process which provides a balance between the often 
conflicting interests of the seller and those of the buyer. The process is the same in 
merger and acquisition. Therefore, these terms are not used separately when referring 
to an “M&A transaction” or “M&A arbitration”.    
 
Addressing the second question in the working hypothesis in reviewing the phases of 
M&A transactions, “consent” of the parties becomes relevant as soon as the process 
starts in the negotiation phase. During negotiation the preparation of the letter of 
intent especially, is key in order to strengthen the future of the process and the 
development of the M&A transaction. But, is the letter of intent an agreement? As an 
agreement, one should consider contract principles when analysing the letter of 
intent. Similar to an arbitration agreement, practitioners can rely on fundamental 
contract law in deciding whether parties  to the letter of intent are bound by its 
provisions.  
 
If the letter of intent is, in fact, manifestation of the consent of the parties, it must be 
considered whether the primary elements of contract are present: (i) offer, (ii) 
acceptance, (iii) consideration, (iv) capacity, and (v) intention to create legal 
relations. Research of commercial practice has shown that often a unilateral letter of 
intent is present. This opens the question further as to whether a binding agreement 
has been formed between the parties. Could one party be considered to be bound by 
acting in accordance with the letter of intent, i.e. progressing to the next phase of the 
transaction? Perhaps, even continuation with negotiations would bind a party to a 
unilateral letter of intent? 
 
These questions aside, recent ICC cases have shown that contract principles have 
been relied on in deciding whether the letter of intent can evidence the parties 
consent. Therefore, the letter of intent is the roadway in order to decrease complexity 
in M&A arbitration because, it is an important issue concerning the parties’ consent 
from the outset. 
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Notwithstanding the reliance by the ICC on contract principles when dealing with 
consent, recent opinion has stated the contrary. Consent can be considered as 
dynamic, rooted in contract law, but developing beyond in recent years
194
. How this 
transitory definition of consent significantly impacts M&A arbitration will be 
discussed further in forthcoming chapters.  
 
This writer opines that consent during different phases of M&A is comparable to 
consent given in an arbitration clause. Therefore, arbitration institutions should 
perhaps recognise declaration in the letter of intent as binding, similar to an 
arbitration clause? In the author’s opinion arbitration institutions should produce 
some guidelines for M&A arbitrations, including for instance, that the letter of intent 
has binding effect. 
  
Consequently, the M&A transaction is a complex process. As the sources and nature 
of possible disputes are numerous, they are unusually difficult to resolve, and 
because of the peculiarities and intricacies involved in M&A transactions, there is 
often no clear answer. Different answers may be given to the same queries, inter alia 
depending on at which stage the issue arises in the process. Time is usually of the 
essence.  
 
Submitting M&A disputes to arbitration is probably often the most appropriate way 
to deal with these many difficult, specialised, sensitive, urgent, multinational, and 
highly controversial problems. This is undoubtedly why most M&A agreements 
contain an arbitration clause, and why such a high proportion of arbitration awards 
concern such disputes. 
 
The following chapter will display that, while it has many strengths, arbitration is not 
without difficulties. The restraints of the arbitration process are further developed, 
with particular emphasis on procedural restraints.  
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CHAPTER II : ARBITRATION AND MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION TRANSACTIONS 
 
A) Introduction  
 
Following the discussion of the complex and lengthy process in M&A transactions in 
the previous chapter, one can appreciate that this process often gives rise to disputes 
at each of those different stages, and thus arbitration can arise at any of the different 
phases of an M&A transaction.  
 
As it would be too voluminous to address every possible dispute which may arise, 
therefore, this author suggests a list of matters which commonly form the basis of 
disputes, and more closely relate the objective of this thesis. 
 
This chapter acts as a bridge from the analysis of the phases of M&A transactions to 
specific problems of M&A arbitrations. In discussing these arbitration problems, the 
chapter is organised parallel to the phases of M&A transactions. It will be shown 
how arbitration can best serve dispute resolution at particular points. For instance no 
material adverse changes, price adjustment arbitration, expert arbitration, 
representations and warranties, put and sale options will be highlighted.  
 
Continuing from the foundations laid in Chapter One, this chapter further 
contextualises the M&A transactions specific to arbitration in order to address the 
questions framed in the working hypothesis. Following chapters examine whether 
M&A arbitration is a suitable example of multi-contract arbitration or is it possible to 
use directly the method of “consolidation” regulated in arbitration institutions’ rules? 
Additionally, the text will explore how the cooperation of different arbitration 
clauses or different but parallel proceedings would be realized, namely, should 
attention be paid to parallel proceedings depending on the same dispute or related 
disputes in order to find a solution, which also broaches the question of connection. 
These complex topics can only be fully appreciated following the understanding of 
the fundamentals of arbitration occurring in M&A transactions.   
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The current chapter proceeds to analyse how arbitration can effectively resolve 
disputes in M&A. Throughout this analysis, the problems and limits of arbitration as 
a dispute resolution mechanism for certain specific issues are addressed. This 
discourse seeks to remedy the existing void in current discussions on arbitration law 
and practice specifically concerning the challenges posed by M&A disputes. Finally, 
it will be seen that it is necessary to have some guidelines.  
 
Continuing analysis of the author’s research from Chapter One, the chronological 
order employed is that followed in the previous chapter, which is practical in 
allowing the reader to navigate through the M&A transaction as it would naturally 
occur in  practice.  
 
It is reiterated in this chapter that careful drafting of arbitration clauses or agreements 
is very important and particularly recommended in order to organize, if not avoid, 
disputes in M&A Transactions. A well drafted dispute resolution clause will 
efficiently address issues of consent of parties, discourage the initiation of parallel 
proceedings and decrease complexity of M&A arbitration. This is important to bear 
in mind from the outset of an M&A transaction, initiated in the pre-signing phase.  
 
B) Arbitration in Pre-Signing Disputes 
 
Pre-signing disputes typically arise during one of the most hectic phases of an M&A 
transaction, when the parties are struggling to prepare all the necessary documents 
and striving to comply with all the conditions to be met for the closing. The buyers 
are often busy obtaining financing for the planned transaction and might suddenly 
have second thoughts about the deal. Thus, in many substantial M&A transactions, 
the closing is something of a balancing act on a knife’s edge, and, the parties are 
often not sure whether the deal will go through or not up to the last minute
 195
.  
 
Although most M&A agreements contain arbitration clauses and the number of 
M&A arbitration proceedings has increased since the late 1990s, arbitration 
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proceedings for pre-closing conflicts are few occurred by the reasons of 
confidentiality, rarely published
196
.  
 
Pre-closing disputes include all disputes arising before the M&A transaction has 
been completed i.e. before the subject of the transaction has been transferred and 
paid for
197
. Pre-signing disputes arise between buyers and seller, however, after they 
have entered into negotiations, but also among buyers who have formed a consortium 
to realise an acquisition, or among partners in a contract which provides for the 
acquisition of shares or assets in a company under specific circumstances
198
.  
 
Parties in a consortium for an acquisition may end up in a conflict which can put the 
closing of the transaction at risk. 
 
In a recent, unpublished ICC Arbitration case
199
, the arbitral tribunal decided that the 
memorandum of understanding was a binding agreement which provided for 
negotiating the acquisition of the target company and imposed on the parties an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith the terms of the shareholders’ agreement. It held 
that the memorandum of understanding had expired, but that the continuing 
negotiations constituted a pre-contractual relationship that, again, imposed an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith. It considered that respondent had breached both 
its obligation to negotiate in good faith and the exclusivity provision by acquiring the 
target company. The arbitral tribunal awarded compensation for costs and expenses 
incurred but not for loss of profit or moral damages
200
. 
 
In this case two buyers formed a consortium to prepare a bid to acquire a particular 
company. To formalise their cooperation, they concluded a memorandum of 
understanding which also constituted the basis for a shareholders’ agreement to be 
concluded once the target company had been acquired. The shareholders’ agreement 
was intended to cover such issues as the level of shareholding of the two buyers, the 
appointment of the chairman of the board of the acquired unanimity. The 
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memorandum of understanding further included an exclusivity clause prohibiting the 
buyers from acquiring the target company individually. The buyers and the seller had 
signed a letter of intent to secure an exclusivity period for negotiations. The buyers 
initiated the due diligence process of the target company and began negotiating a 
stock purchase agreement. At the same time, the buyers started to negotiate the 
shareholders’ agreement and exchanged several drafts. The letter of intent between 
the seller and the two buyers expired without a share purchase or shareholders’ 
agreement having been signed, but the parties continued to negotiate. After several 
unsuccessful meetings between the two buyers, one of them terminated the 
memorandum of understanding, arguing that they could not agree on a shareholders’ 
agreement, and acquired the target company alone. The other buyer filed a request 
for arbitration and claimed that its partner had breached its obligations under the 
memorandum of understanding, had not attempted to negotiate a shareholders’ 
agreement in good faith, acted in violation of the exclusivity provision of the 
memorandum of understanding on acquisition of the target company alone, and 
benefited from the work, information, and data produced during joint negotiations 
with the seller. Based on these allegations, the aggrieved buyer claimed full 
compensation for damages suffered, including loss of profit and moral damages. The 
Respondent contended that the memorandum of understanding was only a 
preliminary agreement (an agreement to negotiate) subject to further negotiations 
with the seller and the agreement on a shareholders’ agreement. The Respondent 
claimed that the only obligation it had under the memorandum of understanding was 
to negotiate in good faith towards a joint bid for the target company and a final 
shareholders’ agreement, and that it had fulfilled these obligations in good faith. It 
further disputed the claimant’s claim for damages201. 
 
In an LCIA case
202
, several companies had concluded various agreements and 
founded a consortium in order to regulate their dealings in connection with a possible 
acquisition of rights relating to the exploration, appraisal, development, production 
and/or disposal of hydrocarbons. An exclusivity / non- circumvention obligation 
binding upon the parties and their affiliates provided that the parties should not seek 
to acquire directly or indirectly any rights relating to the exploration of…, etc. At an 
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early stage of the bidding process, one of the consortium parties acquired a 
competitor. The other consortium members argued that the newly acquired 
competitor had become an affiliate and was thus also bound by the exclusivity /non-
circumvention obligation. They started arbitration proceedings aimed at prohibiting 
the newly acquired competitor from getting involved in the bidding process and 
requesting that an order be issued to the consortium member not to induce the “new 
affiliate” to declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages were sought. While the 
arbitral tribunal denied the request for injunctive relief, it issued a declaratory award 
which defined the permitted behaviour for the bidding process
203
.   
 
These cases are excellent examples of the problems which can arise in the pre-
signing phase of M&A transactions.  
 
1) Conflicts Arising Out of a Letter of Intent 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in a letter of intent rights and obligations are 
established to the extent intended by the parties. However, the core provisions of a 
letter of intent are frequently non-binding in nature. Sometimes, preliminary contract, 
heads of agreement, or even a letter of intent or a memorandum of understanding, 
may already constitute a binding sale and purchase agreement, event though the 
terms of merger or acquisition have not yet been fully negotiated. It is sometimes 
difficult to ascertain in an individual case whether binding sale and purchase 
obligations already exist if the essentials of the sale and purchase agreement 
(essentialia negotii) are already circumscribed in a form which, although 
characterised as preliminary, is nevertheless fairly detailed. Where an explicit “non-
binding clause” is absent, the tribunal will have to determine the parties’ intent based 
on the specific situation, circumstances, negotiations, purpose of the contract, and 
past communications of the parties
204
. 
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In a case decided by an ad-hoc arbitral tribunal under the UNCITRAL Rules
205
, the 
parties had acquired joint ownership of a company and entered into a shareholders’ 
agreement governing their relations. Subsequently, their working relationship 
deteriorated to such an extent that the parties explored the possibility of either one of 
them acquiring 100% of the shares in the company. They entered into negotiations 
and one party made a detailed valuation of the company. Based on this valuation, it 
offered, in a telephone conversation with the representative of the other party, to buy 
the remaining shares for a specified price. At the end of the conversation, both 
representatives had reached an agreement and various conditions and points 
discussed were to be confirmed by letter. The letter specifying the purchase in broad 
terms was sent and the parties subsequently resumed negotiations to implement the 
points set out therein. The parties exchanged various draft heads of agreement, but 
after several more meetings, the sellers (respondents) refused to sign the agreement; 
at this point, the buyers initiated arbitration proceedings to enforce the alleged 
agreement reached by the parties in their telephone conversation and subsequently 
confirmed by letter. The arbitral tribunal held that the confirmation letter constituted 
a valid share purchase agreement. The seller’s subsequent refusal to sign the full 
share purchase agreement was considered to be anticipatory breach of the obligations 
stated in the confirmation letter. Specific performance, i.e. the sale at the price stated, 
was ordered by the tribunal
206
.    
 
2) Conflicts arising out of Due Diligence 
 
The detailed and often complex negotiations between the parties are almost always 
accompanied by due diligence investigations with regard to legal, financial and other 
aspects of the target company, such as possible environmental liabilities. Once the 
future buyer has gathered the relevant information, typically by the seller making 
target company documents available for consultation by the buyer in a data room, a 
written due diligence report is then prepared. This forms the basis of further 
negotiations between the parties.  Generally, and ideally complete due diligence is 
performed before the signing of the purchase agreement. This permits the buyer to 
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assess all relevant economic and financial aspects of the target company and enables 
both parties to draft the appropriate representation and warranty provisions
207
. 
 
The outcome of any due diligence is critical to the parties’ further negotiations and 
generally has far-reaching consequences for the deal. The due diligence process 
therefore frequently gives rise to disputes. The most common area of controversy is 
the scope of the pre-contractual duties of disclosure of the seller. Questions that 
frequently come up concern the completeness of the information provided by the 
seller in the data room and the obligation of the seller to disclose sensitive 
information or certain difficulties at that early stage, without being expressly asked to 
do so by the buyer
208
. On the other hand, the seller might argue that the buyer 
conducted the due diligence only cursorily or not at all, the latter thereby having 
waived its right to notification of defects in the target company that it could have 
discovered in the data room
209
.  
 
A conflict may arise if the due diligence process which precedes the bidding is 
incomplete or favours one bidder over the other. A participating bidder may argue 
that it has incurred costs unlawfully caused by the seller
210
.  
 
Where the bidder in an auction procedure submits a lean mark-up of the share 
purchase agreement as part of its bidding offer in order to obtain exclusivity, a 
subsequent request for material changes of the contract may cause a dispute, e.g. the 
seller may no longer have the possibility to switch to another buyer
211
.  
 
 
C) Arbitration in Post-Signing: Disputes Arising From Merger or 
Purchase Agreements 
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The majority of M&A arbitrations occur after the parties have signed the merger or 
purchase agreement and closed the deal by the transfer of assets, that is “post 
M&A”212.  
 
Naturally, the question of the validity of an M&A agreement may also be a source of 
dispute, for example, arising from one party’s lack of power of attorney, missing 
approvals, unfulfilled  conditions precedent, exercise of rights to withdraw or formal 
objections. For instance, in the arbitration between Reteitalia Spa (Italy) and 
Lagardère SCA (France), the parties were at odds over whether a contract for the sale 
of shares in the French television channel, La Cinq, was void for legal impossibility. 
As a result of the acquisition, Reteitalia’s holding would have exceeded the 
maximum twenty-five per cent threshold permitted under the applicable French Law. 
The three-member arbitration panel dismissed Lagardère’s request for the 
recognition of an option in its favour to sell the shares because it concluded that the 
parties’ agreement was indeed invalid213.  
 
In the period between the signing of the agreement and its execution, however, 
disputes may arise if certain conditions have not been fulfilled or, for example, the 
buyer has negotiated for a force majeure clause and suddenly seeks to exit the 
deal
214
.  
 
According to Segesser the execution of most M&A agreements is subject to certain 
conditions, known as the “conditions to closing”. Typically these conditions are 
drafted as conditions precedent, with a suspensive effect, i.e. providing that the 
agreement will only become binding if and when a particular condition has been 
complied with. Before closing the share purchase agreement is in abeyance and the 
parties may not do anything that might prevent them from duly executing their 
obligations to consummate the agreed transaction
215
.  
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Conditions precedent to closing include
216
: 
 
- governmental, regulatory and similar authorisations,  permits,  concessions, 
etc.; 
- correctness of representations, warranties, guarantees; 
- no material adverse changes; 
- satisfaction with the due diligence process, in particular receipt of reports or 
letters from the accountants, consultants, professional advisors, etc.; and 
- receipt of required letters of consent, e.g., from licensors, the principle of a 
distributor relationship, banks, etc. 
 
Conflicts may arise in situations where it is not clear, whether or not a condition for 
closing has been met, which of the parties has the right to waive the fulfilment of the 
condition, or which party bears the risk if a condition precedent has not been met. If 
clauses have been drafted vaguely, a dispute can arise over the interpretation of 
broadly expressed terms
217
. 
 
In an ICC Arbitration, parties entered into a “promissory purchase agreement”, the 
closing of which was subject to a number of conditions precedent, including 
obtaining the necessary merger clearance from the EU Commission. The conditions 
precedent had to be satisfied by a certain date; otherwise the agreement would 
automatically expire. EU merger clearance was not obtained. The sellers argued that 
the buyers, in the purchase agreement, had assumed the risk of failure of obtaining 
clearance and, therefore, were legally obligated to proceed with and complete the 
intended transaction. Alternatively, if the purchase was not legally possible, the seller 
wished to claim compensation for the damages suffered due to the buyers’ 
insufficient diligence in their attempts to obtain the EU Merger clearance
218
.    
 
In another case, which was tried before a DIS arbitration tribunal, the share purchase 
agreement was subject to several conditions precedent, and especially to the 
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condition that if the buyers could not provide the sellers by an agreed date “with 
written, unconditional, and legally binding commitments for one or several banks to 
loan the Purchase Price to the buyer on the closing date”, they would have to pay 
DEM 20 million as compensation for the sellers’ willingness to stop auction 
proceedings and grant the buyers exclusivity in the negotiations. On the agreed date, 
the buyers submitted to the sellers a letter from their bank in which the bank declared 
its intention to support the intended acquisition by providing a credit facility to the 
buyers on the basis of an attached term sheet. The term sheet contained the 
conditions for the credit facility and the material terms of a credit agreement still to 
be concluded. The arbitral tribunal held that the buyers (respondents) had forfeited 
the contractual penalty of DEM 20 million, as they had not provided a written, 
unconditional, and legally binding commitment from a bank to lend the purchase 
price
219
.  
 
Conditions for closing may imply a contractual obligation for one of the parties; 
later, between signing and closing, the parties may disagree as to whether or not the 
obliged party has made all due efforts to have the condition fulfilled. In other 
situations, pre-closing conflicts can arise when one of the parties (usually the buyer) 
realises the implications of the intended transaction and, having undergone a change 
of mind with regard to the acquisition, “boycotts” the closing by not complying with 
its obligations or tries to find another way or rescinding the contract
220
. 
 
Closing conditions may include the obligation of the seller to provide the buyer with 
a financial statement as at the closing which is often used to definitively determine 
the purchase price. Other conditions precedents to be provided by the parties may 
include all necessary approvals by the corporate bodies and the delivery of 
documents such as environmental reports, auditors’ statements, etc221.  
 
1) Violation of Covenants 
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Generally non-violation of the post-signing covenants of the share purchase 
agreements is made a condition precedent to closing. These covenants usually deal 
with the seller’s business conduct from signing to closing and its compliance with 
obligations necessary for closing (such as timely filing with and notification of 
authorities), non-solicitation obligations, communication with employees, repayment 
of inter company financing, remuneration to executives, payment of interim-
dividends, etc
222
. 
 
2) No Material Adverse Changes 
 
Another important condition precedent in M&A Agreements is the “No Material 
Adverse Changes Clauses” (“MAC clauses”). These clauses provide the buyer with 
the possibility of rescinding the purchase agreement and of refusing the closing if a 
material adverse effect occurs that has a significant negative consequence for the 
target company
223
. A material adverse effect is sometimes described in purchase 
contracts as an event, fact, or issue, which gives rise to a material change in the 
financial conditions, assets, liabilities, or operational results of the company as a 
whole, that is so substantial and averse as to fundamentally impair the company’s 
value to the buyer
224
.  
 
In this clause, the seller represents that from a particular time on the company being 
sold and its subsidiaries have not suffered any changes which would result in a 
material adverse effect. The reference date is usually the end of the last financial year 
for which audited financial statements are available. The no material adverse change-
representation would thus cover the period from the financial year end up to closing. 
The material adverse change is defined as an occurrence or event having a substantial 
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negative impact on the business, assets, income or financial situation and, from time 
to time, prospects of the company and its subsidiaries. In some cases, the parties 
quantify the adverse change in terms of turnover or income or limit or extend the 
scope of the clause by defining more specifically or excluding certain causes for the 
material adverse effect
225
.  
 
If the parties do not quantify the negative impact, the arbitration panel is confronted 
with the necessity to interpret the contract. Certain guidance can be found in cases 
decided abroad. In those cases, the courts have rejected the applicability of the no 
material adverse change clause. They held that the change must be analysed from the 
long term perspective of a strategic investor. Accordingly, a short-term hiccup in 
earnings was not considered to suffice. However, when referring to those cases, one 
must bear in mind that the clause had a different function there, namely it would 
have allowed the buyer to abstain from consummating the transaction. In the context 
of a representation and warranty the interpretation might be different
226
.    
 
The no material adverse change clause is of great importance. It protects the buyer to 
a certain degree for a period of uncertainty, from the end of the last financial year for 
which audited financial statements exist up to closing
227
. 
 
In many M&A contracts, the no material adverse change clause has been transformed 
into a clause named “Absence of Certain Changes”. It is only stated that the business 
of the company and its subsidiaries has been conducted in the ordinary course of 
business consistent with past practices, and that there has been conduct in the 
ordinary course consistent with past practices, and that there has been no material 
adverse change, but rather certain specific events are singled out and listed, such as 
the absence of dividend payments and like payments, changes in the financial 
position (such as incurrence of new debt or security), the absence of material new 
commitments to employees, no change of accounting practice, etc. Accordingly, this 
clause is extensively debated in the process of negotiations. Given that this 
representation and warranty must also be true at the time of closing, it puts 
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considerable constraints on the seller in his running of the business from the time of 
signing up to closing. The exact definitions of the changes, therefore, vary from case 
to case
228
. 
 
MAC Clauses allocate the risk of an event that is beyond the control of the parties 
and are deployed between the signing and the closing. Their effect is thus similar to 
that of a force majeure clause
229
. 
 
In practice, the seller is often almost forced to make further concessions and reduce 
the purchase price if the buyer invokes the MAC clause, as it will have difficulty in 
finding another buyer willing to pay the originally envisaged price
230
.  
 
The question of whether an event, fact or issue is of such relevance that it has 
substantially negatively impaired the value of a target company, may give rise to 
disputes and, where it hinders the consummation of the transaction, may result in a 
damages claim
231
. 
 
If not directly addressed by MAC clauses, other issues may arise due to an 
unforeseen and material change of circumstances with a disruption of the contractual 
equilibrium providing a party with the remedies stemming from the clausula rebus 
sic stantibus rule
232
. 
 
In many situations, there is an inherent conflict surrounding the signing, with respect 
to the determination of the final purchase price and the due diligence. The seller 
wants to set a definite purchase price as early  in the process as possible, while the 
buyer’s intentions are to keep the determination open as long as possible and to 
                                                          
228
 Ibid.  
229
 Segesser, supra note 54, p. 28. 
230
 Ibid. 
231
 Ibid. Such disputes may be avoided or at least the risk that they end up in litigation may be mitigated 
by providing in detail what would constitutea relevant negative impact on the business of the target 
company (e.g. a  decrease of gross revenues of more than 30%) and provide an expert with the authority 
to make a determination thereon, quoted in footnote 30. 
232
 Ibid, p. 29. For instance due to a devaluation of a currency, a collapse of an economy; see in general 
Martin Burkhardt, Vertragsanpassungen bei veränderten Umständen in der Praxis des schweizerischen 
Privatrechts, Bamberg 1996.  
91 
 
obtain from the seller as much information as possible before a final agreement  is 
reached on the price
233
.  
 
Parties generally include a price adjustment clause if a due diligence is to take place 
after signing. Frequently, disputes on price adjustment clauses are due to a lack of 
clear descriptions of accounting methods, discrepancies in methods and concepts 
applied in asset and share deals, insufficient time allowed for compliance with 
certain obligations, or vagueness in the delimitation of accounting methods from 
legal methods
234
.  
 
3) Price Adjustment Arbitration 
 
Generally, and ideally, full due diligence is performed before contract signing in 
order to assess all relevant economic and financial aspects of the target company, and 
to draft the appropriate representation and warranty provisions. Finally, the ‘closing’ 
of the transaction takes place. This is normally the moment when the shares or title 
documents are delivered against payment. Thereafter, a closing balance sheet, or 
other reference factors, such as the target company’s earnings, will be established 
and serve as the basis for price adjustment
235
.  
 
Purchase agreements are generally lengthy and complex, drafted in the Anglo-Saxon 
style, comprising of many schedules and annexes. Reading may require some 
experience, as the deal’s specific provisions are often drowned in lengthy boilerplate 
language. Further M&A deals usually involve a host of contingent or ancillary 
contracts. The contract terminology is highly specific, including detailed financial 
and accounting concepts
236
.  
 
This thesis will focus on disputes where it is possible to use arbitration as a dispute 
resolution. According to W. Peter, one particular element makes the price adjustment 
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process potentially litigious: it is the open-ended nature of the agreement. As there is 
money to be gained, parties have an obvious incentive to construe the adjustment 
process in their favour, and in addition to use to the largest extent their policy 
influence in terms of accounting and management of the company, in order to 
achieve the most favourable result
237
.   
 
Price adjustment provisions can be divided into two main categories:  
 
a) Provisions dealing with the net asset value of the target company, which 
compare a closing balance sheet with a predefined earlier reference balance 
sheet, thus computing the difference of the net asset values between these 
two financial statements and adjusting the price accordingly.  
 
b) The price adjustment may be based on earn-out provisions based on the 
future turnover, gross margin, EBITDA, or EBIT. These provisions usually 
provide that a contractually defined portion of the purchase price will be 
determined by such future data, using a pre-established formula, 
respectively multiplier
238
.  
 
3-a) Reasons for price adjustment clauses  
 
It seems necessary to review the reasons for price adjustment clauses in order to 
clarify dispute resolutions on that matter.  
 
Purchase price adjustment provisions based on net asset value are included in 
acquisition agreements for a variety of reasons. There is, in particular the time lag 
between the execution of the purchase agreement and the closing, often due to 
competition law problems or tax considerations, or the necessity of obtaining consent 
from third parties or from the board of directors, not to speak of the need for 
confirmatory due diligence. A price adjustment provision mitigates the buyer’s risk 
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of suffering from the target company’s financial deterioration in the event that the 
seller should fail to manage the company efficiently until the closing of the 
transaction. Further, the balance sheet, on the basis of which the provisional purchase 
price is determined, is obviously drawn up well before closing and unless the target 
company is a static enterprise, there will invariably be changes by the time of 
closing
239
.   
 
Purchase price adjustment (earn-out) provisions based on future earnings of the 
company (which can be determined by EBITDA, EBIT, turnover, or gross margin) 
are inspired by a different philosophy. Essentially, the buyer wants to ensure that the 
company’s future income is in line with projections. If not, these earn-out provisions 
will adjust the provisional price accordingly, but this can obviously play in favour of 
either the seller or the buyer
240
.  
 
These two adjustment mechanisms rely on different financial data. Net asset value is 
calculated on the basis of the target company’s balance sheet, while earn-out 
provisions focus on the profit and loss account. This latter approach is considered, in 
economic terms, a more efficient method for determining the economic value of the 
target company
241
, but it creates uncertainties if the contractual reference period is 
long and is thus more vulnerable to attempts to manipulate the result by the buyer 
who controls the company. Therefore, more transactions rely on valuation based on 
net assets (also called net equity). Furthermore, in a net asset-based transaction a 
buyer will not ignore the issue of future earnings. On the contrary, it will certainly do 
its own estimate of future EBIT, and it will want to be comforted by the careful 
review during due diligence of the past earnings record of the company, and its own 
estimate may influence the net asset value negotiations
242
.  
 
3-b) Frequently Disputed Issues on Price Adjustments 
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Purchase agreements regularly state only a provisional price and, in addition, provide 
for “open-ended” adjustment mechanisms and procedures. By far the most common 
M&A disputes centre on earn-out provisions and purchase price adjustment 
calculations. Earn-out clauses provide for an additional purchase price that the seller 
will receive, based on the future earnings of the target over a stipulated period (earn-
out period). Such clauses may engender dissention between the parties when the 
future performance needs to be assessed objectively
243
. 
 
Typical issues concern the type of performance indicator that is to be taken into 
consideration or the seller’s contention that the buyer tried to “manipulate” earnings, 
for example, by changing the accounting policies or by altering the operations of the 
business after the purchase, making it difficult to prepare accurate earn-out 
calculations consistent with the terms of the agreement. In an international setting, 
the parties’ different cultural backgrounds and accounting or reporting practices may 
produce additional complications
244
.  
 
Similarly, purchase price adjustment clauses are litigious. Providing for a post-
closing mechanism to adjust the price based on a change in a specified benchmark, 
such as the net asset value of the target company, between the date of the financial 
statements, used to negotiate the purchase price, and the closing balance sheet, upon 
which the purchase price is ultimately determined
245
. The following two examples 
demonstrate the kind of complications that might originate from purchase price 
adjustment clauses.  
 
In an international arbitration administered by the Zurich Chamber of Commerce, the 
claimant company had sold its shares in the defendant company to the defendant and 
its holding company under a contract subject to German Law. The defendant then 
changed its Articles of Association and increased its share capital by issuing new 
shares to a third company. The arbitral tribunal, appointed to interpret the price 
increase clause included in the share purchase agreement, ruled that, although the 
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clause did not expressly cover the increase of the share capital, such increase – which 
was to be considered under Swiss Law – nevertheless constituted a betterment 
improvement that came within the scope of application of the price increase clause. 
Consequently, the arbitral tribunal ordered the defendants to pay the claimant 
additional amounts to the purchase price plus interest. The defendants’ motion to set 
the award aside was denied by the Swiss Federal Tribunal
246
. In the facts section of 
the decision the Federal Tribunal cites the definition of a price purchase adjustment 
clause (Besserungsabrede) used by the arbitral tribunal in its award: 
 
“…provision based on which the purchaser pays to the seller an (additional) 
purchase price depending on the occurrence of certain events after the 
closing of the purchase agreement for the acquisition of a company or shares 
in a company”.  
    
In the 2003 case from the United States, Richard Hoeft III v. MVL Group, Inc. et al, 
the parties had agreed that the seller could, after paying a portion of the price for the 
purchased stock until the following year, receive a purchase price adjustment if the 
value of the companies increased. The adjustment would be based on a calculation of 
EBITDA, which was defined in an amendment to the stock purchase agreement. The 
disagreement involved the proper treatment of certain one-time payments to 
employees (sale-related bonuses and stock option extinguishment costs) made in 
connection with a stock sale. The arbitrator, a certified accountant, found in favour of 
the seller and awarded damages accordingly. The District Court set the award aside 
on the ground that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in failing to calculate 
Primary Year EBITDA in accordance with the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). The United States Court of Appeals for the second Circuit, 
however, reversed and remanded that decision, upholding the principle of finality in 
the arbitral process
247
.    
 
Another important issue in the context of earn-out clauses and price adjustment 
calculation is the question as to whether any benefits or burdens of operating the 
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business during the period between the signing of the agreement and closing give rise 
to a claim for compensation between the buyer and the seller
248
.  
 
Earn-out clauses can give rise to disputes when they are not drafted in enough detail, 
for example as to which type of performance indicator is to be taken into 
consideration (EBIT or EBITDA?), what the reference period will be, which 
accounting principles should be used in a multi-jurisdictional transaction, or whether 
specifically defined GAAP of a particular reference country (for instance, UK 
GAAP, or French GAAP) will prevail under any circumstances over the seller’s past 
accounting practices
249
.   
 
A part earn-out clauses dispute arises when proceeding to establishing the closing 
balance sheet or the profit and loss account in order to adjust the price. Frequently 
disputed issues include
250
: 
 
- governing accounting rules and principles, 
- principle of continuity, in practice difficult and highly litigious, 
- materiality standards, 
- revenue recognition issues (at which point in time must the revenue be recorded? 
how to handle pre-invoicing?), 
- amortisation and depreciation issues, particularly inventory and receivables, 
- deferred income and expenses, 
- percentage of completion method in evaluating long-term projects, 
- consolidation issues, 
- impact of exchange rate fluctuations; and 
- basis of provisioning for litigation or contingencies 
 
However, disputes are clearly not confined purely to accounting and valuation 
questions, but are frequently legal in nature, as the following example shows. Where 
a seller wishes to obtain a certain minimum price level for the target company it can 
initiate a bidding procedure involving several potential buyers. According to the 
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experience of W. Peter, disputes where one of the bidders makes a high offer and 
secures the deal, although it does not wish or intend ultimately to pay the bid price. 
After closing, this buyer purports to obtain a substantial price adjustment by pointing 
out certain accounting practices of the seller which were in violation of applicable 
GAAP. This would normally lead to a price adjustment. However, if the auditors’ 
working papers reveal that this buyer had knowledge of these facts relied on to 
reduce the price prior to placing its bid, the buyer should be precluded from claiming 
a price reduction
251
.  
 
3-c) Expert Arbitration  
 
In M&A transactions, the contract frequently provides for an expert who, in the event 
of a price adjustment dispute, will determine the adjustment by reviewing the 
situation on the basis of a procedure and criteria generally defined in detail in the 
contract
252
.  
 
Most purchase or sale agreements, particularly in cross-border transactions
253
, 
contain valuation
254
 or purchase price adjustment clauses providing for a two-stage 
dispute resolution mechanism. At the expert determination system, if the parties 
cannot agree upon a valuation or the adjustment, an independent third party 
(forensic) accountant will be retained to determine the resolution of certain specific 
questions that are well circumscribed and generally fact-based
255
.   
 
Generally, expert determination (‘expertise arbitrale’; ‘Schiedsgutachten’) is the 
determination of a material fact by one or more expert(s), as opposed to the final 
resolve of the disputes as a whole, which is the role of an arbitral tribunal. In many 
jurisdictions, expert determination is not legally regulated. In order to ensure that the 
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function of such an expert is clearly distinguished from that of an arbitrator, the 
parties should put special care into spelling out the expert’s terms of reference; (since 
in assessing whether the parties’ intention was to resort to expert determination or 
arbitration proper, regard will be given to the contents of the agreement, i.e., for 
example, the tasks entrusted to the expert or arbitrator, rather than to the terminology 
to be used). Unless the contract provision is so ambiguous that it could be construed 
as an arbitration proper, an expert’s determination is not an arbitral award and 
consequently not subject to the New York Convention
256
. 
 
The accountant acts as an expert, not as an arbitrator, that is, he neither tries to 
achieve resolution of the dispute as a whole, nor does he render an award that could 
be enforced against an uncooperative party
257. However, the expert’s determination 
does bind the arbitral tribunal dealing with the same case, in the sense that, the latter 
will not have the right to revisit the factual outcome settled on by the expert
258
. 
 
On the second level, the arbitration stage, the dispute is resolved as a whole, in a 
binding legal determination, proceeding on the facts established by the expert
259
. In 
some cases, however, the arbitrators may have to determine the content and 
signification of a certain balance sheet item impacting upon an evaluation, before the 
expert can determine the correctness of a financial statement
260
.  
 
In addition, the arbitrators are frequently called upon to resolve disputes arising when 
one of the parties obstructs the expert determination process, for example, by 
appointing the expert or a new expert if the first has been challenged. As the 
determination of the expert is often crucial to the outcome of the dispute, the 
resolution of such preliminary issues is very important
261
.  
 
Under an agreement to merge American Medical Electronics, Inc. (AME) with 
Othello to form Orthofix, Inc., the determination of the amounts payable to the 
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shareholders pursuant to the contractually specified formulae was entrusted to a 
Review Committee, the decision of which would be final and binding. If the Review 
Committee was unable to agree by a majority decision on the correct pay-out, the 
matter could be submitted by the Committee to binding arbitration. The Review 
Committee decided that the appropriate pay-out was US $6million. As part of its 
decision, the Committee specified that its pay-out determination would be 
conditional upon submission to and approval by an arbitrator. An arbitrator was 
appointed and rendered a “consent award”, adopting the settlement in its entirety. 
Dissatisfied with the pay-out, AME shareholders filed a suit in Colorado against the 
Committee’s members and against Orthofix, asserting inter alia, claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty and breach of contract.  The AME shareholders also filed a motion in 
the Southern District of New York to vacate the award. The Colorado Case was 
transferred to United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and 
the proceedings were consolidated
262
. 
 
As seen carefully drafted of arbitration clauses is essential for identification of 
parties’ consent. Even if that parties drafted an arbitration clause identifying their 
consent in the end of the M&A phases; it is possible to be unsatisfied. As studied in 
the next chapter consolidation like in this example is not the best way in order 
resolute dispute. All the details of the case are not known, but there is an important 
question of how to consolidate court proceedings with another in case of existence of 
an arbitration clause. In this case what would be the effect of “consent award” by an 
arbitrator.   
 
Since expert determination and arbitration are often combined in a two-step (or 
parallel) dispute resolution mechanism
263
, disputes have been caused by the lack of 
definition of the scope of assignment at each level
264
. The following 2002 case from 
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the United States is a good example of the problems that may arise if the dispute 
resolution clause is not sufficiently clear
265
.  
 
The parties had entered into a share purchase agreement which provided that the 
“final share price” for the sale was to be determined by the company’s accountants, 
and specified that such determination “shall be final and binding on seller and buyer 
and shall not be subject to any appeal, arbitration, proceeding, adjustment or review 
of any nature whatsoever”. The agreement provided that all disputes arising under 
the agreement were to be resolved by arbitration. Following the accountants’ 
submission of a valuation substantially lower than the seller expected, the seller 
initiated arbitration seeking to invalidate the accountants’ determination. The buyer, 
in turn, sought to rescind the agreement and recover money already paid to the seller. 
The arbitral panel assumed jurisdiction and overturned the accountants’ 
determination as flawed
266
. 
 
The buyer brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York, seeking approval of the arbitral award in his favour. The court instead 
vacated the panel’s decision to overturn the accountant’s determination, holding that 
the parties had committed review of the valuation determination to the accountant 
under the purchase agreement and that the panel had exceeded its authority in 
reviewing that determination
267
. 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that 
questions of arbitrability are to be decided by the court where the parties’ purchase 
agreement contains both a broad arbitration clause and specific clauses assigning 
certain decisions to an independent accountant. The appellate court stated that 
arbitrators, rather than the courts, may resolve questions of arbitrability only if there 
is “clear and unmistakable” language to that effect in the arbitration agreement.  The 
Court explained that when a broadly worded arbitration clause committing all 
disputes to arbitration is coupled with a specific clause assigning certain 
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determinations to an independent  accountant, ambiguity exists that requires 
questions of arbitrability to be decided by a court
268
. 
 
In FAX (France) v. SL (Netherlands), which involved an acquisition of shares with a 
guaranteed value, an “audit arbitration” was followed by arbitration proceedings. The 
purchaser requested the ICC arbitral tribunal to hold that the accounts were wrong 
and to order the seller to pay damages for having breached the guarantee clause. The 
arbitral tribunal, however, first had to determine its competence in view of the “price 
adjustment procedure” (audit arbitration) and the arbitration agreement in the share 
purchase agreement. After interpretation of the provisions, the arbitral tribunal 
declared itself competent and that is was not bound by the audit arbitration
269
. 
 
While expert determination and arbitration may usefully interact in complex M&A 
related disputes, the combining of different alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms may not always be in the parties’ best interests. A multi-step system 
may indeed lock the parties up into a fixed program that results in the loss of 
valuable time and may even be the source of new disputes when the parties disagree 
on whether or not the “next step” has been reached270.  
 
In the majority of cases, the parties will first try to resolve their dispute through 
management negotiations, or even resort to mediation, before initiating binding 
arbitration proceedings. The preliminary mechanisms can always be agreed on ad 
hoc
271
. 
 
4) Representations and Warranties 
 
The clauses dealing with representations and warranties are the most debated clauses 
in an M&A transaction. This is so regardless of the applicable law, and regardless of 
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whether the shares of a company are bought (share deal), or transfer directly to the 
assets of a company (asset deal)
272
.  
 
Many post M&A arbitrations result from claims of the acquiring company based on 
contractual representations and warranties, that is, statements of the seller concerning 
the state of the target at the time of the execution of the acquisition agreement
273
. 
Many of these “snapshot” statements concern the correctness of the company’s 
financial statements, the absence of liabilities other than those reflected in its latest 
balance sheet, the seller’s title to the assets part of the sale and compliance with 
applicable laws
274
.  
 
According to Tschäni, representations and warranties in M&A contracts have 
become rather extensive. However, it is fair to say that the scope still varies 
depending on the governing law. Of the more important jurisdictions, representations 
and warranties in England and the United States have probably become the most 
elaborate and detailed. As a result of the considerable influence of the Anglo-
American practice, representations and warranties are generally laid out in much 
detail in M&A contracts. Frequently, the clauses containing representations and 
warranties are contained in the purchase agreement as such; they are also seldom 
listed in a specific exhibit of the contract
275
.  
 
The parties are at liberty to define the representations and warranties in the share 
purchase Agreement. Conceptually, representations and warranties relate to 
characteristics of the company and the business being sold. Technically, 
representations on the one hand and warranties, on the other, have to be 
distinguished. According to American sources, representations are statements of past 
or existing facts, while warranties are promises that existing or future facts are or will 
be true
276
. However, in practice the difference has proven unimportant. Under Swiss 
law the term “Representations” would most suitably be translated into 
“Zusicherungen”; while the term “Warranties” would be equivalent to 
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“Gewährleistungen” or “Garantien”. “Garantien” would rather amount of 
indemnities
277
. 
 
Indeed, representations and warranties must be distinguished from indemnities which 
are normally agreed upon separately. Indemnities are given in respect of future facts, 
regarding which the parties agree on the (financial) consequences. Thereof, on the 
other hand, representations and warranties (Gewährleistungen) relate to facts existing 
at the time of signing and/or closing. According to the Federal Supreme Court of 
Switzerland, representations and warranties may also relate to facts at a later time, 
provided that the seller is contractually obligated and in a position to bring about 
those facts
278
. If future facts warranted are beyond the influence of the seller, the 
representation and warranty must be deemed an indemnity; although indemnities 
sometimes also relate to present (known or assumed) facts, with the parties agreeing 
on which party shall bear the (negative) consequences that might arise from these 
facts. The exact definition will depend on the applicable law, but practically speaking 
indemnities are used where the parties agree that the consequence of a problem they 
have identified will be borne by the seller, regardless of the knowledge of the 
buyer
279
.   
 
Representations and warranties must further be distinguished from covenants, which 
define actions to be undertaken, or abstained from, by the parties in the future, i.e. 
from the time of signing or closing of the share purchase agreement
280
.  
 
According to Tschäni, the parties in an M&A deal agree that representations and 
warranties are given as of the time of signing and usually -at least in a qualified 
form- of closing. This means that the risk of the representations and warranties 
becoming untrue between signing and closing is borne by the seller
281
.  
 
Representations and warranties are ascribed to have three purposes. First, they 
constitute the starting point for due diligence. Second, they are the basis for any 
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claims the buyer might have after the transaction has been closed because a 
representation and warranty was not accurate. Third, the buyer might be entitled to 
refuse to close a transaction should it prove that the representations and warranties 
are no longer accurate at the time of closing, particularly if the accuracy of the 
representations and warranties is made a condition precedent to closing
282
.  
 
The seller is often asked to represent and warrant that the company is not in material 
breach of any applicable law, governmental permit or order, and has obtained all the 
material permits and authorizations to carry on its business as presently being 
conducted
283
. 
 
Given the recent tendency of governmental agencies to enforce compliance with 
laws, particularly in regulated areas, this is a representation and warranty which is 
becoming increasingly important. In light of this trend, it is becoming more difficult 
for a seller to refuse to give such a representation and warranty
284
. 
 
The clause needs to be interpreted as regards the term “material”. The parties 
sometimes agree that a breach of applicable law must amount to a material adverse 
change that they define and quantify. Otherwise, it will be up to the arbitrators to rule 
whether the breach is material. Depending on the case this might prove to be rather 
difficult. If the parties have agreed on a minimum threshold amount generally, does 
this mean that the breach has to be material (however defined) and then a claim is 
solely available if in addition the minimum threshold is met? The answer will depend 
on the particulars of the case. In some cases, the seller tries to restrict the clause by 
referring to this knowledge, with the argument that he cannot possibly be aware of 
breaches of any law. If accepted at all, the buyer will require that the knowledge of 
the management of the target company be attributed to the seller. Such an agreement 
will generally be valid
285
. 
 
One important source of disputes is vaguely, ambiguously or incompletely drafted 
representations and warranties, as the buyer may then more easily claim that the 
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seller is liable for breach of contract and/or (negligent) misrepresentation. On the 
other hand, the seller may ask that certain claims be excluded by making reference to 
independent assessment made by the purchaser and the knowledge gained in the due 
diligence process
286
. Further, representations and warranties are closely linked to the 
purchase price as they reflect the target’s guaranteed qualities. If any warranted 
qualities of the target turn out to be groundless, such as the existence of certain assets 
on the balance sheet, the purchaser will often claim an adjustment of the price. The 
following are two practical examples
287
.  
 
In a 1997 arbitration case before the Geneva Chamber of Commerce, the buyer, S. 
Compagnie S.A., found grave errors and gaps in the balance sheet of the target 
company S. Créations S.A.S. Compagnie S.A. argued that these misrepresentations 
had led to a substantive over-valuation of the share price and claimed the breach of 
contractual warranties entitling it to a reduction in the purchase price
288
.  
 
In another case, ICC arbitration in Switzerland, two companies had sold their entire 
stock in a company to the purchaser, who negotiated a reservation for a certain price 
adjustment. The parties agreed to place a part of the purchase price in an escrow 
deposit to secure certain representations and warranties. Subsequently, the purchaser 
conveyed parts of the receivables to a third company, which later filed a request for 
arbitration for price adjustment, based on general representations and warranties. In a 
partial award, the arbitral tribunal declared itself competent. The sellers challenged 
this award before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which denied its jurisdiction, holding 
that the partial award had not been rendered in an international arbitration in 
accordance with Articles 176 et seq. of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private 
International Law, but in a domestic arbitration and, thus, within the scope of 
application of the Swiss Intercantonal Concordat Regarding Arbitration of 27 March 
1969
289
.   
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4-a) Breaches of representations and warranties 
 
4-a-a) Duty to investigate 
 
Under Swiss law, the buyer has an immediate duty to investigate the business after 
closing failing which he will have no remedy for breaches that could have been 
detected in a customary examination. The holding of the Federal Supreme Court has 
been quite strict on this point, imposing a rather short time period on the buyer to 
investigate the company after closing. In M&A practice this has been found to be 
unpractical. Therefore, in a share purchase agreement governed by Swiss law the 
parties regularly waive the duty to investigate
290
.  
 
In one arbitration case, the purchase agreement provided that the buyer shall “as soon 
as reasonably possible” investigate the business. The agreement was subject to 
German law. The buyer carried out the investigation approximately one month after 
the closing. Due to a settlement the case did not have to be decided, but the arbitral 
tribunal was leaning towards assuming that the one month period would have been 
sufficient to meet the requirement “as soon as reasonably possible”. Ultimately, this 
is a question of interpretation, taking into account all circumstances
291
.  
 
4-a-b) Duty to Object 
 
If a breach has been discovered, the buyer has the duty to report the breach to the 
seller. This is an area regulated in the contract in detail. The parties agree that the 
buyer reports the breach within a certain defined period (30/90 Business days) after 
detection. Alternatively, they agree that the duty to object is sufficiently fulfilled if 
the objection occurs within certain time period after the representations and 
warranties have lapsed, regardless of the time when the breach was detected. 
Frequently, the parties agree that the claim for a breach of representation is forfeited, 
if the duty to object has not been fulfilled. Increasingly, however, the parties concur 
that the claim is not forfeited, but that the buyer must bear the consequences of his 
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late notification (such as, for instance, increased costs), which seems in general more 
appropriate
292
. 
 
In the case mentioned above the buyer had to meet a 45 days notice period following 
discovery. Obviously, the day on which the period starts to run is not easy to 
determine. It would appear that it can only start to run from the time that the buyer 
has sufficient knowledge of the facts and circumstances to come to the conclusion 
that there was a breach. Namely, knowledge which would enable him to give an 
explanation of the facts and circumstances in the notice, as required by the provisions 
of the purchase contract. A further question arose from the fact that the parties had 
not spelt out what the consequences were if the duty to give notice had not been 
complied with. Either, the meaning must have been that any claims are forfeited as a 
result, or that the buyer could not claim for damage caused by the late notice. In the 
case at hand the arbitral tribunal would probably have denied forfeiture
293
.  
 
To prepare for possible arbitration cases, it is important for the parties to establish 
what the knowledge has been at the time they entered into the transaction. In one 
case, the purchase agreement provided that the buyer shall have no remedy if he or 
any of his advisors, prior to signing date, had accrual knowledge of the breach, 
because the breach became “obviously and doubtlessly apparent at first sight from 
the documents provided to the buyer”. This is a relatively rigid standard to meet. In 
this case, the arbitral tribunal had to review the documents and to come to a 
conclusion whether the breach had become apparent as contractually stipulated. For 
instance, is it sufficiently disclosed that the IT system needs a re-haul if the budget 
lists investments for a new server? The arbitral tribunal tended towards denying the 
question. The circumstances play a certain role, namely, how voluminous the 
documents were, how much time was granted to review them, whether the buyer was 
a commercial party familiar with due diligence, etc
294
. 
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In another case, the buyer claimed that the seller had breached the representation  
that the total net inventory value as reflected on the company’s financial statements, 
was not higher than the lower of the cost or market value. The seller had agreed that 
no investigation by the purchaser shall prevent the purchaser from claiming under the 
representations and warranties, except for matters which were disclosed in the 
documents listed on the schedules and exhibits to the share purchase agreement. The 
buyer objected and asserted that the respective representation and warranty obligated 
the seller to make up the difference between the accounted value of the inventory and 
the actual value
295
. 
 
4-b) Consequences of breaches of Representations and 
Warranties 
 
It is not surprising that parties address the consequences of a breach of a 
representation and warranty in the share purchase agreement in detail. The clauses 
dealing with indemnification in agreements subject to US or English law are more 
detailed and elaborate as compared to contracts subject to Swiss Law. They usually 
list the various items for which the seller will be liable; such as, damage, loss, 
liability and expenses and sometimes diminutions in value, and also reasonable 
expenses for investigation and attorney’s fees and expenses. The indemnification is 
owed not only to the buyer, but also to the target company and it’s subsidiary 
companies. Furthermore, the seller is held liable generally for breaches of covenants 
or agreements made or to be performed by the seller pursuant to the share purchase 
agreement, in addition to breaches of representations and warranties. Despite the 
more detailed indemnification language, the unpredictability of claims in case of 
breach is equally deplored, as for share purchase agreements, under Swiss Law
296
.          
 
5) Third- Party Claims 
 
In practically all M&A contracts it is specifically addressed of a third party 
(including authorities) bringing a claim against the target company after closing date 
which claim, if successful, is likely to qualify for a claim of the buyer against the 
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seller for breach of representations and warranties. In this case, the buyer has to 
notify the seller of a third-party claim. The purchaser or the target company has the 
right to defend the claim, while the seller is consulted and assists in the defence. The 
parties agree on who may appoint counsel defending the claim. Subject to certain 
conditions, the seller might be accorded the right to take over the defence of the 
claim altogether. Furthermore, the parties allocate the costs and agree on the 
requirements for a settlement with the third party
297
. 
 
More generally, the issue at stake is who should have control over third-party 
litigation. Depending on the situation the clause in the share purchase agreement on 
this point may vary. 
 
Third-party claims might pose difficult questions for the purchaser. To be able to 
claim from the seller, the buyer might have to bring an action at an early stage in 
order to meet the term of the representation and warranty which is allegedly 
breached. In many cases, the third-party claim at that time is not precise enough and 
also the third-party claim needs to be adjudicated first. In such cases, the buyer may 
have to apply for a stay of proceedings by the tribunal until the court has ruled on the 
third party-claim
298
.   
 
6) Claims for Non-performance or Fundamental Error 
 
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court held that apart from the Gewährleistungsklagen 
other remedies are available if the respective requirements are met. Those remedies 
concern claims for non-performance (Erfüllungsklage) and fundamental error 
(Grundlagenirrtum)
299
.  
 
In many cases the parties agree that the remedies set forth in the share purchase 
agreement are to be exclusive. From time to time the parties even explicitly exclude 
the right of the buyer to rescind the share purchase agreement. For lack of a court 
precedent, it is not entirely certain whether such exclusion is valid in respect of a 
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claim for fundamental error. Against this background, it is not astonishing that in 
most arbitration under Swiss Law, the buyer will not only claim for a breach of 
representations and warranties, but he will also base his claim on the theory that there 
has been a fundamental error. Depending on the particulars of the case, especially 
when the term of the representations and warranties has lapsed, the remedy for 
fundamental error might even be the only possible basis on which the buyer may 
proceed against the seller. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland has held that, 
indeed, the buyer may “partly rescind” share purchases, this effectively results in a 
reduction of the purchase price
300
.   
 
The effect of this practice can be illustrated by two cases shortly described below: 
 
In one case, the term for bringing a claim for breach of representations and 
warranties had lapsed. The buyer, therefore, brought a claim on the theory of 
fundamental error alleging that, in determining the purchase price, he was relying on 
financial data, in particular on the EBITDA, and a certain amount of liquidity not 
needed for operating purposes. According to the buyer, those facts and assumptions 
proved to be wrong. The buyer, therefore, claimed a reduction of the purchase price 
using his formula for calculating the purchase price. The seller alleged that the 
purchase price had been arrived at regardless of the EBITDA and the liquidity. In 
fact, a representation regarding the income statement of the on-going year and 
regarding the liquidity had explicitly been refused
301
.  
 
In another case, the transaction was preceded by an auction procedure. In his bid 
letters, the buyer indicated that he was calculating the purchase price on the basis of 
the DFC method. For this purpose, he allegedly relied on indications contained in an 
information memorandum, particularly on the EBITDA and CAPEX forecasts for the 
running year. Those forecasts ultimately proved to be wrong by some margin. On the 
other hand, the EBITDA and CAPEX final figures were not represented and 
warranted in the purchase agreement. The purchase agreement also contained a 
statement  that no further representations and warranties were given  and that the 
seller expressly disclaimed any representation regarding future business 
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development, profits and business plans of the target company and its subsidiaries. 
The parties had further agreed that the share purchase agreement shall supersede the 
information memorandum and the bid letters as well as any other prior agreement
302
.  
 
By correcting the EBITDA and CAPEX and inserting the corrected figures into his 
formula the buyer arrived at the amount of CHF 81 million, which was the difference 
between the actual purchase price paid and the purchase price calculated on the basis 
of the corrected parameters
303
.  
 
Alternatively (in the case that the main claim for CHF 81 million would be 
dismissed), the buyer claimed some CHF 45 million arguing that a number of 
representations and warranties had been breached. In other words, the buyer brought 
the action based on fundamental error because this would have translated into a 
higher amount as compared to the breaches of the representations and warranties
304
.  
 
An error is deemed to be fundamental if based on circumstances where the party in 
error would not have entered into the contract at all, or only on different terms, if that 
party had known the true facts. The error must relate to a set of facts which the party 
in error could take as the necessary basis for the contract, pursuant to the principle of 
good faith in commercial transactions. Not only a subjective but also an objective 
test is applied to determine whether the requirement is met
305
.  
 
Particularly in international M&A transactions between sophisticated parties, the 
non-exclusivity of the contractual remedy has been questioned. When the claim has 
lapsed because the representations and warranties have expired, it is considered 
inadequate to give the buyer an additional remedy. It is argued that for breaches of 
representations and warranties the parties have defined the term, and in most cases 
have stated that the breach once detected has to be notified within a defined period 
(30/90 business days). In such cases it is viewed to be inappropriate that the buyer, 
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after having detected a fundamental error, be free to wait for a year before he notifies 
the seller, and still be able to claim for fundamental error
306
.     
 
7) Put and Sale Options  
 
Another area that is fertile for post-transaction disputes is put and sales options. It 
does not appear in chronological phases of M&A transactions in the thesis but 
disputes generally revolve around the issue of whether or not an option has been 
triggered. The following three cases underline the practical importance of arbitration 
in this respect
307
.  
 
In the first case, the Dutch retailer Ahold had recently announced that it had received 
a decision from a Swedish arbitration tribunal regarding the premium which was part 
of the price of a put option exercised by the Norwegian entity Canica AS for 
Canica’s twenty per cent stake in the Scandinavian joint venture ICA AB. According 
to the shareholders’ agreement, between Ahold, Canica and the third joint venture 
partner, ICA Fürbundet Invest AB, Ahold was obliged to buy the shares offered by 
Canica. The arbitration tribunal rejected the challenges made by Canicato concerning 
the premium rate, and established the rate at 49.56 per cent, which corresponded to 
the outcome of the valuation made earlier by the valuation expert engaged by the 
partners in ICA AB
308
. 
 
In another arbitration between IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd. (Bermuda) and 
LV Finance Group Ltd. (British Virgin Islands), the ICC arbitrators ordered LV 
Finance Group Ltd. to honour one of two stock option agreements and transfer the 
promised 25.1 per cent of the shares in the Russian mobile telephone operator, OAO 
MegaFon, to IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd. The panel in Geneva found that 
IPOC had “validly exercised sale to another company309. The Swiss Federal Tribunal 
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dismissed LV Finance’s motion to have the award set aside310.A second arbitration 
has been initiated regarding the second option agreement
311
.   
 
In the Canadian arbitration case Agrifoods International Cooperative Ltd. v. (1) 
Agropur, Coopérative Agro-Alimentaire and (2) Ultimas Foods Inc. Aliments Ultima 
Inc., the shareholders’ agreement contained a share purchase option. The Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice granted an injunction enjoining a shareholder from 
exercising the purchase option pending arbitration proceedings on the validity of the 
sale and the occurrence of a trigger event provided for in the shareholders’ 
agreement. The court enjoined the application of the relevant section of the 
shareholders’ agreement until the fifth day after the decision of the arbitration panel 
became final
312
.  
 
In a published ICC arbitration case decided in March 1998, the situation was as 
follows: two parties, both shareholders of the same company, had concluded a 
shareholders’ agreement providing for a buy/sell mechanism as a means of 
dissolving their relationship, should either of them wish to cease their partnership. 
The parties interpreted differently statements made in applying this mechanism. The 
claimant alleged that the defendant had sold all its shares, and the defendant took the 
position that it had bought the claimant’s share. The Defendant further claimed that 
some of the provisions of the shareholders’ agreement were null and void, or had 
been fraudulently engineered, or performed in bad faith, or violated by the claimant. 
The tribunal had to decide on a request for interim or conservatory measures
313
. 
 
As seen in these arbitration cases summarized by Von Segesser, there is no unique 
way of resolution. The complexity of M&A arbitration is reflected in many different 
ways depending on the consent of parties. ICC Case pay attention to the 
interpretation of statement by the parties, however in other cases, arbitral and 
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national tribunals pay more attention to the concrete findings. Therefore the author 
believes that it is necessary to analyse particular aspects of M&A arbitrations. 
 
D)  Particular Aspects of M&A Transactions Related Arbitrations 
 
A number of procedural problems have frequently arisen in the context of M&A 
arbitrations. For instance: validity of an arbitration clause, scope of arbitration 
clause, applicable law, expedited procedure, interim relief, damages etc.
314
. 
However, it is especially focused on multi-party and multi-contract M&A 
arbitrations.  
 
D-1) Multi-party and Multi-Contract Disputes 
 
M&A related arbitrations often arise out of multi-party situations or multi-contract 
structures, especially on the purchaser’s side315. This creates problems regarding the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal, namely, in view of equal participation, that is, 
each party’s right to appoint its “own” arbitrator. 
 
To take account of the well-known 1992 Dutco decision of the French Cour de 
Cassation, according to which it was against public policy to force multiple 
defendants to jointly appoint an arbitrator
316
, the rules of most modern arbitration 
institutions, such as the ICC
317
 and the LCIA
318
, today provide for adequate solutions 
to solve this practical problem, consistent with the principle of equal treatment of the 
parties
319
. In transactions involving several parties and/or multiple contracts, it may, 
therefore, be sufficient to insert the model clauses of such institutions into 
agreements.  
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Another important question is whether the parties agree to consolidate parallel 
proceedings in order to prevent contradictory decisions from being rendered
320
. 
 
D-2) Extension of Arbitration Agreements to Third Parties 
 
Lawyers dealing with M&A arbitrations are frequently confronted with the issue of 
extension of the proceedings to third parties who have not signed the arbitration 
agreement. This is particularly an issue in situations with group company structures 
and transactions
321
. As there is a multitude of possible situations, the rules of national 
and international arbitration institutions, unlike in the case of multi-party disputes, 
rarely provide any guidance. On the one hand, an extension to non-signatories may 
take place by virtue of a number of legal theories, such as legal succession, or 
through letters of comfort
322
. However, as many arbitral tribunals are rather reluctant 
to extend the arbitration to third parties on these grounds, it is advisable to provide 
clearly what parties are bound by the arbitration agreement and to let them all sign
323
. 
 
A controversial issue is whether an arbitration agreement can be extended to other 
companies within the same group
324. According to the “group of companies 
doctrine”, developed in the famous French case Dow Chemical firms et al. v. Isover 
Saint-gobain, the “corporate veil” can be “pierced” if the other group company325:  
 
a) Actively participated in the execution or termination of the agreement; 
 b) can be regarded as the “actual” party o the agreement; and 
 c) has its own peculiar economic interest in the contract. 
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In other European countries, however, such as Switzerland and Germany, this 
doctrine has been rejected by both courts and doctrine for being inconsistent with the 
parties’ intention and the principle of privity of contract326.   
 
It is certain that the intent of the parties is essential in order to deal in multi-party 
arbitrations. Therefore, it will be necessary to draft clear, complete arbitration 
clauses in the context of multiparty M&A disputes. The court-tested model clauses of 
the more reputable arbitration institutions have proved themselves in the majority of 
cases, despite the fact that they rarely include a provision for multi-party disputes. 
Selecting such a clause will make it unnecessary to draft lengthy provisions and 
provide a degree of security to the parties. The parties and arbitrators can still tailor 
the procedure to their needs once it is underway
327
.  
 
On the other hand, all arbitration clauses, including model clauses, should be drafted 
with close cooperation between the transaction and the arbitration lawyers to make 
sure that they “fit” the specific dynamics of specific deals. A particularly important 
issue is the clear separation of scope between letter of intent and share purchase 
agreement. In other words, it is possible to generate the question if the arbitration 
clauses and/or agreements are different in every phase how will the arbitrators deal 
with this complexity? Is it always possible to invoke parties’ intent for a solution in 
multi contract M&A arbitrations? 
 
 
E) Conclusion of Chapter II 
 
 
In further analysis of the phases of M&A transactions and the disputes resulting 
therefrom, the conclusion can be drawn that arbitration is an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism in M&A at every stage of a transaction. M&A arbitration 
benefits from features that make it an attractive alternative to court litigation, despite 
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certain procedural particularities and pitfalls to look out for when drafting arbitration 
clauses.  
 
The initial key to resolving the disputes with arbitration is the careful drafting of an 
effective arbitration agreement, preferably and necessarily to be done jointly by the 
transaction and the arbitration lawyers, or to consider the choice of a model clause of 
a well-known arbitration institution. However, often in practice, a tailored arbitration 
clause is required in M&A transactions as the complex and intricate nature often 
demand customised specifications.  
 
The need for well-drafted arbitration clauses is well displayed when one considers 
the brevity of the subject matter of this chapter. In continuation of the analysis 
initiated in Chapter One, arbitration can arise in the pre-signing phases of an M&A 
transaction. Particularly, the phase of the letter of intent, which reinforces the point 
of the author’s proposed guideline, can create binding obligations between the 
parties.  
 
M&A arbitration must also be concerned with post-signing disputes, such as 
violation of the covenants, and material adverse changes. Most frequently problems 
arise concerning representations and warranties, non performance, fundamental error, 
and especially, price adjustment. Price adjustments, as explained above, often 
involves appointment of an expert to determine the appropriate price adjustment, 
which can lead to disputes. The use of such experts being common, it is later 
discussed in Chapter Four, how such experts interact in M&A arbitration, and the 
possibilities of multi-step dispute resolution are explored. 
 
The discussion of the various problems grounded at different stages of the 
transaction in M&A arbitration in this chapter provides the basis for detailed and 
focused discussion in the forthcoming chapters on the coordination and cooperation 
of arbitration, parallel proceedings during M&A Transactions and the problem of 
consent. From examining the interface of arbitration with the M&A transaction, 
analysis can develop into the risks presented by multiple and parallel proceeding, and 
beyond to examining methods to overcome these issues.  
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Furthermore, current discussions by institutions or practitioners lack the quantity and 
depth needed in order to resolve the complexity of M&A arbitration, especially in 
terms of “consent”. There are no rules in any national or international institutions 
regulating consent problems. In discussion of multi-party, multi-contract, and third 
party issues, it has been deduced that the rules concerning multi-party or multi-
contract issues are not sufficient in providing a clear idea of whether M&A 
arbitration is an example of multi-contract or multi-party arbitration. As outlined 
above, inserting model clauses is the best way to deal with multi-party or multi-
contract arbitrations, however, there are no model clauses of an institution for M&A 
arbitrations, because there is no standardisation of M&A arbitration. 
 
Thus the working hypothesis’ fourth question is partially answered by the second 
chapter’s findings, insofar that M&A arbitrations cannot be typical examples of 
multi-party or multi-contract disputes, given the absence of guidance or 
standardisation on the matter by arbitration institutions. Subsequent chapters will 
therefore address how consolidation may be applied to related disputes in M&A 
arbitration.  
 
To rectify the deficit in guidance or standardisation, the author would not propose 
law reform given the plethora of existing arbitration laws and rules, but rather 
respected specific non-binding rules for M&A arbitrations, which are necessary at 
least for arbitration institutions to inject additional guidelines to M&A arbitrations. 
The author agrees that careful drafting of arbitration clauses or agreements is very 
important and particularly recommends the practice. Specific guidelines, however, 
may also be necessary to standardise the dispute resolution method in order to 
decrease the complexity of M&A arbitration. While proposing this method, the 
author is wary of how to standardise. Standardisation should not be applied insofar 
that provisions appear as institution rules. The flexible and non-binding approach of 
guidelines for M&A arbitration, rather that codification in the rules of institutions, 
has been shown to be effective by the IBA Rules concerning the gathering of 
evidence in Arbitration, which are not mandatory, but persuasive in assisting the 
parties. 
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The author finds this the most pragmatic approach, appreciating that it is not easy to 
standardise M&A arbitration with mandatory rules, because “consent” should not be 
regulated in a rule. Nonetheless, the author believes that guidelines are necessary for 
M&A arbitration. Research reveals there has not been any guidance from arbitration 
institutions on the coordination of arbitration clauses in M&A transactions, or the 
extension of arbitration clauses to third parties who do not sign the arbitration 
agreement; thus, the existing rules are not suitable for M&A arbitration. As shown, 
the M&A process is more complex than the problem of multi-party or multi-contract 
issues.  This will also be discussed further in chapter three. 
 
Simply, M&A arbitrations are different than multi-party and multi-contract 
arbitrations, in this author’s opinion. Therefore, the current rules and discussions are 
inadequate for the complexity of M&A arbitration, which necessitates the creation of 
some guidelines specific to M&A arbitrations.  
 
In introducing and contextualising the subject matter of the thesis, Chapters One and 
Two have raised significant issues, which by themselves would warrant further 
study. Benefitting from the necessary background of the examination of the M&A 
process, disputes arising therefrom and the issues faced by arbitration as a means to 
resolve those disputes, the thesis accelerates into it’s second part.  
 
During Part two, the thesis focuses on challenges and practical solutions to M&A 
arbitrations. To obtain further insight, it is necessary for Chapter Three to overview 
the cooperation and coordination of arbitral proceedings between different phases of 
M&A transactions. Chapter Four develops on such problems arising in the 
cooperation and coordination, or synergy, specifically on how they have been 
resolved by multi-step processes.  
 
The term “consent” will be the main actor throughout this complex overview M&A 
arbitrations, not only concerning the consolidation process, but also when examining 
the successive effects of M&A transactions. Therefore, Chapter Five focuses 
specifically on the term “consent” and addresses the related issues, before summation 
of matters in the Conclusion. 
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PART II : CHALLENGES AND PRACTICAL 
SOLUTIONS 
 
 
 
The second part of the thesis discusses the potential risks of multiple and/or parallel 
proceedings in different phases of merger and acquisition transactions and the 
possible solutions which can be provided.  
 
With regard to M&A transactions, two solutions of different aspects of these risks 
are examined in particular: the first, the consolidation of parallel proceedings and 
consolidation of arbitration clauses in merger and acquisition transactions (Chapter 
III); second multi-step processes in M&A transactions (Chapter IV) and Issues of 
Consent in M&A Arbitration (Chapter V).  
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CHAPTER III : COOPERATION AND COORDINATION OF 
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 
 
 
A) Introduction 
 
In this chapter, research will ascertain whether M&A arbitrations consistently form 
typical examples of multi-contract issues. In multi-contract cases, if there are 
different arbitration clauses or agreements, it is remarked that national laws and 
institutional rules provide only for “consolidation” of arbitration proceedings as a 
solution. 
 
In reviewing institutional rules and given the lack of regulation of M&A arbitration, 
analysis in confined to rules on multi-contract issues. These regulations require 
“connection” between the contracts, however, a definition of “connection” is lacking 
across institutional rules.    
 
In cases where agreements provide for different dispute resolution means such as 
arbitration and court proceedings in different phases of M&A transactions, it should 
be taken into consideration whether they are from the same dispute or from related 
disputes. In both instances, the problems of parallel proceedings may occur, and 
where parallel proceedings concern the same dispute, mechanisms of lis pendens or 
res judicata are often used.  
 
The principle of party autonomy imposes that any consolidation necessarily depends 
on the agreement of all parties involved. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the 
intent of the parties. There are many ways of doing this. For instance, the scope of 
arbitration clauses is studied in this chapter. In addition, the “group of contracts” 
doctrine is also examined. However, these methods are not sufficient in order to 
coordinate parallel proceedings in M&A transaction. On the other hand, it is 
mandatory to take into consideration the interdependence of agreements, and for 
interdependence, there should be some binding methods for interrelation between 
different phases of M&A transaction. In order to implement this, some guidelines 
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specially tailored for M&A arbitration would be needed, because, existing rules for 
multi-contract disputes and consolidation rules are not sufficient for M&A 
arbitration. 
 
The chapter will initially focuses on the scope of application of arbitration clauses in 
order to later determine issues which arise concerning multiple contracts and/or 
proceedings.  
 
 
B) The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in M&A Transactions 
 
Once the parties’ consent to arbitrate has been established, the arbitration agreement 
is deemed to cover all disputes between the parties, provided that they are arbitrable 
and originate from the relationship referred to by the arbitration agreement
328
. Most 
jurisdictions with a substantial arbitration practice assume that parties opting for 
arbitration wish the arbitral tribunal to have an all-embracing jurisdiction
329
. 
 
When interpreting the scope of an arbitration agreement, it will often be necessary to 
consider the applicable law, including the proper approaches to interpretation. It has 
long been recognized that under the doctrine of separability, an arbitration agreement 
may have a different applicable law to the balance of any contract within which it is 
found
330
. Mark Blessing has noted nine possible laws that could apply in such 
circumstances
331
. Some scholars suggest that the normal position is to apply the lex 
arbitri. This might be justified on the basis that this is the law expressly referred to in 
Art. V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, in the context of one of the discretionary 
bases for refusing enforcement. Another possible justification is that the place most 
closely connected to an agreement to arbitrate would be the seat of arbitration, where 
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such a closest-connection to conflicts rule is seen as most applicable. Others, such as 
Lew, Mistelis and Kröll332, and Redfern and Hunter333, suggest that the law 
governing the subject matter might best apply, an option provided for by Art. 178 (2) 
of the Swiss Statute on Private International Law
334
. 
 
In M&A transactions where conflicts may occur during different phases of the 
transaction and may consequently relate to different agreements or documents (letter 
of intent, pre-contract, final agreement), depending on the wording of the clause 
questions with respect to the scope of arbitration clause may arise. One issue may be 
whether the arbitration agreement also applies to pre-contractual liabilities, such as 
damages for culpa in contrahendo
335
. Attention must therefore be paid to the careful 
drafting of the arbitration clause to cover all aspects, from the very first moment the 
M&A transaction process started through to its completion
336
. If several documents 
contain arbitration clauses, they should be coordinated, or consolidated, so as not to 
be in conflict with one another. Earlier clauses should be replaced by subsequent 
ones with an extended scope. Where the M&A agreement contains an “Entire-
Agreement Clause”, the arbitration clause must be drafted carefully to compromise 
all possible disputes relating to the transaction
337
.   
 
Moreover, it is not uncommon that the parties’ consent establishes different dispute 
resolution mechanisms in different phases of M&A transaction. The subject gives 
rise to significant theoretical and practical questions arising at the stage of 
commencement of arbitration procedure: 
 
If there are different proceedings concerning the same dispute, which means of 
dispute resolution will be applied or prevailed? 
 
What are the risks of multiple or parallel proceedings? 
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How the doctrine of “consolidation” can be applied depending on the related disputes 
in M&A Arbitrations? 
 
It is the author’s intention to deal first with the risks of multiple and/or parallel 
proceedings in different phases (letter of intent, final agreement) of M&A 
transactions that were clarified in the second chapter. 
 
C) Multiple Proceedings and Parallel Proceedings in M&A Transactions 
 
For more than 30 years, arbitral practice has witnessed the development of complex 
arbitrations, as well as the specific procedural difficulties inherent thereto. A great 
source of such problems can be found in the large number of interrelated agreements 
involved in the performance of major projects, namely in the engineering, 
construction, raw materials, mining and oil sectors
338
. In the ICC Arbitration 
handbook this list is extended with M&A Arbitrations under the name of 
shareholder’s agreement339. These complex contractual relationships may give rise to 
parallel arbitrations, and to situations in which the unity of the arbitral proceedings 
may be affected by the multiplicity of issues, agreements, or parties involved in a 
certain dispute
340
.  
 
As these situations have become very frequent in today’s business world, various 
authors have proposed solutions to the difficulties. While some plead for compulsory 
consolidation or parallel arbitral proceedings by court order, others seek for these 
procedural questions to be governed by institutional and national rules regarding 
international arbitration. But there is no general consensus about the best way to 
handle procedural problems regarding complex arbitrations
341
, and especially in the 
context of M&A transactions.  
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It is rather astonishing to observe that most of the literature about complex arbitration 
addresses multi-party arbitration, whereas the situation of parallel proceedings in 
multi-contract arbitrations involving two parties only a situation much simpler than 
multi-party arbitration and which has become very frequent seems to have been 
ignored by doctrine
342
.  
 
Taking into account the place that authors have dedicated to this hypothesis and the 
fact that multi-contract situations involving two parties only have been put into the 
same basket as multi-party arbitrations, one may be tempted to consider that the 
same conclusion which has been drawn up for multi-party arbitration should be 
applied to bi-party arbitrations. Actually, some solutions proposed for the former can 
be applied to the latter, but these solutions are not totally transposable, as two-party 
arbitrations give rise to very specific problems and present neither the same degree of 
complexity nor the same difficulties as multi-party arbitrations
343
. 
 
As a matter of fact, it appears that joinder of interrelated agreements, is a very useful 
procedural rule, which could easily be transposed to multi-contract arbitrations 
involving two parties only
344
. Although multi-contract situations may involve two or 
more parties, this chapter deals with multiple and parallel proceedings in M&A 
transactions involving two parties which require the joinder of parallel arbitral 
proceedings. However it will be seen that M&A Arbitration involving multiple 
contracts has many examples with more than two parties. Therefore, examples of 
multi-party will be given where necessary.  
 
C-1) Terminology 
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C-1-1) Multi-Contract and “Group of Contracts” Doctrine in M&A 
Transactions 
 
In the international business world, a contractual relationship between two or more 
parties may involve a multi-contract situation. It includes not only group of contracts 
and (that is, contracts which, although formally independent, are part of a single 
transaction or operation), but also cases where there are several agreements, having 
no connection with each other, between the same parties
345
. Therefore, it seems that 
the utilisation of the “group of contracts doctrine” seems more appropriate for M&A 
transactions, because it is considered that each of the phases are related to each other.  
 
According to the classic theory of contract, each individual agreement within a group 
of contracts is completely independent from the others. If there is no formal link 
between agreements, each of them is considered to be an extrinsic fact regarding the 
others. However, this traditional notion does not correspond to current contractual 
practice
346
.   
 
Furthermore, Prof. Hanotiau makes a clear distinction between groups of companies 
and groups of contracts and he mentions that:  
 
“a clear methodological distinction should be, and is not often, made 
between, on the one hand, the issues arising from the circumstances in 
which the project at the center of the dispute has been negotiated and 
performed by one or more companies that belong to a group, some of which 
are not signatories to the arbitration clause, and on the other hand, the issues 
arising from the fact that the dispute involves or concerns a variety of 
problems originating from, or in connection with, two or more agreements 
entered into the by the same and/or different parties and which do not all 
contain the same (or at least compatible) arbitration clauses. In this second 
scenario, the fact that the parties to the contracts may belong to a group is a 
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priori irrelevant, although it may in some cases help clarify to resolve the 
issues that arise from the existence of a group of contracts
347
.     
 
According to Prof. Train, a fundamental distinction should be made between 
contracts that are linked one to other and those that are not. Contracts are linked one 
to the other when they are united in a relationship of economic or functional 
dependence. They fall into two categories. The first category includes group of 
contracts that coexist to attain a common goal: a framework agreement and 
implementation agreements; a main contract and an accessory agreement for the 
financing of the main transaction; or a group of contracts of equal importance united 
by a common cause or goal. The second category covers contracts united in a 
relationship of substitution or, in other words, group of contracts consisting of two 
successive agreements between the same parties, where the second one impacts upon 
the first to amend it or to terminate it: the original agreement and a contract 
providing for its amicable termination; a novation; or a settlement. Contracts that do 
not fall in either category are not linked. This is the case, for example, in successive 
agreements of the same nature between the same parties
348
.  
 
The issue of groups of contracts is not dealt with as such in the USA. US courts 
rarely reason their decisions in terms of groups of contacts. Even in the multi-
contract situations, they either tend to decide the case (whenever appropriate) in 
terms of arbitrability (that is according to the American terminology, whether the 
relevant arbitration clause is wide enough to encompass all the disputes arising from 
various connected agreements), or in terms of whether non-signatories to one or 
more connected agreements may be authorized, or must be compelled, to arbitrate 
with the signatories. In other instances, the issue is approached in terms of 
consolidation: i.e. whether it is possible to “consolidate” disputes arising from 
various connected agreements in one arbitral proceeding
349
?  
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By contrast, in continental Europe, the issue of groups of contracts is dealt with 
under the heading of consolidation by courts and arbitral tribunals. It often arises 
before arbitral tribunals which are asked to extend their jurisdiction to one or more 
connected agreements. It sometimes arises before courts, mainly in the context of 
setting aside proceedings. In continental Europe, national courts and arbitral tribunals 
are often confronted with the issue of whether it is possible to join and decide 
together all the disputes arising from inter- related contracts in one single set of 
proceedings
350
.  
 
C-1-2) Parallel Proceedings in M&A Arbitration 
 
The same dispute or two closely related disputes may result in parallel proceedings 
before different arbitral tribunals (or between a national court and an arbitral 
tribunal), with a resulting risk of conflicting decisions and awards
351
.  
  
C-1-2-1) Parallel Proceeding depending on the same dispute 
 
An international arbitration agreement has two distinct sets of effects: positive and 
negative effects. The positive effect is the obligation of the parties to participate in 
the arbitration proceedings. The negative effect of the arbitration agreement prevents 
national courts from hearing the dispute, unless they find the arbitration agreement to 
be manifestly null and void
352
. Different international conventions have recognised 
the “negative effect” of the arbitration agreement, including the New York 
Convention and Geneva Convention
353
.  
 
The exclusive jurisdiction effect of the arbitration agreement does not always prevent 
a party from bringing the same dispute (or two closely related disputes) 
simultaneously before different forums (parallel proceedings). Parallel proceedings 
may occur between different arbitral tribunals, or between national courts and 
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arbitral tribunals. Parties may start parallel proceedings for different reasons, 
including seeking the widest legal proceedings
354
.   
 
According to Prof. Cremades, there is not a unanimous solution to the problems 
arising from lis pendens and res judicata in international arbitration, except perhaps 
the recommendations made by the ILA
355
. There are, however certain procedural 
mechanisms to avoid or mitigate the undesirable effects of parallel proceedings. 
These mechanisms include the well-known doctrines of lis pendens and res 
judicata
356
. 
 
C-1-2-1-1) Mechanism of Lis Pendens in M&A Arbitration  
 
During M&A transactions, one of the parties may start court proceedings arising out 
of disputes concerning the letter of intent and the other party may start an arbitration 
procedure. In such case, there will automatically be a problem of lis pendens. 
Therefore, it is essential to pay attention to the principle of “lis pendens” in M&A 
arbitration.  
 
The principle of lis pendens refers to pending proceedings. It is a procedural 
mechanism which serves to avoid conflicting decisions when the same dispute, 
between the same parties, regarding the same subject matter or relief (petitum) and 
the same legal grounds (causa petendi) is brought to another forum
357
.  
 
James Fawcett, in his authoritative 1994 Report to the International Academy of 
Comparative Law on Declining Jurisdiction in Private International Law
358
, 
describes lis pendens
359
 as a situation in which parallel proceedings, involving the 
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same parties and the same cause of action, continue in two different states at the 
same time
360
. 
 
In international procedural law, lis pendens operates when two or more disputes are 
pending, regarding the same claim, but before the courts of different states. In March 
2002, the 1968 Brussels Convention was replaced by Council Regulation (EC) 44 
/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters. Art. 27 of Regulation 44/2001 (ex article 21 of the Brussels 
Convention) directs national courts to stay the second proceedings or to decline 
jurisdiction, if the jurisdiction of the first court is established. Furthermore, Article 
28 of the same Regulation (ex-article 22 of the Brussels Convention) refers to the 
“related actions” and establishes that when such actions “are pending in the courts of 
the different Member States, any court other than the court first seized may stay its 
proceedings”. Both provisions recognise the possibility for a national court to stay 
the proceedings, thus avoiding contradictory judgments
361
.  
 
Most national laws provide specific rules on lis pendens between courts. However, 
the application of the lis pendens doctrine varies between the civil law and common 
law legal systems: a common law court has a discretion whether or not to stay its 
proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens and the order in which the 
proceedings were commenced is only one of several factors that the court will take 
into account; whereas a civil law court will generally apply a first-in-time rule
362
. 
The purpose of these rules is to prevent the same dispute from being brought before 
the courts of two different jurisdictions when the applicable rules confer jurisdiction 
upon both. Furthermore, there are different mechanisms under international law to 
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prevent duplicate proceedings or contradictory decisions. However, these rules do 
not automatically apply to arbitration
363
.  
 
If court proceedings have been initiated in respect of a dispute submitted to 
arbitration, national laws do not offer the possibility to raise the defence of lis 
pendens, but a party may object to the jurisdiction of the court that was seized in 
breach of the arbitration clause
364
. In considering these questions, the ILA 
Committee has had to consider whether an arbitral tribunal should apply the rules of 
the place of arbitration, or whether there is or should be an accepted international 
arbitration practice. It has been suggested that the question of whether “an arbitral 
tribunal has legitimate jurisdiction” should be determined by application of the 
principle of “competence-competence”365. The arbitral tribunal has exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide all disputes covered by the arbitration clause. Therefore the 
arbitration agreement serves as the legal basis to challenge the jurisdiction of 
national courts when court proceedings were started in breach of the parties’ 
agreement
366
.  
 
The arbitration agreement prevents national courts from hearing disputes submitted 
to arbitration, as required by the New York Convention and in the Geneva 
Convention (articles II.3 and VI.1). Therefore, courts have no jurisdiction when there 
is a valid arbitration agreement; but the author agrees with Prof. Cremades that this 
lack of jurisdiction must be raised in proper form and within the applicable time 
limits. If a party does not challenge the jurisdiction of the court and enters its defence 
without invoking the courts lack of jurisdiction, it will be presumed that both parties 
have accepted the jurisdiction of the court to hear the dispute
367
. 
  
Article II (3) of the New York convention is reflected in Article 8 (1) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) and 
many national laws (e.g. Section 9 of the English Arbitration Act). The underlying 
reasoning is to prevent one of the parties to an arbitration from resorting to parallel 
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court litigation as a mere dilatory tactic. Unless the dispute refers to a matter which 
cannot be submitted to arbitration, or the arbitration agreement is null and void, 
national courts must refrain from hearing a dispute which has previously been 
submitted to arbitration
368
.  
 
It therefore follows that the defence of lis pendens is inappropriate, as the proper 
procedural mechanism is to challenge the jurisdiction of the court in cases where 
court proceedings are initiated while the same case is being decided in an arbitration. 
Arbitration proceedings are different in nature from court proceedings, and therefore, 
according to Prof. Cremades, cannot produce real lis pendens. The different national 
laws reveal that the procedural formula in these cases to be the objection to the 
jurisdiction of the national court
369
.   
 
According to French and Swiss approach, Prof. Poudret and Besson ask, when/if lis 
pendens arises between an arbitrator and a judge, before whom the same claim has 
been brought simultaneously, should the full effect of negative competence-
competence be applied, giving absolute priority to the arbitrator as done by article 
1458 (1) of the Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile (NCPC), or on the contrary, 
recognise as the Swiss Federal Tribunal a chronological priority for the one first 
seized on the matter, even if this is the judge?; or is it preferable not to provide any 
priority, like the New York Convention and most laws, including the new article 186 
(1bis) of the PILS, thereby generating two parallel procedures before the judge and 
the arbitrator regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement? Even if the first 
rendered decision would be binding, this last solution leads to a costly duplication of 
procedures and does not rule out the risk of contradicting decisions. Should the 
power of examination of the judge first seized be limited to the prima facie existence 
of an arbitration agreement as laid down by Article 1458 (2) of the NCPC or by the 
Article 7 of the PILS as interpreted by the Federal Tribunal? This solution has rightly 
been criticised not only because it introduced an additional control, which is limited 
and worthless, but also because it is difficult to determine when an arbitration clause 
is “manifestly” invalid. Therefore, Poudret and Besson find another solution and 
reflect upon the true justification of the arbitrator’s priority to rule on his own 
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jurisdiction, whereas the judge could also invoke the principle that every court has 
the power to determine its own jurisdiction. In their view, the best justification 
follows from the benefit of attributing the control of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, on which depends the jurisdiction of the arbitrator or the judge, to the 
jurisdiction of the seat applying its own law rather than to a foreign judge. It is 
important not only to avoid the risk of contradicting decisions, but to favour the 
jurisdiction in the best position to correctly interpret the applicable law which is the 
law of the seat. This is why Poudret and Besson suggest, de lege feranda to apply a 
plea of lis pendens, leading to the stay of court procedure, when the arbitrator has 
been seized first and, in the opposite case, to distinguish depending on whether the 
forum and the seat of arbitration are in the same country. In the affirmative, there is 
no serious inconvenience to giving priority to the court whose decision will in any 
case be controlled by the superior court of the seat, as will the award on jurisdiction. 
In the negative, the priority should be given to the arbitrator and the foreign judge 
should suspend the pending procedure until a decision is rendered by the arbitrator. 
Such a solution would however only be coherent and useful if it were contained in an 
international convention and not only in one or several national legislations
370
.  
 
The existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties should be alleged in 
due time and proper form
371
. Failure to do so may result in a tacit submission to the 
jurisdiction of the national court and may be interpreted as the parties’ waiver of the 
arbitration previously agreed. Each party, by performing certain procedural steps, 
may tacitly waive the right to arbitration. However, under certain circumstances, the 
arbitral tribunal might eventually decide to continue with the proceedings, despite the 
fact that the same dispute is pending before courts. In these cases, parallel 
proceedings may result in a risk of conflicting decisions. The Buenaventura and 
Fomento arbitrations illustrate these issues
372
.  
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1) Buenaventura Case373  
 
The Buenaventura and Fomento cases involved parties in Latin America. The 
underlying contracts in those cases provided a multi-tiered dispute resolution clause 
(See Chapter IV), including arbitration in Switzerland, in accordance with the 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules (‘ICC Rules’) of Arbitration. When 
disputes arose, one of the parties started court proceedings notwithstanding the 
arbitration allegedly agreed. Both parties undertook a number of procedural steps 
before the national courts, including the filing of different claims. Subsequently, 
when one party initiated arbitration proceedings in Switzerland regarding the same 
dispute, the other requested the Swiss courts to stay the arbitration on grounds of lis 
alibi pendens. 
 
In Compania Minera Condesa SA and Compania de Minas Buenaventura v. BRGM-
Peru SAS, the Peruvian mining company, Buenaventura, and the French state 
company, Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) entered into 
negotiations regarding the acquisition by Buenaventura of a stake in Cedimin SA, a 
subsidiary in Peru of BRGM. A memorandum of understanding providing for mutual 
call options over the shares in Cedimin was signed by BRGM-Perou, Cedimin and 
Buenaventura. Cedimin's bylaws would be amended, recognising the terms of the 
memorandum of understanding. Both the agreement and the amended bylaws 
included an arbitration clause, whereby any disputes arising between the parties 
regarding the agreement or bylaws should be submitted to arbitration in Switzerland, 
in accordance with the ICC Rules. When BRGM sold BRGM-Peru to the Australian 
Normandy Corporation, Buenaventura brought a lawsuit against BRGM and BRGM-
Peru, asserting that they had breached Buenaventura's call option. BRGM-Peru 
objected to the jurisdiction of the Peruvian courts based upon the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
Subsequently, BRGM-Peru initiated an arbitration in Zurich against Buenaventura 
and Condesa, in accordance with the ICC Rules. Buenaventura contended that the 
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dispute was already pending in Peru and requested the arbitral tribunal to stay the 
arbitration pursuant to Article 9 of the PIL Act which provides as follows:  
 
When an action having the same subject matter is already pending between the same 
parties in a foreign country, the Swiss court shall stay the case if it is to be expected 
that the foreign court will, within a reasonable time, render a decision capable of 
being recognised in Switzerland. 
 
Later, the Court of Appeal in Lima rejected the respondents’ objection that the 
dispute should be submitted to arbitration, because not all the parties involved in the 
court proceedings had signed the arbitration agreement. However, the arbitration 
proceeded in Switzerland. The arbitral tribunal found that it had jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding the fact that the same dispute between the same parties was being 
heard before the Peruvian courts. The arbitrators reasoned that the arbitration 
agreement was valid and covered the subject matter of the claims. 
 
Buenaventura subsequently attempted to annul the award on jurisdiction grounds 
before the Swiss courts, which was dismissed by the Federal Court. The court 
recognised as controversial the issue of whether Article 9 of the PIL Act also applied 
between courts and arbitral tribunals. However, in the present case, the Federal Court 
considered that no real lis pendens existed between the litigation in Peru and the 
arbitration in Switzerland, as the decision of the Peruvian courts would not in any 
case be enforceable in Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Court reasoned that the 
Peruvian courts breached their duty under Article II(3) of the NY Convention, to 
refer the parties to arbitration. 
 
2) Fomento Case374 
 
In the Fomento case, three years after Buenaventura, another arbitral award was 
challenged before the Federal Court on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal had 
failed to stay the arbitration pending court proceedings abroad. The Fomento 
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arbitration arose from the dispute between the Spanish company, Fomento de 
Construcciones y Contratas SA (FCC) and the Panamanian company, Colon 
Container Terminal SA (CCT). The parties had entered into a contract whereby CCT 
commissioned FCC to carry out certain construction works in the Republic of 
Panama. The contract provided for ICC arbitration in Switzerland. However, FCC 
brought a lawsuit against CCT before the courts of Panama seeking, inter alia, a 
declaration that the contract and the performance guarantees were null and void. 
CCT challenged the jurisdiction of the courts based on the arbitration agreement, but 
the Panamanian Court of First Instance dismissed CCT's arbitration objection as 
untimely. CCT appealed but also instituted arbitration proceedings in Geneva against 
FCC. 
 
Subsequently, the Panama Court of Appeal revoked the judgment delivered at first 
instance and confirmed that CCT's jurisdictional objection had been raised within the 
legal time limits. FCC appealed before the Supreme Court of Panama as the 
arbitration proceedings continued in Geneva. On 22 January 2001, the Supreme 
Court of Panama rendered a judgment confirming the decision of the Court of First 
Instance, dismissing CCT's objection to the jurisdiction of the Panamanian courts. 
 
Having moved in vain before the arbitral tribunal for a stay of the arbitration until the 
final decision of the courts in Panama, FCC sought the annulment of the award 
before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. The court held that the lis pendens rules 
under Article 9 of the PIL Act also applied between court adjudication and 
arbitration, and therefore must be observed by arbitral tribunals sitting in 
Switzerland. Therefore, the arbitrators should have stayed the proceedings because 
previous court proceedings were pending in Panama as the foreign court proceedings 
could result in a decision that was enforceable in Switzerland. Accordingly, the 
Swiss Supreme Court decided to set aside the award
375
. The court reasoned that the 
principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz does not give an arbitral tribunal a right to 
disregard lis pendens rules. 
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The Fomento case raised concerns that in an international arbitration sitting in 
Switzerland, parties could delay the arbitration proceedings by challenging the 
validity of the arbitration agreement before the Swiss courts. Notwithstanding these 
concerns, in Fomento, it was the parties' tacit submission to the Panamanian courts, 
by taking relevant procedural steps, which the Federal Supreme Court saw as a 
decisive criterion in considering whether there was a still a valid arbitration 
agreement between the parties. 
 
It should be pointed out that the basis of the Federal Court's decision was not so 
much the arbitrator's non-application of the principle of lis pendens, as the parties' 
prior tacit submission to the jurisdiction of the Panamanian courts. The parties 
initiated proceedings on the merits of the case, conducting sufficiently relevant 
procedural acts, which the Swiss Federal Court clearly considered as tacit submission 
to the Courts of the Republic of Panama, waiving the arbitration that they duly 
agreed in the contract. Whether CCT had lost its right to arbitrate by not invoking it 
in time before the Panama court was not a matter covered by the NY Convention but 
for the Panama courts to decide. Consequently, the Swiss arbitral award was set aside 
for lack of jurisdiction
376
. 
 
This is the first time that the Federal Tribunal has clearly stated that the lis pendens 
rules of Article 9 PIL Act apply to arbitral tribunals and courts alike. The Federal 
Court's decision in the Fomento case resulted in the Swiss legislator amending 
Chapter XII of the PIL Act, approving new article 186(1bis), which entered into 
force on 1 March 2007. Article 186(1bis) recognises the arbitrators' power to decide 
on their own jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the same dispute is already pending 
between the same parties before the courts of a state or another arbitral tribunal, 
unless there are good grounds to suspend the proceedings
377
. Therefore, the Swiss 
legislator has recognised that Kompetenz-Kompetenz prevails over lis pendens
378
. 
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The ILA Recommendations on lis pendens endorse the principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz as the first criteria in approaching to issue of parallel proceedings. An 
arbitral tribunal that considers itself to be prima facie competent pursuant to the 
relevant arbitration agreement shall, therefore, continue with the arbitration 
regardless of any other proceedings pending before a national court or arbitral 
tribunal, in which the parties and one or more of the issues are the same or 
substantially the same. But, if duplication in full of the parties, petitum and the causa 
petendi are present, the principle of lis pendens becomes particularly relevant, 
allowing the second tribunal to decline jurisdiction or to suspend the arbitration until 
a relevant determination in the previous proceedings is made
379
. 
 
Where there are two parallel arbitrations raising the same or substantially the same 
issues, the Committee concluded that the secondly constituted tribunal should give 
consideration to case management issues. The Committee concluded that it would be 
wrong for the second tribunal to proceed with its arbitration, blinkered to the 
existence of the other arbitration. This recommendation is based on the consideration 
that, in the case of parallel arbitrations, there is a real lis pendens situation because 
there is parallel jurisdiction, and a policy need for coordination in order to avoid 
conflicting awards. But the Committee does not recommend that the rigid first-in-
time rule applied in many civil law jurisdictions should apply. Instead, the tribunal 
should have considerable discretion to order a stay on the arbitration on such terms 
as it sees fit. This might be a stay of only some of the issues. It might be a stay for a 
limited period, in order to avoid the successful application slowing down the other 
arbitration unfairly
380
.  
 
C-1-2-1-2) Mechanism of Res Judicata in M&A Arbitration  
 
The term res judicata refers to the general doctrine that an earlier and final 
adjudication by a court or arbitration tribunal is conclusive in subsequent 
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proceedings involving the same subject matter or relief, the same legal grounds and 
the same parties (the so-called “triple-identity” criteria)381.  
 
The principle of res judicata has a positive or formal and a negative or material 
effect. The former refers to the fact that a decision is final between the parties and 
may not be appealed or challenged. Therefore, a final judgment or award will be 
binding in subsequent proceedings. The negative effects of res judicata prevent the 
re-litigation of same dispute by the same parties, also referred to as non bis in 
idem
382
.  
 
For instance a Swiss award held that “it is settled law by now that an arbitral tribunal 
sitting in an international arbitration in Switzerland must apply the same rules as a 
Swiss court in matters of res judicata
383
.   
 
When the doctrine is described, it is generally stated that the parties must be the same 
in the two sets of proceedings for the doctrine to apply (or, at least, legally deemed to 
be the same, which the common law refers to as ‘privies’, e.g. trustee and 
beneficiary). However, the strictness of this requirement varies between legal 
systems. In addition, this requirement has been relaxed somewhat in the United 
States, where third parties may rely on the doctrine in some circumstances
384
. 
 
Res judicata is generally applied defensively, to stop a claimant bringing the same 
claim or seeking further relief. At least in the United States, it may also be applied 
offensively to prevent a respondent from denying rulings made against it in earlier 
proceedings
385
. 
 
It is generally accepted that the res judicata doctrine applies in the context of 
international arbitration, such that a final award has res judicata effect (both positive 
                                                          
381
 De Ly and Sheppard, ILA Interim Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration, Arb. Int. 2009, Vol. 25, 
Issue 1, p. 36 (hereinafter De Ly and Sheppard, Res Judicata). For the potential situations where res 
judicata might be argued see Audley Sheppard, Res Judicata and Estopppel, in Bernardo M. Cremades 
and Julian D. M. Lew (eds.), Parallel State and Arbitral Procedures in International Arbitration, 2005, pp. 
220-221 (hereinafter Sheppard, Parallel State).  
382
 Cremades, Madalena, supra note 46, p. 519. 
383
 A v. Z. Order No: 5 of 2 May 2002, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 21 No.4, 2003, p. 810. 
384
 De Ly and Sheppard, Res Judicata, supra note 382, p. 37. 
385
 Ibid. 
140 
 
and negative)
386
. Both in common law countries and in continental civil law systems, 
the principle of res judicata directly applies to arbitration
387
. Most national laws 
indeed recognise the res judicata effects of arbitral awards, including France (Art. 
1476 and 1500 of the previous French New  Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 1484 
after the modification on 14 January 2011), Belgium (Art. 1703 of the Code of civil 
Procedure), the Netherlands (Art. 1509 of the Code on Civil Procedure), Austria 
(Art. 594 of the Code on Civil Procedure), Switzerland (Art. 190 of the Code on 
Private International Law), Italy (Art. 829.8 of the Code on Civil Procedure), Spain 
(Art. 43 of the Arbitration Act
388
. However, the scope of the application of res 
judicata varies for each country. In Switzerland, the Federal Supreme Court has held 
that: “Res judicata only relates to the acts based on knowledge of the decision or the 
award. It does not cover the reasoning of the decision to know the exact meaning and 
extent of the dispositif
389
. In Italy, while the legal doctrine holds that res judicata 
effect is limited to the operative part of the judgment, Italian case law has admitted 
that the res judicata effect may include the entire reasoning and in almost all cases 
that res judicata includes the grounds that constitute the logical and necessary 
assumptions for the decision itself (the so called “giudicat implicito”)390. 
 
It should again be pointed out that, in principle, res judicata applies only to the 
operative part of the award, i.e. the part of the award containing the decision. It does 
not normally extend to the reasons, which will only be taken into consideration to 
determine the meaning and the scope of the operative part
391
. It is however, generally 
considered that res judicata extends to the reasons which are necessarily adjunct to 
the decision; that is to say, the ratio decidendi of the award. In other words, the fact 
that the latter is located in the body of the award rather than in its operative part is 
irrelevant
392
.  
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The issue of the scope of res judicata has also been addressed in other arbitral 
awards. For example, in a final award of 31 May 1988 rendered in ad hoc 
proceedings, the arbitral tribunal decided that “the principle of res judicata prevents 
the re-opening of necessarily decided points”393; it does not prevent the clarification 
or interpretation of a decision, nor does it prevent a decision from being rendered on 
points left undecided by an award. In an award of 28 March 1984 in ICC case no. 
3267, the arbitral tribunal decided that  
 
the binding effect of its first award is not limited to the contents of the order 
thereof adjudicating or dismissing certain claims, but that it extends to the 
legal reasons that were necessary for such order, i.e., to the ratio decidendi 
of such award. Irrespective from the academic views that may be entertained 
on the extent of the principle of res judicata on the reasons of a decision, it 
would be unfair to both parties to depart in a final award from the views held 
in the previous award, to the extent they were necessary for the disposition of 
certain issues. By contrast, the arbitral tribunal made clear in other parts of 
its first award that the views expressed therein on certain other aspects of the 
case were of a preliminary nature only and without prejudice to its final 
decision. On such aspects, the arbitral tribunal holds itself entirely free to 
adopt other views with the benefit of further evidence and investigations
394
.   
 
 
The res judicata effect of an earlier decisions raised by a party in subsequent 
proceedings by pleading: cause of action estoppel, or issue estoppel. If accepted, the 
plea will have the effect of precluding the other party from contradicting the earlier 
determination in the later proceedings. The rules of estoppel by res judicata are rules 
of evidence
395
. 
 
English Law recognises two further pleas of preclusion: merger/former recovery; and 
abuse of process. Although the fourth, abuse of process, has its own rules, some 
authors have posited that all four doctrines have as their objective prevention of 
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abuse of the courts’ process, and that the term “abuse of process” can be used to 
describe all four
396
.  
 
In the US, the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have taken somewhat different 
approaches in determining when res judicata can be asserted as a valid jurisdictional 
defence against re-litigation in domestic courts. Some circuit courts have focused on 
the language of the arbitration clause to determine whether res judicata is within the 
scope of the arbitration clause; others have focused on the finality of the award and 
applied a traditional transactional analysis to the claims being raised; and others have 
pursued a hybrid approach between the two
397
.  
 
Many scenarios may arise for res judicata
398
. One of these scenario is that res 
judicata may arise because the parties institute arbitration based on different 
agreements to arbitrate arising under the same legal relationship. The battle of forms 
is a typical example of such situation. A similar situation exists between identical 
parties in relation to related legal relationships (such as different format of group of 
contracts). If disputes are brought before different arbitral tribunals, res judicata 
issues may arise
399
.  
 
The application of res judicata in M&A Arbitration does not have many examples. 
However some cases in international commercial arbitration mention the 
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requirements for res judicata. For instance the final award of ICC Case No: 6363 
confirmed that the application of the doctrine of res judicata requires “identity as 
regards subject matter of the dispute, petitum and causa petendi, between a prior 
judgment and a new claim”400.  
 
Parallel proceedings involve a clear risk of different claims in different forums, 
between different parties, but in relation to the same facts or legal relationship. The 
issue, therefore, remains as to whether and to what extent an arbitral tribunal may be 
bound by an award rendered in another connected arbitration, which is not res 
judicata
401
. In the ICC Case No: 6363 the arbitral tribunal held that a previous 
decision was not res judicata, however, it decided that the first decision could not be 
ignored
402
.  
 
In the context of investor-state arbitration, previous arbitral awards are not 
considered binding precedent, although they may have persuasive effects on 
subsequent proceedings. However, arbitral tribunals have no obligation to rule in 
accordance with precedent and must decide the dispute only on the basis of the 
applicable law
403
. 
 
In contractual disputes, the governing law will be established in the contract itself 
and the applicable mandatory rules. When the applicable law is a common law 
jurisdiction, the binding precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis play a more 
important role. However, when the dispute is governed by a civil law system, 
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national legislation becomes much more relevant. In both systems, however, 
previous awards are not formally binding
404
.   
 
 
C-1-2-2) Parallel Proceedings depending on related disputes 
 
When full identity does not exist between the parties, the petitum and the causa 
petendi between two or more arbitrations, there may nevertheless be certain elements 
in common, such as the underlying legal relationship, resulting in the award rendered 
in one case having certain effects on the other
405
.  
 
In M&A transactions, contractual relationships usually involve long-term economic 
operations comprising a large number of distinct, but interrelated contracts. In many 
cases, the different kinds of agreements seem to give rise to an indivisible 
transaction, an economical and operational unit “hidden” behind a multi-contract 
façade that actually amounts to one fundamental single relationship. The notion of 
interrelated agreements takes into account this reality and defines agreements in 
relation to the business context in which they operate and to the purposes they are 
meant to serve
406
.  
 
As Prof. Dely and Mr. Sheppard mention, in the situation of related claims between 
the same parties, the issue may not be one of lis pendens but of case management
407
. 
There are many examples of case management in M&A arbitration depending on 
related disputes, because disputes sometimes arise where the parties have entered 
into a number of different agreements, either simultaneously or consecutively, each 
with (or sometimes without) a separate dispute resolution mechanism. This can 
create procedural difficulties, with the potential for parallel or overlapping 
arbitrations and litigation under different dispute resolution clauses. It also gives rise 
to questions of whether an arbitration clause in one contract applies to disputes under 
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the provisions of another contract
408
. In M&A arbitrations this is particularly an issue 
in situations with group company structures and transactions
409
. 
 
In such situation, it is advised by the doctrine that those drafting international 
agreements should ordinarily ensure that a single, unitary dispute resolution 
mechanism governs all of the parties’ various relations410. 
 
This is a question of the parties' intent, but, in largely fact-specific decisions, courts 
have endeavoured to construe the parties' contracts in a commercially-sensible 
manner that, insofar as possible, permits a single, centralized dispute resolution 
mechanism. So long as the parties to the relevant contracts are the same, and the 
contracts all relate to a single project, or course of dealing, U.S.
411
, French
412
, 
English
413
, Swiss
414
, German
415
 and other courts have generally been willing to hold 
that an arbitration clause in one agreement extends to related agreements (provided 
that the other agreements do not contain inconsistent arbitration or forum selection 
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clauses). One commentator has described the decisions of national courts in this 
context as follows: 
 
“the courts have uniformly concluded that if two agreements between the 
same parties are closely connected and one finds its origin in the other, or 
is the complement or the implementation of the other, the absence of an 
arbitration clause in one of the contracts does not prevent disputes arising 
from the two agreements from being submitted to an arbitral tribunal and 
decided together
416.” 
 
A more likely scenario is two arbitrations between the same parties raising different 
claims, albeit closely related. The existence of separate arbitration provisions in 
related agreements has generally been held to be strong evidence that disputes under 
the various agreements were meant to be arbitrated under different dispute resolution 
provisions – not those of some other contract417. This is particularly true where 
different contracts contain different arbitration clauses
418
. Even where an identical 
arbitration clause (e.g., a model clause from a leading institution) is simply repeated 
verbatim in multiple contracts, it is sometimes said not to be the “same” clause, 
giving rise to the possibility of separate arbitrations (and arbitral tribunals) under 
each separate substantive contract, with each arbitration limited to a single, specific 
agreement. Arbitral tribunals have generally sought to avoid this latter result
419
, at 
least where different contracts involve the same parties
420
. According to Mr. Pryles 
and Prof. Waincymer it is reasonable to start with the view that identical clauses can 
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lead to multiple claims being brought together and differences in clauses constitutes 
evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, they observe that, as to the first, some cases 
may raise legitimate procedural justice concerns as to composition even where 
clauses are identical. Where there are different clauses, being a matter of 
construction of both in context, it is at least arguable that such clauses may say 
nothing more than that isolated claims must go to different places. They may give no 
clear indication of what was intended for concurrent reverse claims. In these 
circumstances, tribunals should analyse all of the factors in construing intent
421
.   
 
Similar issues arise when one or more of a related group of contracts contain(s) a 
forum selection clause
422
, and other contract(s) contain(s) an arbitration clause. In 
these cases, and absent contrary indication, some courts have sought to give broad 
effect to arbitration clauses, refusing to conclude that the forum selection clause 
overrides or qualifies them
423
.  
 
It is debatable whether the court’s minimization of the significance of a forum 
selection clause is universally applicable: in many cases, the contractual choice of 
particular national courts has substantial commercial and legal importance, and 
should not necessarily be subjugated to a parallel arbitration agreement
424
. Thus, 
many arbitral tribunals appear to have concluded that the inclusion of a forum 
selection clause in one agreement, and an arbitration clause in a related agreement, 
will ordinarily signify the parties’ expectation for separate dispute resolution 
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mechanisms
425
. Similarly, indications that two contracts were intended to be treated 
separately (for example, in their merger or integration provisions) have sometimes 
been relied upon in holding that the arbitration clause in one agreement does not 
cover disputes under the other contract
426
.  
 
 
D) Solutions Proposed by Doctrine and Case Law in Different 
Jurisdictions for Joinder of Parallel Proceedings 
 
Various solutions have been put into practice, including the possibility for national 
courts to appoint the same arbitrator to hear disputes, or the consideration of an 
“umbrella clause” by the parties427. In addition, the consolidation of proceedings is 
an effective mechanism to avoid contradictory awards, but without the parties’ 
consent, the possibility to consolidate different proceedings will depend on the 
provisions of the applicable arbitration rules and national legislation
428
. 
 
Moreover, if the potential problem of parallel or multiple proceedings is raised 
before arbitrators, it is proposed that the arbitrators explore the possibilities of the 
parties reaching an agreement on consolidation, or proposing a “coordination 
conference” with all parties and the arbitrators, which would meet to identify 
common issues and the manner of their determination. Such conference might 
increase the possibilities of the parties reaching an agreement on a total or partial 
consolidation, or some less far-reaching form of coordination by highlighting 
potential risks associated with a continuation of the different proceedings without 
any such coordination. Also the psychological pressure usually generated by such a 
conference as opposed to traditional correspondence with the parties might make it 
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harder for a party, who is refusing any form of coordination, to persist in such 
refusal
429
.  
 
A stay of the proceedings could be an efficient way of coordinating parallel or 
multiple proceedings, in particular, in the examples of vertical disputes such as the 
employer-contractor-subcontractor example and the ship-owner – time-charterer - 
voyage charterer example. In these cases, the subsequent proceedings between the 
contractor and subcontractor, or the time charterer and voyage charterer, would 
simply disappear, were the claim of the employer, or the ship owner, in the primary 
proceedings to be denied
430
. 
 
However, no matter how efficient such a stay of the proceedings might be, it is 
important not to overlook that one of the duties of the arbitrators in relation to the 
parties is to adjudicate the dispute in a speedy manner, and of course within any 
award period that may have been agreed. Since the resolution of the parallel disputes 
could take considerable time, a stay ordered by the tribunal against the will of one of 
the parties could be seen as depriving such party of its right to have its case heard in 
a speedy manner, which in turn could lead to the setting a side of the award
431
.  
 
Another possible means to deal with parallel or multiple proceedings is to coordinate 
the resolution of such proceedings without consolidation and joinder. This can be 
done, for instance, by appointing the same arbitrators for all the related disputes, or 
appointing the same chairman for all the related disputes. The appointment of a joint 
tribunal is usually suggested by the parties before an arbitral tribunal has been 
appointed in any of the proceedings. However, should a related dispute arise 
subsequent to the formation of the first tribunal, the parties to the parallel dispute 
must involve the arbitrators in determining whether it would be appropriate that the 
subsequent tribunal consist of the same members
432
.   
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The most efficient method of avoiding these difficulties is, of course, the 
consolidation of the contract and subcontract disputes into one arbitration. This 
arbitration would nevertheless still face the same questions of choice of rules, arbitral 
institution, and procedure normally faced by the arbitration of disputes arising from 
purely bilateral international commercial contracts
433
. 
 
Neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules contain 
provisions on the consolidation of arbitration proceedings
434
. However, the risk of 
parallel proceedings is a problem which the different international arbitration 
institutions are carefully considering. Article 4(6) of the ICC Rules provides that 
when a party submits a request for arbitration in connection with a legal relationship 
in respect of which an ICC arbitration is already pending between the same parties, 
any of the parties may request the court to include the claims contained in the request 
for arbitration in the pending proceedings, provided that the terms of reference have 
not been signed or approved by the court. If the terms of reference have been signed, 
additional claims may only be included if authorised by the arbitral tribunal
435
.    
 
In international arbitration, there are at least three situations in which consolidation 
has been considered: (i) two arbitration proceedings between the same parties under 
the same contract and arbitration agreement; (ii) two arbitration proceedings between 
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the same parties under different arbitration contracts and arbitration agreements; and 
(iii) two arbitration proceedings between different parties and based on different 
contracts and arbitration agreements
436
. 
 
A valid arbitration agreement is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, enhancing the risks 
of parallel proceedings. Issues relating to consolidation thus arise more often in 
relation to different arbitral tribunals, rather than between courts and arbitral 
tribunals
437
. When the same dispute is brought before two different arbitration 
proceedings, arbitrators will decide on their own jurisdiction pursuant to the principle 
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz
438
. 
 
Most arbitration rules fail to address the consolidation of claims where common 
questions of fact or law affect multiple parties, but the 1998 ICC Rules now deal 
with the joinder or consolidation of arbitral proceedings. Article 4(6) of the Rules 
proposes a solution allowing the parties to agree on joinder or consolidation
439
. 
Otherwise, the general rule in arbitration is that consent of all parties is necessary, 
even though the current trend is that consent may be either expressed or implied
440
. 
 
CEPANI cases No. 2176 and 2189
441
 provide an illustration of such a request for 
consolidation by two related multiparty-multicontract proceedings. A number of 
companies and one individual, who was the majority shareholder of the group 
(respondents), had sold their interests in the assets of various companies of the said 
group, involved in the textile business, to a number of companies controlled by X 
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International SA (claimants). The sale purchase agreement provided for the 
application of Belgian law and for ICC arbitration in Luxembourg in case of dispute. 
Together with the sale purchase agreement, various ancillary and related agreements 
were entered into by claimants and respondents, or some of them, together, for part 
of the agreements, with other companies. These agreements included a shareholders 
agreement concluded between some of the sellers who were already shareholders and 
would remain shareholders of group companies, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, new shareholders, X International SA and a Swiss bank referred to as bank Y. 
The shareholders agreement was governed by Luxembourg law and also provided for 
ICC arbitration. A request for arbitration was filed by the purchasers against the 
sellers on the basis of a breach of the representations and warranties. An arbitral 
tribunal was appointed under the CEPANI Rules. At the time the arbitral tribunal 
was discussing the terms of reference, the respondents decided to file a counterclaim 
against the claimants, and also against bank Y, which was not a party to the 
arbitration. The claimants objected. There was, therefore, no other possibility for the 
respondents than to start a separate arbitration procedure against bank Y and ask for 
the consolidation of both arbitrations, which they did. In the second arbitration, the 
parties did not appoint the same arbitrators as in the first one. The claimants objected 
to consolidation, considering in the first place that the two disputes were not closely 
related – the first one concerned the breach of the warranties under the sale purchase 
agreement, and the second, a breach of the shareholders agreement by bank Y, which 
was not a party to the first contract – and that there was therefore no risk of 
contradictory awards. They also pointed out that the issues were different, that the 
applicable law was not the same and that consolidation would normally lead to a 
tribunal composed of five arbitrators (two from Luxemburg and three from 
Belgium), which was not optimal. The respondents challenged all these objections 
and added that according to Article 11 of the Rules, the arbitral tribunal could be 
appointed by CEPANI, which could therefore decide to appoint for the consolidated 
arbitration the three arbitrators appointed in the first case. After the parties submitted 
briefs of their arguments in favour or against consolidation, a meeting was organised 
by the Appointments Committee of CEPANI, where the parties were invited to 
present their submissions orally. After this meeting, the Appointments Committee 
decided not to join the arbitrations, without disclosing its reasons. This decision 
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clearly illustrates the challenges that consolidation under CEPANI Rules may 
involve on the grounds of the equality and due process principles. 
 
However, it is not clear to see the reasons for denying the consolidation between two 
separate but parallel arbitration proceedings. According to the summary of Prof. 
Hanotiau, it can be seen that the Appointments Committee of CEPANI did not accept 
that there is a relation between the sale purchase agreement and the shareholders 
agreement. This can be another reason why M&A transactions are not a typical 
example of multi-contract arbitration or related agreements arbitration. Furthermore 
if two different arbitration tribunals produce contradictory decisions, which one will 
be applied? In any case awards of the first arbitration court concerning the sale 
purchase agreement will have effects on the shareholding agreement. Therefore the 
author believes that some guidelines should be drafted. 
 
Moreover, in this case, the consolidation problem arises with the counterclaim 
against the claimants together with a party which is not a party to the arbitration 
agreement. This is the main reason for the second arbitration and for the 
consolidation of both arbitration proceedings. However, if there were some M&A 
arbitration guidelines in CEPANI, it may be possible to allege that the dispute arose 
from the breach of representations and warranties, therefore only the first arbitration 
agreement will be applied and any effect of this arbitration award will be limited 
only with representations and warranties, nothing more.  
 
In the decision of the Appointment Committee of CEPANI, one cannot clearly 
observe the evidence in order to precise the “consent” of parties. The Committee 
does not focus on the consent of parties in order to resolve the problem of 
consolidation. Again, with M&A arbitration guidelines it may be possible to focus 
more on the consent of parties from different arbitration agreements. 
 
E) Advantages and Disadvantages of Consolidation in M&A Arbitration 
 
The most compelling factor in favour of consolidating related proceedings is the risk 
of inconsistent or even contradictory decisions in separately held proceedings, with 
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respect to both the facts involved and the application of the governing law
442
. This 
concern is even more important in international arbitration than it is in litigation, 
given that the review of arbitral awards by national courts, be it in the context of an 
action to set aside an award or to enforce the award, will normally not look into the 
correct handling of the facts or the law by arbitral tribunal
443
.  
 
Nevertheless, the consolidation of related proceedings is by no means always the 
ideal answer to the difficulties arising in complex international disputes. Especially 
in M&A arbitrations the consolidation of related proceedings is likely to raise the 
problem that confidential information, such as trade secrets, cost margins, or general 
financial information, is exposed to risk of being disclosed to parties from which this 
information was normally to be kept secret
444
.  However, such intrusion upon the 
right to privacy and confidentiality should remain limited, given that such 
information produced for or generated by an arbitration cannot be disclosed for 
purposes unrelated to the arbitration
445
.  
 
The use of documents generated in, or obtained during, the arbitration for use outside 
the arbitration, is not permissible even when required for use in other related 
proceedings. The English Privy Council clarified in Associated Electric and Gas 
Insurance Services Ltd v. European Reinsurance Company of Zurich
446
 that the 
restriction on use of documents obtained in an arbitration should not be extended to 
the award made, as the award itself may be required for purposes of accounting, or of 
enforcing a right which the award confers
447
. 
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In England, confidentiality in arbitration is recognized as an essential corollary to 
privacy in arbitration
448
, and is a term the law will necessarily import into the 
agreement. This appears to be the position in Singapore
449
.
 
As Prof. Boo classifies 
the English rule of confidentiality is subject to certain exceptions, such as
450
:  
  
1) where the parties consented to disclosure; or 
 
2) disclosure is made pursuant to an order of court; or 
 
3) if disclosure is reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate 
interests of a party vis-à-vis a claim by a third party451 
 
4) where the interest of justice requires disclosure452 
 
The Singapore position is consistent with, and has specific statutory provisions 
enacted to preserve confidentiality of arbitral proceedings and awards made. 
Confidentiality also extends to proceedings in court arising out of any matter related 
to arbitration or the agreement
453
. 
 
In one situation, there were parallel ICSID and ICC arbitrations. The respondent in 
both cases was the same, but the claimants differed. The claimant in the ICSID case 
was a shareholder of the claimant in the ICC case. The two tribunals were different 
and there was no common member. The tribunal in the ICSID case ordered the 
respondent to produce all the documentation in the ICC case. The ICC tribunal 
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issued a corresponding order requiring the respondent to produce all the 
documentation in the ICSID case
454
. 
 
The exchange of documentation in parallel arbitrations may raise questions of 
confidentiality, particularly where the parties in the two arbitrations are not identical. 
Even where the parties are the same, but the tribunals differ and contain a common 
member, an interesting question may arise. Can the common arbitrator refer to or 
otherwise have regard to a document produced in arbitration A in arbitration B? If 
the arbitrator discloses it, is it a breach of a duty of confidentiality? As 
confidentiality belongs to the parties, and as the parties are the same in both 
proceedings, it might be thought that no breach occurs. But disclosure is being made 
to the other members of the tribunal
455
. Bernard Hanotiau says that the principle of 
neutrality, independence, and impartiality of the arbitrator is of paramount concern, 
and the duty of confidentiality will lead the arbitrator in some cases to reach the 
conclusion that it is no longer possible to fulfil the arbitrator's duties in total 
independence or impartiality and that he may have to resign. However in other cases 
the arbitrator may simply make a full disclosure of the problem to the co-arbitrators 
and the parties
456
. 
 
According to Prof. Boo, a strict application of the rule of confidentiality would mean 
that a tribunal's finding or what had transpired in one arbitration may not be referred 
to in another even if the parties and subject matters involved are closely related. 
Apart from the obvious waste of time and resources, this could also lead to 
inconsistent findings by a different tribunal. In back-to-back contracts, a party who 
had lost in an earlier arbitration may be in an unenviable position if the party against 
whom he is seeking an indemnity insists on a replay of the evidence adduced before 
the earlier tribunal with no certainty that the second tribunal would come to the same 
or consistent finding or holding
457
. 
 
The consolidation may also raise difficulties for the effective administration of the 
case, when two proceedings have been filed under different mechanisms. According 
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to Prof. Cremades, the ultimate decision as to whether or not to order consolidation 
will lie within the discretionary powers of the arbitral tribunal. However, several 
non-exhaustive cumulative conditions are usually regarded in the balancing test for 
consolidation, including (a) that there is high degree of connection between the 
proceedings, so that the decision reached in one of them will have direct effects on 
the other; (b) that the consolidation is in the interests of both parties and of a fair and 
effective resolution of the claims; (c) that all the parties have granted their consent, if 
the applicable law or arbitration rules so require; and (d) that the consolidation is 
possible within the framework of the different applicable dispute resolution 
mechanisms
458
. 
 
First, consolidation requires a high degree of connection between the different claims 
with a risk of conflicting decisions or awards. It is not necessary that both 
proceedings refer to identical claims, but rather that there is close link of 
interdependence between them. The required degree of connection between the 
different claims may vary depending on the applicable arbitration rules. Some of 
them require that the triple-identity test (between parties, petitum and causa petendi) 
is fully met, but there is no uniform criteria. Article 4(6) of the ICC Rules seems, for 
example, to require that all claims refer to the same legal relationship, which is 
stricter than the criteria adopted by the LCIA Arbitration Rules
459
. 
 
Secondly, the main purpose of consolidation is the effective resolution of the 
disputes, avoiding inconsistent solutions, optimising resources, and contributing to 
appropriate administration of justice
460
. 
 
A third element, and the main issue to be discussed in any analysis of the 
consolidation of related proceedings, is the question of who can decide upon such 
consolidation. Recent arbitration practice shows that consent may be understood in 
broad terms, including both expressed and implied consent
461
.  
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The fourth element in the test for consolidation requires that all claims are being 
pursued under the same dispute resolution mechanisms. The greater the differences 
between the two mechanisms involved, the greater difficulties in the consolidation, 
especially when the law governing the merits of the case or the procedural rules are 
different
462
.  
 
Although most national arbitration laws and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration do not contain provisions on the consolidation 
of arbitral proceedings, such provisions are found in a limited number of laws
463
. 
Some legislators have simply enacted a solution which prevails in the absence of any 
agreement by the parties to the contrary, and which provides for consolidation of 
related arbitral proceedings ordered by the national courts, but subjects this power to 
the consent of all parties concerned
464
. This guards against mandatory consolidation 
based on the local court’s power, without the agreement of the parties involved. 
Other national laws, on the other hand, such as in the Netherlands
465
, for a while in 
                                                          
462
 Cremades, Madalena, supra note 46, p. 537.  
463
 Gaillard, ICC Bulletin 2003, supra note 443, p. 38. On the consolidation of related arbitration 
procedings in comparative law, see . F. Bourque, Le règlement des litiges multipartites dans l’arbitrage 
comercial international, Thesis University of Poitiers, France, 1989 at 508 ff; I.I. Dore, footnote 584; P. 
Level, Joinder of Proceedings Intervetion of Third Parties, and Additional Claims and Counterclaims, 
ICC Int. Comm. Arb. Bull. 36 (1996) 7:2; M. F. Guarin, International Approaches to Court-Ordered 
Consolidation of Arbitral Proceedings, The American Review of International Arbitration, 1993 (4), p. 
519 and 520; P. Sanders, Unity and Diversity in the Adoption of the Model Law, Arb. Int., 1995, Issue 1, 
p. 29; Edwin Tong Chun Fai, Nakul Dewan, Drafting Arbitration Agreements with “Consolidation” in 
Mind?”, Asian Int. Arb. Journal, 2009, Issue 1, p. 70 et seq.  
464
 See e.g. the international commercial arbitration statutes of some of the common law provinces and 
territories of Canada, such as Ontario and British Columbia; S. Jarvin, Canada’s Determined Move 
Towards International Commercial Arbtration, J. Int. Arb., 1986, Issue 3, p. 111; M. F. Guarin, ibid, p. 
532 ff.; Leboulanger, supra note 49, p. 58. Similarly, the state laws of those US states that have adopted 
the UNCITRAL Model Law have typically included a provision on consolidation of arbitral proceedings 
by the courts “on terms the court  considers just and necessary”, where all parties involved agree to such 
an application to the courts. See also s. 35 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act which allows the 
consolidation of arbitral proceedings only with the explicit agrement of the parties. See Redfern, Hunter, 
supra note 49, p.181; M. F. Guarin, ibid, p. 526. For a court’s criticism of the absence of any statutory 
power in England to order the consolidation of separate arbitral proceedings, see The Viemira, Aiden 
Shipping Co. Ltd. V. Interbulk Ltd., Lloyd’s Rep. 1984/2, p. 66. See also s.s 24-26 of the Australian 
International Arbitration Act. This position is adopted in the Arab legislation and jurisprudence. 
Especially the Lebanese and Syrian state courts reiterated their positions on the non-admissibility of the 
request for joinder of a third party to an arbitral proceeding, and considered that such request shall be 
dismissed unless all the parties to the arbitral proceeding and third party agreed to the joinder, see Prof. 
Obeid, supra note 435, p. 505. 
465
 See Article 1046 of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. For consolidation in Netherlands see Jan 
Willem Bitter, Consolidation of Arbitral Proceedings in the Netherlands: The Practice and Perspective of 
the NAI, in Multiple-Party Actions in International Arbitration, PCA, 2010, p. 221 et seq.  For a 
discussion of the article 1046 see J.J. van Haersoltevan Hof,  Consolidation under English Arbitration 
Act 1996: A View from the Netherlands, Arb. Int. 1997, Issue 4, p. 427; K. P. Berger, International 
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Hong Kong
466
, and the USA
467
, permit genuine court ordered consolidation of 
arbitral proceedings, even without the agreement of all the parties concerned. 
However, these provisions do not apply to the consolidation of arbitral proceedings 
and court proceedings
468
.  
 
In France, previously, the primacy of the will of the parties placed limits on any kind 
of judicial intervention regarding consolidation. Ex-Article 1444 of the New Code 
allowed French Courts to rule on difficulties regarding the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, but it did not empower judges to decide against what was stipulated in the 
arbitration agreement
469
. It seems that with the new arbitration rules adopted on 14 
January 2011 this rule is not changed, the limits of the intervention seems greater 
with the use of the official title of support judge (juge d’appui) of the President of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Germany) p.111;  M. F. Guarin, ibid, p. 533; G. Herrmann: “Does the World Need Additional Uniform 
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 Gaillard, ICC Bulletin 2003, supra note 443, p. 39. 
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Paris Court of First Instance within Article 1459. This term has been previously used 
in the doctrine and case law, but the president now officially has the sole jurisdiction 
to “support” international arbitration proceedings in case of related procedural 
disputes. This centralisation of power by the Paris Court has been commented on as a 
designation to ensure consistency in decisions
470
. 
 
Despite these rare provisions allowing for court-ordered consolidation of arbitration 
proceedings seated in a country whose law permits such consolidation, no law other 
than the Colombian decree allows related court proceedings and arbitral proceedings 
to be consolidated without the consent of all parties
471
.  
 
The consent of parties may result in two types of consolidation: The parties may 
agree to waive their arbitration agreement, and consolidate in a single court action
472
 
or in a single arbitration. With regard to the topic the author will focus on the 
consolidation in a single arbitration. 
 
 
F) Consolidation in a Single Arbitration   
 
 
Discussions concerning related or parallel proceedings in the context of international 
arbitration very rarely turn on the possible consolidation of court proceedings and 
arbitral proceedings. Rather, the topics that are normally discussed are the 
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 See the commentary of Christophe von Krause in Kluwer Arbitration Blog, New French Arbitration 
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consolidation of different arbitral proceedings. Unsurprisingly, the consolidation of 
such proceedings depends entirely on the agreement of all parties involved and it 
thus remains true the parties’ agreement constitutes both the foundation and, in the 
case of multi-party situations, sometimes the inconvenience of international 
arbitration
473
. 
 
The parties’ agreement to consolidate the related proceedings in a single arbitration, 
is the precondition for such consolidation. In the absence of such agreement, any 
award that is made on the basis of the arbitration agreement in one of the contracts at 
issue but extends to disputes arising out of another contract could be challenged on 
the ground that the arbitral tribunal decided- at least in part- in the absence of an 
arbitration agreement
474
. 
 
The parties’ agreement that their disputes should be solved through arbitration is not 
the only condition for consolidating related proceedings. In addition all the parties 
involved must agree to consolidate their arbitral proceedings with the related 
arbitration. Such agreement can obviously be made expressly
475
. The arbitral tribunal 
in the Sofidif arbitration, for instance, suggested to the parties that they expressly 
agree to extend the arbitration agreement in question to the cross-claim to be 
decided
476
.  
 
In any event, admissibility of counterclaims in multi-contract situations would still 
need to be linked back to an agreement to arbitrate found within one contract that, 
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because of the integrated nature of the various contracts, is held to be broad enough 
to encompass claims under distinct contracts
477
.  
 
In the absence of an express agreement to consolidate, the arbitral tribunal will have 
to examine whether the parties implicitly agreed to have the related arbitral 
proceedings consolidated. In the M&A arbitrations it will be difficult to interpret the 
parties’ true intent, particularly in cases where several contracts are connected. 
According to Ms. Chiu, the consolidation of proceedings is necessarily in line with 
the parties’ agreement, since the parties’ “fundamental goal” must be “a speedy and 
fair resolution of their disputes”478. However, alongside Prof. Gaillard, the author 
does not share this view. The concept of consolidation should be determined 
carefully on a case-by-case basis as to whether the parties implicitly agreed that 
disputes arising out of the related contracts could, and should, be heard together in a 
single arbitration
479
.   
 
G) Conclusion of Chapter III 
 
Following from the author’s examination of different proceedings in the different 
phases of M&A transactions and their relation to arbitration, this chapter further 
exposes the risks of multiple and parallel proceedings. Consistent with the working 
hypothesis, the author examined how consolidation may be applied to related 
disputes in M&A arbitrations while noting the deficit in existing arbitration rules. 
Possible guidelines for M&A arbitration will also be proposed.   
 
It is accepted that in each phase of M&A transactions there is a link between the 
agreements which demonstrates that there is a necessary interdependence between 
them. Following this view, one should typically mention that, during M&A 
transactions, there is a situation of multi-contract arbitration, which is regulated in 
the majority of institution rules and national legislations. However, as seen in this 
chapter, it is not convenient to apply directly multi-contract or consolidation rules to 
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M&A arbitration, because of the nature of M&A arbitrations distinct from typical 
multi-party or multi-contract arbitration i.e. M&A arbitrations are not typical 
examples of multi-contract arbitration. There are many reasons for this:  
 
Firstly, for multi-contract issues, institution rules focus on the condition of 
“connection” between contracts. However, the meaning and the extent of 
“connection” fails to appear in any rules or legislation. For instance, in a recent 
revision by an institution on multiple contracts, the ICC Arbitration Rules 2012 state 
that:  
 
“claims arising out of or in connection with more than one 
contract may be made in a single arbitration, irrespective of 
whether such claims are made under one or more than one 
arbitration agreement under the Rules”. 
 
However, the lack of meaning or definition of the term “connection” creates 
problems. For instance in the CEPANI cases studied above, the Appointment 
Committee decided that there is no relation between the sale purchase agreement and 
shareholding agreements because of the problem of representations and warranties 
without stating any reason. This limit the analysis of the tribunals finding however, it 
is noted that in their consideration the following was considered: a) The parties b) the 
applicable law c) the number of arbitrators i.e. was consolidation the optimal 
solution. These considerations are not consistent with the provisions of arbitration 
institutions. Therefore, the absence of definition of “connection” or “related 
agreements”, the tribunal in this instance developed its own criteria. However, in the 
author’s opinion it is not possible to generalise that where there is a dispute of 
representations and warranties there is no “connection” between the purchase 
agreement and shareholders agreement. The arbitral tribunal determination in this 
case can be considered specific to these disputes and offers little practical application 
for practitioners in future disputes. This is a recurring problem in M&A arbitrations 
which could be suitably cured by practical guidelines.  
 
Research has shown that it is not possible to mention that M&A arbitration is a 
typical example of multi-contract arbitration. In the first chapter it is mentioned that 
there is a relation between different phases of M&A transactions. However these 
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relations do not amount to “connection” in every case. Therefore it cannot be 
presumed that M&A arbitrations are always multi-contract arbitrations.  
 
Furthermore, if one of the parties to an arbitration is strategically applying to a 
national court or another arbitration, which occurs very often in M&A transactions, 
parallel proceedings between arbitration and court proceedings are not regulated in 
any institution rules.  
 
Depending on the different phases of M&A transaction, the same or related disputes 
may arise in parallel proceedings before different arbitral tribunals, as seen in 
CEPANI cases No. 2176 and No. 2189 analysed above, or between courts and 
arbitral tribunals. While there is no unanimous solution, discussions rarely turn on 
the possible consolidation of arbitral proceedings. Consolidation which offers 
solution to parallel proceedings is inhibited by the lack of guidelines or definition of 
connection. However, the consolidation of related court proceedings and arbitral 
proceedings raises important obstacles both on the conceptual and procedural level. 
Institution rules impose conditions for consolidation on parties’ agreement. However, 
the problem arises as to how the interpretation of parties’ agreement will be done.  
The principle of party autonomy imposes that any consolidation necessarily depends 
on the agreement of all the parties involved. Nonetheless, arbitration institutions such 
as the ICC, LCIA etc. stipulate that all claims seeking consolidation must not be 
contrary to the parties’ agreement and should be made under the same arbitration 
agreement, or same agreements where the parties are the same. However, as seen 
above in M&A arbitration depending on different phases, arbitration or court 
proceedings are determined in different agreements which cause the problem of 
parallel proceedings. 
 
In cases of parallel proceedings, the question arises about whether the parallel 
proceedings concern the same or related disputes. Where the same dispute is 
concerned, two doctrines can appear to assist: “lis pendens” and “res judicata”. It is 
possible to use these doctrines in M&A arbitrations. If an application for lis pendens 
and res judicata is filed, it is necessary that both actions concern the same dispute 
and the same legal ground. However, in the author’s opinion, in M&A arbitration the 
“same legal ground” criterion can be problematic. It is necessary to clarify this 
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notion of the same legal grounds within the context of M&A arbitration, because, it 
is possible to consider all disputes arising from an M&A transaction as falling within 
the same legal ground. A guideline can be recommended to define the limits of this 
notion to assist practitioners and insure consistency in the area.  
 
On the other hand, while applying the doctrines of lis pendens and res judicata, 
earlier and final adjudication by a court or arbitration tribunal is conclusive in 
subsequent proceedings. However, it is difficult to apply this rule directly to M&A 
arbitration. In M&A arbitration, very often where an award is issued in initial stages 
such as negotiations and/or letter of intent, the parties alter their terms applicable to 
the next steps, and in these cases the subsequent changes may be more favourable to 
the parties of M&A. Given that the parties wish to adhere to their altered terms, what 
should be done with the earlier award based on the previous terms? In different 
arbitration cases noted, it is also indicated that the parties can still progress to 
different phases of M&A in spite of the existence of problems in previous phases. 
Therefore, in the author’s opinion, there should be some restrictions on the 
application of lis pendens and res judicata in M&A arbitration, and the best way of 
doing this is to draw up guidelines for M&A arbitration. For instance, guidelines 
could recommend individual evaluation of each phase with an arbitration agreement 
contained in itself, and “connection” should only be taken into consideration for 
material elements (such as price, information about the target company etc.), not for 
arbitration agreements. This is also more suitable for autonomy of arbitration clauses 
particular to their respective phases.  
 
A third reason why the potential disadvantages of consolidation render its application 
convenient for M&A arbitration is confidentiality. From the beginning of 
negotiations, confidentiality is the main point that parties pay attention to during the 
process. The uses of a confidentiality agreement or data room within the organisation 
of the target company are common methods employed in order to protect 
confidential information. While consolidating two or more proceedings, confidential 
information about the target companies may be exposed to parties to the consolidated 
proceedings. On the other hand, similarly for res judicata and lis pendens, subsequent 
proceedings become privy to earlier determinations which may contain information 
parties’ would rather remain confidential.  Therefore, neither consolidation clauses 
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proposed by arbitration institutions or national legislatures or the doctrines of res 
judicata and lis pendens are convenient for M&A arbitrations. 
 
As a solution to the problems mentioned above, in practice alternative dispute 
resolution has been used as a substitute or incoordination with traditional dispute 
resolution methods offered by courts and arbitral tribunals in M&A transactions. The 
following chapter will examine the emergence of ADR used in M&A transactions 
and the relation with arbitration. ADR has proved effective in providing flexible 
means to address the complexities involved in M&A transactions owing to the 
different phases. However, it will be shown that ADR and its interface with 
arbitration can pose procedural complexities in the forthcoming chapter.    
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CHAPTER IV: MULTI-STEP PROCESSES IN M&A 
TRANSACTIONS   
 
A) Introduction 
 
In order to avoid multiple and parallel proceedings and problems arising from 
convergent decisions, which were examined in Chapter Three, parties in M&A 
transactions, as a second option, may also choose different alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) proceedings
480
. The number of the potential conflicts detailed in 
Chapter Three proves there is considerable scope for disputes arising during any 
M&A transactions prior to a deal’s consummation. Therefore, it is important to 
choose an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism that is tailored for possible 
incidents and the particular circumstances of the transaction. 
 
The promise of a negotiated solution with time and cost savings, combined with the 
finality of a determinative process like arbitration, is proving increasingly attractive. 
Arbitration also meets the needs of the business community which judicial litigation 
cannot, such as the confidentiality of disputes and the use of expertise in their 
settlement. Such expertise in the analysis of the merits of the case is a clear and 
settled advantage of ADR methods. Confidentiality – especially in arbitration – has 
also become crucial and disputed factor which the parties to arbitration expect to be 
effective. This contrasts sharply with the public nature of litigation. Consequently, it 
is perceived to be particularly advantageous where both parties to a dispute are 
anxious to protect and control their priceless confidential material.  
 
The valued tailoring of these methods to such intricate transactions, however, 
demands a great deal of negotiation between contract drafters to avoid those 
problems most likely to arise. Draftsmen in merger transactions frequently include 
mixed or multi-step dispute resolution clauses where any disputes relating to 
particular matters such as post-closing balance sheet adjustments, will be resolved by 
a neutral expert, whereas all other dispute(s) will fall under a more general 
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arbitration provision, i.e. a combination of binding and non-binding ADR 
mechanisms
481
.  
 
Given the large number of ADR mechanisms available, it is not the author’s 
intention to deal with every ADR method for solving disputes. Focus will 
concentrate more on the binding and non-binding effects of ADR in M&A 
transactions and their relation with arbitration. Therefore, after discussing the terms 
conciliation and mediation, expert determination which is most used in M&A 
transactions is specifically addressing the question whether a hybrid staged process 
involving ADR with arbitration can serve as a practical mechanism in M&A 
arbitration.  
 
B) Background  
 
The survey of corporate attitudes to international arbitration conducted by the School 
of International Arbitration, Queen Mary College, University of London, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2006 found that, of the 73% of respondents who 
preferred international arbitration as their dispute resolution mechanism of choice, 
approximately two-thirds preferred to use arbitration “in combination with ADR 
mechanisms” in a “multi-tiered, or escalating, dispute resolution process”482. These 
mechanisms are referred to as “escalation clauses”483, “multi-tier clauses”484, “multi-
step alternative dispute resolution clauses”485, “ADR-first clauses”, or “Integrated 
Dispute Resolution Clauses”486. 
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As a matter of fact, companies which enter into transnational merger transactions 
show the desire to avoid, both the escalation of antagonism that the adversarial 
system has come to represent, and the severe financial consequences of corporate 
litigation. Thus, contrary to the former longstanding attitude of seeking justice 
through judicial channels, nowadays many companies seek to settle their conflicts 
through consensus, where practicable. Mechanisms available include binding and 
non-binding procedures. These devices are not always mutually exclusive, but rather 
complementary, especially when applied in M&A transactions
487
.  
 
According to Von Segesser, dispute resolution clauses are often discussed and 
negotiated at the very end of lengthy M&A negotiations, and their drafting does not 
always get the degree of attention it should. Considering what may be at stake, not 
only with respect to the time and costs involved, but also the fact that a divergence of 
opinions may jeopardise the entire transaction, it should be the duty of the 
negotiators or their advisors to provide the appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanism(s)
488
.  
 
Where many dispute resolution methods are anticipated, it is important to draw a 
clear line between the task and competence of the expert, on the one hand, and the 
scope of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, on the other. However, each dispute 
resolution mechanism has its own characteristics. When integrated in a tiered ADR 
clause, those differences must be anticipated in the drafting. Failure to do so can 
have serious consequences
489
. 
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One set of issues involves the drafting of integrated clauses. Should the negotiation 
and conciliation phases be mandatory or optional? If mandatory, should there be a 
mechanism by which a party may withdraw and proceed to a binding phase of the 
process where the other party is delaying or obstructing dispute resolution? Should 
clauses or statutes provide that conciliation settlements may be enforced as arbitral 
awards, or only as contracts? What provisions in clauses can strengthen the 
enforcement of settlement agreements
490
? 
 
Depending on the text, the multi-step dispute resolution clause can be considered as: 
(a) a condition precedent to the commencement of arbitration, (b) a procedural 
requirement for arbitration, or (c) a procedural step that ought to be followed for a 
party's own benefit (“carga procesal”)491. 
 
On one side of the debate believes the clause bars recourse to arbitration until the 
negotiation process has been complied with, and is therefore a type of condition 
precedent. This position is popular among U.S. courts, when the parties clearly desire 
to establish an obligation as such. The clause has similarly been considered to be a 
“pactum de non petendo”, a temporary waiver of the right to commence arbitration 
until negotiation has ended
492
. Except for a U.S. court decision which held that the 
arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction because a condition precedent had not been 
met
493
, the consensus is that this issue should be decided by the arbitration 
tribunal
494
.   
 
 
C) Different ADR Procedures used in M&A Transactions and Interaction 
with Arbitration Proceedings  
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C-1) Conciliation 
 
There are many statutes regulating conciliation in various countries. Indeed, they 
were described recently by one author as a “hodgepodge,” a “rag bag” and a 
“confusing quilt of laws that create different rules for all the different areas in which 
mediation or conciliation is supposed to take place”495. Much of this legislation is 
permissive or provides default provisions for situations in which parties do not adopt 
conciliation rules or draft full conciliation agreements
496
. 
 
According to Martin Hunter, in modern times, the terms “mediation” and 
“conciliation” have come to be used interchangeably. In Asia and in the civil law 
countries of Europe the term “conciliation” is commonly used. In the United States, 
the term “mediation” is more usual. In the models used here, the UNCITRAL 
Conciliation Rules are used merely as an example
497
. 
 
Many M&A agreements provide for a conciliation mechanism to resolve potential 
conflicts either alone, or in combination with other dispute resolution instruments
498
. 
Often, such clauses provide that parties may only file a request for arbitration or 
initiate court proceedings after they have undergone conciliation or mediation. Such 
conciliation efforts may be conducted in a variety of ways, such as with a neutral 
conciliator, a dispute resolution board
499
, or by turning to a higher management level 
within both parties
500
.  
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Conciliation procedures are particularly useful in long-term construction projects 
where they are used to settle conflicts speedily and efficiently without jeopardising 
the completion of a project. In the M&A context, and especially with regard to 
disputes before closing, the same benefits can apply. However, conciliation should 
not be misused and the initiation of arbitration or court proceedings should not be 
delayed where successful conciliation appears to be unrealistic
501
.    
 
If a share purchase agreement or a preliminary document (letter of intent or others) 
provides for conciliation prior to adjudication, the question arises as to whether an 
arbitral tribunal is bound by such a clause should a party initiate arbitral proceedings 
without having undergone conciliation (or some other ADR procedure). Where there 
is a clear obligation for the parties to attempt to settle their disputes first through 
conciliation, the arbitral tribunal will have to decline jurisdiction
502
, or to suspend 
arbitral proceedings for a defined period of time to allow the conciliation to take 
place
503
. This is the English Law perspective. As Mr. Naughton states, an arbitral 
tribunal applying English law will decline jurisdiction where a contractual provision 
expressly states that determinate procedures are a condition precedent to arbitration, 
until they have been followed. But non-determinative procedures, e.g. negotiation or 
mediation, would be considered unenforceable and not constituting a condition 
precedent to the tribunal assuming jurisdiction
504
. 
 
In Germany, the Federal Supreme Court in a decision where the parties had agreed in 
the context of a purchase agreement, that in case of dispute, the parties would first 
present their controversy to their local professional organisation for conciliation, 
prior to commencing litigation. The claimant failed to do so, and argued that in the 
circumstances conciliation was a futile exercise, given that the respondent had shown 
no willingness to settle the matter in earlier negotiations. The court held that such 
pre-litigation conciliation clauses are valid and must be respected by the parties and 
the courts. Thus, as long as a party invoking the pre-trial conciliation clause had a 
legitimate interest in conciliation, the courts had to treat an action filed prior to the 
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agreed conciliation as inadmissible (without prejudice) (unzulässig), but not as 
unfounded (with prejudice) (unbegründet)505. 
 
Like the German Federal Supreme Court, the French Cour de Cassation
506
, the 
English Commercial Court
507
, the Supreme Court of New South Wales
508
, and the 
Irish High Court
509
, also assume a comparable procedural effect for a preliminary 
mediation or other ADR clause. The US courts, whose jurisprudence is characterised 
by a positive basic attitude to ADR proceedings, have also advocated the 
enforceability of such clauses
510
. The US Uniform Mediation Act similarly provides 
for the enforceability of ADR agreements
511
. Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Conciliation also provides that an undertaking to 
conciliate shall be given effect by a court or arbitral tribunal, provided that the parties 
have ‘expressly undertaken not to initiate, during a specified period of time or until a 
specified event has occurred, arbitral or judicial proceedings with respect to an 
existing or future dispute’512. 
 
In contrast, the Zurich Court of Cassation (Kassationsgericht) qualified the pactum 
de non petendo contained in a mediation agreement as an element of substantive law, 
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and therefore, denied it the quality of a procedural requirement. In consequence, the 
action before the arbitral tribunal was not dismissed as inadmissible, despite the 
failure to comply with the escalation levels
513
. 
 
In a recent decision, the Swiss Supreme Court examined whether contractual 
provisions contemplating certain procedural steps before initiating arbitration 
proceedings impacted the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
514
. The Supreme Court 
confirmed that a party believing that a mandatory pre-arbitral procedure had not been 
followed could rely on Art. 190(2)(b) PIL Act (lack of jurisdiction). According to the 
Court the more specific and binding the contractual language used to describe the 
pre-arbitral mechanism, the more likely arbitral tribunals and the Court will sanction 
the absence of its implementation, and vice versa. Although not clearly stated, parties 
must undertake the required steps antecedent to arbitration in good faith. However, 
bad faith cannot be presumed merely if a party insists on its position. 
 
According to Prof. Berger, if a party brings an action before an arbitral tribunal 
bypassing the contractually agreed escalation levels, the respondent's reaction is 
determined by the principles applicable to objections to jurisdiction of the arbitration 
law at the seat of the arbitration (lex loci arbitri)
515
.  
 
In several ICC arbitrations over the last decade, tribunals have dealt with the issue of 
multi-tier arbitration clauses
516
. In ICC cases, when faced with an objection from a 
respondent alleging that the claimant has submitted the request for arbitration 
prematurely, without having completed the necessary steps prior to arbitration, the 
arbitration tribunals tend to adopt a two-ponged approach. First, considering whether 
the parties were obligated to attempt amicable dispute resolution before arbitration. If 
the answer is yes, they then look at the facts to determine whether or not this 
obligation has been fulfilled
517
. Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by 
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the Court’s decision that an arbitration agreement exists, and may render a final 
decision as to its jurisdiction in an interim or final award
518
. 
 
The issue of whether a multi-tiered dispute resolution clause raises a valid condition 
precedent to arbitration is a question of jurisdiction. Under the Kompentenz-
Kompentenz principle, it is question to be ascertained by the arbitral tribunal itself; 
but the effectiveness of the clause will depend on whether there is doubt about the 
parties’ intention to resolve the dispute by arbitration should ADR fail519. 
 
In addition, there are always certain exceptions that allow the parties to resort 
directly to arbitration without following all the tiers addressed in an escalating 
dispute resolution clause. This would be the case “…where interim relief of some 
sort is required”520. 
 
Accordingly, it is advisable that the parties provide in the dispute resolution clause 
that they “…retain the right to seek interim relief from an appropriate court or 
arbitration tribunal.”521 
 
C-2) Mediation 
 
Mediation is a dispute resolution method which may, in specific situations, lead to an 
acceptable outcome within a short time frame. In contrast to arbitration, in which the 
tribunal adjudicates over conflicting interests, mediation is aimed at establishing the 
parties’ common interests in order to find a solution based thereon. In M&A 
transactions in particular, it might be helpful and efficient to initiate mediation, with 
a mediator who has expert knowledge in the area of the disputed issue, which might 
add another dimension to the discussion in which the two negotiator are mired
522
.  
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Research in the area of international arbitration indicates that European jurisdictions 
may be more comfortable with the notion of arbitrators making settlement and 
meditative interventions than their Anglo-American counterparts
523
.  
 
To understand the differences between mediation and consolidation one can refer to 
the Discussion Paper by the lord Chancellor’s Department on Alternative Dispute 
Resolution where while defining “Mediation” and “Conciliation”, it is stated that 
“Mediation” is a way of settling disputes by a third party who helps both sides to 
come to an agreement, which each considers acceptable. Mediation can be 
“evaluative” or “facilitative”. “Conciliation” is a procedure like mediation but the 
third party, the conciliator, takes a more interventionist role in bringing the two 
parties together and in suggesting possible solutions to help achieve a settlement
524
. 
These discussions show that the mediator is a facilitator and does not have a pro-
active role
525
. 
 
In an article from the US, a number of conciliators treat “conciliation” as less formal 
and “mediation” as pro-active where there is an agenda and there are ground rules. In 
the US from the informal conciliation process, if it fails, the neutral person moves on 
to a greater role as a “conciliator”. In the US the word “mediator” reflects a role 
which is attributed to a pro-active conciliator in the UNCITRAL Model. The position 
in the US, in terms of definitions, is therefore merely a restatement in alternative 
wording than the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules or English Arbitration and 
Conciliation Act 1996 where the conciliator has a greater role, along the same lines 
as the mediator in the US
526
. 
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      C-3) Med-Arb or Arb-Med 
 
Med-Arb defines when an attempt is first made to resolve a dispute by mutual 
agreement through mediation and if it fails, then directly proceeding to a binding 
arbitration. Med-arb is sometimes said to be superior to pure mediation on the 
grounds that a binding resolution is assured
527
.  
 
It offers advantages: first, that the process will, in one way or another, produce a 
resolution; second, that parties may perhaps try harder to be reasonable and to 
resolve the matter during the mediation phase; and third, that if an adjudication is 
required, there will be no loss of time or cost in having to re-acquaint a new neutral 
party with the facts of the case and the issues between the parties
528
.  
 
It may also have negative consequences in comparison with mediation. If the parties 
in med-arb feel that a settlement has been imposed upon them – rather than 
voluntarily agreed to – they may be less willing to comply with the same. 
Additionally, if the parties focus primarily on persuading the mediator that they are 
right, rather than seeking an accommodation with the other party, they will not 
improve their ability to resolve disputes without resort to an outside decision-
maker
529
.  
 
Traditionally, it was an agreed doctrine within the world of arbitration that an 
arbitrator's duty should not be mixed with any mediating activity or intent to 
reconcile. Several arbitral institutions have begun to recognize the options available, 
and this has been reflected in their arbitration/conciliation rules. Where the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 2002 governs a 
dispute, it allows a conciliator to act as an arbitrator in the same case subject only to 
the consent of the parties
530
. This shows a limited acceptance of Med-Arb, which is 
reflected in the rules of several institutions. For example, the ICC has Rules of 
Optional Conciliation, which do not allow for a conciliator to subsequently become 
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an arbitrator, unless the parties agree
531
. This provision, however, is rather limited in 
that Art. 11 provides that parties “agree not to introduce in any arbitration proceeding 
any proposals put forward by the conciliator”. Institutions are gradually 
incorporating Med-Arb in some form into their accepted procedures. For example, 
since 1 April 1999, the Mediation Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce's Rules provide for Med-Arb
532
. 
 
 
This was one of the greatest dangers widely highlighted in arbitration seminars, as it 
was stated clearly that an arbitrator who initiated conciliation or mediation was 
exposed to the risk of an eventual challenge
533
.  
 
Again, the participation in international commercial arbitration of jurists with such 
different origins has, in practice, caused such inflexible positions to be questioned
534
. 
Even in continental Europe, procedural laws in countries of Germanic origin have 
included an obligation for the judge to facilitate conciliation between opposing 
parties throughout proceedings. Likewise, in Far East countries, conciliation is 
something natural and closer to the mentality of its jurists than litigation or 
arbitration. The excessive ‘judicialization’ of international commercial arbitration 
has in fact led to the search for alternative dispute resolution techniques distinct from 
both litigation and arbitration
535
. 
 
The first question which arises is knowing whether a person who has acted as 
mediator or conciliator may later intervene as an arbitrator in the same conflict and 
among the same parties; because, according to Prof. Lew, a mediator or conciliator 
should be able to put legal and factual issues out of his mind in order to assist in 
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settlement. This assistance may involve revising a contract for future execution, 
narrowing the issues and problems at stake, identifying the strengths and weaknesses 
of the respective parties' cases, and helping the parties to understand one another and 
to look towards making a deal at this early stage. He should have the courage to put 
pressure on and cajole the parties where necessary
536
.  
 
The general rejection which this proposition enjoyed some years ago is today 
questioned even by the most reticent. It primarily depends on the will of the parties 
in conflict, and the ethical beliefs of the person whose services are solicited. The 
parties may even prefer someone who has knowledge of a conflict in conciliation to 
be the person in charge of deciding as arbitrator after the conciliation or mediation 
attempt has failed. The limits of his performance as arbitrator will have to be 
established by himself in accordance with his own conscience: in his decision, it 
seems quite impossible that he may mentally disregard everything which he may 
have discovered during the conciliation or mediation phase; however, the influence 
and use during his arbitral decision-making process of all that he has discovered, is 
something which only he can determine within the limits of the parties’ desires and 
the applicable arbitration rules and legislation
537
. 
 
Another question rests in knowing whether, during arbitration proceedings, the 
parties may consent to the arbitral tribunal undertaking the functions of a conciliator 
or mediator
538
. Until very recently, rejection of this arbitration doctrine was general.  
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Today, this question depends on the will of the parties. Having chosen arbitration, 
the parties’ expectations of an adjudication are basically assured. This does not 
preclude a tribunal from actively suggesting exploration of settlement, but any such 
exploration must be voluntarily accepted by, rather than imposed on, the parties, who 
must also have the power to choose how any settlement explorations are to be 
conducted. If the arbitrator is vested with a meditative function (amiable 
compositeur), and if it is envisaged that the same person may return to the arbitral 
function, this should be voluntarily and explicitly agreed. Provided that such 
transparency is respected, party expectations will not be disappointed and arbitration 
as an institution will be broad enough to accommodate the diversity of psychology 
that prevails throughout the world in respect of dispute resolution. For instance, in 
the ‘Machinery Joint Venture’539 case, Med-Arb was successfully employed to 
produce an agreement between the parties, without the need for a formal settlement 
agreement or an award
540
.  
 
The arbitral tribunal with the parties must establish the terms of the conciliation or 
mediation period and suspend arbitral activity during such a phase. In the event that 
the mediation or conciliation is successful, then the parties by mutual agreement 
must decide how this positive result should be formalized: either separately from the 
arbitration proceedings or as an agreed award by the tribunal
541
. Likewise, they must 
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settlement does not always surprise an arbitrator. Often, the nature of 
the dispute or certain elements of it, immediately suggest settlement possibilities. The arbitrator may then 
recommend conciliation to the parties, a practice which is common in the courts of a number of 
countries. Thus, in France, courts practise so-called judicial mediation by means of which the court itself 
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set the terms under which the arbitration proceedings shall continue if the 
conciliation or mediation between the parties does not prove possible, establishing 
these conditions in the clearest possible fashion to prevent challenge of the arbitrator 
or an eventual appeal of the arbitration award. In any event, the arbitral tribunal will 
decide the ethical limits within which it may use the information which has been 
obtained during the conciliation or mediation attempt, in the arbitration phase. The 
important question may arise as to whether the arbitrator becomes bound in his 
arbitration decision to any proposal he made during the mediation phase. For 
example, if under mediation terms he proposes the payment of a specific 
compensation to one of the parties, may he disregard his mediation proposal or even 
modify it later in making his arbitration decision after his mediation formula has 
been rejected
542
. 
 
Prof. Hunter responds to this question with arbitration-first clauses. He believes that 
there is no reason to expect that the results of an integrated “arbitration-first” system 
would be less effective than the results of such processes
543
. 
 
Indeed, support for this proposition can be found in the ICC and the American 
Arbitration Association’s published materials. The foreword to the ICC’s ADR Rules 
refers to the possibility of the parties solving the dispute amicably after the 
arbitration has been commenced. Further, in earlier versions of its guide on drafting 
ADR clauses, the AAA offered a model “Arb-Med” clause, which envisaged sealing 
the arbitration award for a certain number of days to give the parties an opportunity 
to negotiate a settlement while the award was “hanging over their heads” like a 
sword of Damocles. This guide also rightly emphasized the cost advantages of 
starting mediation procedures at a much earlier stage of arbitration proceedings. 
However, the current version of the AAA's Guide has dropped this feature
544
, and the 
ICC has never offered model clauses or procedures for “arbitration-first” schemes545. 
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Under the 2011 Hong-Kong Arbitration Ordinance, a member of an arbitral tribunal 
is permitted to serve as a mediator after arbitration proceedings have begun, provided 
that all parties give their written consent. The Ordinance provides that, in these 
circumstances, the proceedings are to be stayed to afford the mediation the maximum 
chance of success – although if the mediation fails, the arbitrator-mediator is required 
to disclose to all parties any confidential information obtained during the mediation 
which he considers to be “material to the arbitral proceedings”546. 
 
The arbitrator's interactive approach as a formula to overcome the possible clash of 
legal cultures shows that the initial dogmatic rejection of the combination of 
arbitration with an eventual mediation or conciliation is not correct, especially parties 
express this by mutual agreement
547
. Commentators on arbitration in Germany argue 
that there is no need for a new system of mediation, but just a recognition that 
mediation is one of the functions of the arbitrator. In their view, “arbitration and 
mediation form a synthesis not an antithesis”548.  
 
In order to decrease this clash of legal cultures, Prof. Lew proposes that inspiration to 
re-evaluate the arbitrator’s role can be taken from Singapore Sect. 17(3) of the 
Singapore International Arbitration Act 2002. He proposes that with the written 
consent of both parties to the mediator acting as arbitrator should be obtained at the 
outset, perhaps at the preparatory conference. As a precautionary measure, such 
consent should be recorded in the minutes of the hearing or as standardized wording 
in a separate procedural protocol, to the effect that the mediation should not give 
reason to challenge the tribunal on the grounds of lack of impartiality
549
. 
 
C-4) Expert Determination 
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Expert determination can be a very efficient and time effective way to solve a 
conflict about a factual issue, such as valuation, the examination of financial 
statements whether a material adverse change has occurred, and, in general, on issues 
where a state court or an arbitral tribunal would also have to rely on an expert
550
.   
 
In many M&A transactions, the appointed experts are chartered accountants or 
professionals with a technical, environmental, financial, or construction background. 
Among the said non-binding alternatives, the retention of a neutral expert (an 
established ‘big six’ accounting firm) is widely practised in cross-border merger 
transactions
551
. The issues typically subject to expert determination relate to 
valuation matters, such as determining the net equity of the target company as a basis 
for calculating the purchase price, or the company’s future earnings in the context of 
EBIT or EBITDA guarantees or earn out clauses
552
.  
 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, experts have the power to make binding 
determinations regarding a particular fact
553
. However, as a rule, expert 
determinations do not result in an enforceable decision, in contrast to the situation 
with an arbitration award
554
. 
 
Expert determination is intended to be a mechanism independent and distinct from 
the general arbitration mechanism. This is reflected in M&A contracts in practice, 
where as a rule expert determination clauses are embedded in the price adjustment 
provisions. By contrast, arbitration clauses are typically found at the end of the 
contract. It is interesting, and even surprising, to note that M&A contracts rarely 
provide any specific language as to the demarcation of the two proceedings from 
each other. In most cases, they simply stand parallel. However, arbitral practice 
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shows both that the demarcation of the two mechanisms from each other, and the 
interaction between them, is not always easy
555
.   
 
Nevertheless, as a starting point, it is generally held both in civil and common law 
jurisdictions that an arbitral tribunal or state court lacks jurisdiction to the extent that 
a matter has been contractually referred to expert determination
556
. Under German 
and Swiss law, this effect is referred to as “Ausschlusswirkung”, and this effect of 
exclusion of competence is reciprocal between the two mechanisms. Hence, if a 
party were to start arbitration proceedings, introducing a claim the factual basis of 
which, pursuant to the contract, is subject to the expert determination, (for example, 
by claiming a reduction from the purchase price on the ground of an alleged shortfall 
in the target company’s net equity), such request for arbitration would have to be 
dismissed as premature
557
.  
 
The author believes that the parallelism between different ADR, including the expert 
determination and arbitration is a question of binding or non-binding effect of these 
ADR mechanisms. In that case, drafting in such clauses is a key issue in order to 
precise the demarcation between ADR and arbitration. Quite often such clauses are 
relatively short and simply state that if the parties fail to agree on, for instance, a 
valuation issue, then this matter shall be referred for determination by a neutral 
expert whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties. As a rule, expert 
determination clauses further state the required qualifications of the expert, e.g. 
neutrality, specific know-how, and provide - similar to arbitration clauses - that 
failing an agreement between the parties on the neutral expert to be appointed, such 
expert shall be nominated by an appointing authority, so that one party cannot 
prevent the proceedings from taking place. However, many clauses are more 
elaborate defining the powers of the expert and the proceedings to be followed in 
detail
558
.  
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On the other hand, there are cases in which it is questionable whether a clause 
providing for expert determination must in reality be interpreted as an arbitration 
clause. Thus, in Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v. Kayah Holdings 
Pty Ltd, despite the clear wording that the so-called referee shall act as an expert and 
not as an arbitrator, the Supreme Court of Western Australia found that because the 
referee was entrusted to decide any dispute arising out of the contract, the clause 
operated “to oust the jurisdiction” and should therefore not be recognized559. 
Certainly, this is a rather extreme case which probably rarely occurs in the context of 
M&A contracts where the scope of the expert determination, as a rule, does not 
encompass any disputes between the parties, but is limited to specific valuation 
issues. Nevertheless, even in M&A contracts, the question sometimes arises whether 
the parties agreed on an expert determination or on arbitral proceeding. In most 
jurisdictions, the terminology used by the parties is not ultimately decisive. Rather, 
one has to examine the true intention of the parties: Did they want the expert, or the 
referee, to decide on a specific question of fact; or did they intend that such third 
party be authorized to decide any disputes between them as a whole
560
? 
 
C-4-1) Problems Involving Expert Determination 
 
In arbitration practice, parallelism between the expert determination or other ADR 
mechanisms and the arbitration mechanism often creates problems. Mr. Sachs gives 
examples from practice for expert determination which are undoubtedly valid for 
other ADR mechanisms as well
561
.  
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In the first example the parties agreed an EBITDA guarantee
562
 which provided for 
terms as to how to evaluate the EBITDA. A dispute arose as to proper meaning of an 
accounting term used.  The question came up whether an expert was empowered to 
decide on the correct interpretation of the contract term and was this a task which the 
expert was empowered to fulfil in the context of his evaluation of the EBITDA, or 
was this a legal matter to be decided by the arbitral tribunal? If this was a legal 
matter, how would the two proceedings interact?
563
 
 
In another example, a dispute on the correct Net Equity of the sold company resulted 
in expert determination proceedings. It lasted for one year and half, and at the end the 
buyer commenced arbitration to challenge the result of the expert determination on 
the ground that it had not been heard sufficiently and that the result was materially 
wrong. What rules of procedure apply to an expert determination proceeding? Is an 
expert determination result final and binding even though it is materially wrong? Can 
it be challenged on the ground that procedural rights have been violated? What 
happens if the challenge is successful?
564
 
 
In the last example, it was agreed the Buyer of the Company was to prepare and 
submit to the Seller the Closing Date Accounts within 180 days after the closing. For 
various reasons this did not happen in time. Therefore, the Seller, who still had 
access to the sold Company, arranged for the Closing Date Accounts to be prepared 
and claimed them to be the ones foreseen in the expert determination clause. The 
Buyer rejected those Accounts on the ground that he had not prepared them and 
prepared and submitted his own Accounts, but long after the lapse of the 180 day 
period. There was a disagreement between the parties as to the correct Net Equity 
value. Neither of the two Accounts fulfilled the formal prerequisites for the expert 
determination proceedings – the Seller’s Accounts having not been submitted by the 
Buyer, and the Buyer’s Accounts having not been submitted in a timely manner. 
What must happen in such a situation? Can the Seller’s Accounts be considered as 
replacing the Accounts required under the contract? Can the expert determination 
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clause work on this basis? Or, shall the case be submitted first to the arbitral tribunal 
in order to decide which Accounts are relevant and if neither of them are relevant, to 
decide the correct Net Equity itself, with the help of a tribunal-appointed expert?
565
 
 
Following this, confusion can arise when separate documents in a single transaction 
make reference to both expert determinations and arbitration without clarifying their 
relationship. Such a situation can occur, for example, in a transaction implemented 
by more than one agreement, in which the parties provide for one type of dispute 
resolution mechanism (such as appraisal or ruling by accountants on balance sheet 
adjustments) in one agreement, and for a different type (typically arbitration) in 
another related document. If a dispute arises, one party may claim that it is a balance 
sheet adjustment to be determined by an accountant, while the other may say that the 
dispute arises out of or is related to a transaction document containing an arbitration 
clause. Is that for arbitrators to determine? For a court
566
? If the parties address both 
is it possible to declare “lis pendens”? 
 
C-4-2) Solutions proposed 
 
Referring to the previous chapter, applying to the consent of the parties is 
recommended. When analysing the issues raised by these case examples, it is 
important to understand that the concept of expert determination and the scope of 
these ADR mechanisms are contractual. Most jurisdictions concur that arbitration 
laws do not apply to expert determination proceedings. This has important 
consequences: there are no binding procedural rules; there is no court support 
available regarding procedural incidences, e.g., making a challenge against an  
expert; and most importantly, the result of the expert determination cannot be 
enforced
567
.  
 
Therefore it is essential to focus to the intent of the parties in stead of applying for 
court intervention. In so doing, it is important to focus first on the draft of the clause 
and discuss the scope of it. But the issue arises as to whether the expert may interpret 
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the contract, or whether this is the exclusive task of the arbitral tribunal of the court. 
Under French law, such expert interpretation is not permissible due to the particular 
concept of the “mandataire commun”. Under the traditional view of French law, the 
correct interpretation of an accounting term in question, for example, could not be 
left to an expert, but would have to be deliberated on by a judge or arbitrator. 
However, the Paris Court of Appeal, in a decision, rejected a challenge based on the 
ground that the powers of the expert included the possibility to “apprécier” the 
meaning of those contract provisions that relate to his task, thus he can fulfil the 
same. The interpretation related to a technical issue and was therefore still within the 
competence of the expert
568
. 
 
Under German
569
 and English Law
570
, the expert may be authorised to decide 
preliminary questions of law and to interpret the contract where necessary, but it is 
held, at least under German law that, such authority must be granted expressly
571
. By 
contrast, under the laws of most US states, the interpretation of the contract is a 
question of law exclusively reserved for the court or the arbitral tribunal
572
.  
 
Whether or not the expert should be given the authority for contractual interpretation 
can only be answered with due regard to the circumstances of the case. In the case 
mentioned above where a specific accounting term was in dispute, the economic 
impact of the correct meaning amounted to more than 200 million Euro. For that 
reason, the parties both preferred to submit this interpretation issue to the tribunal 
first, before calling the expert to proceed with the value determination. But, there 
may  be other cases where it would be in the interest of all the parties to give the 
expert such authority, for example to decide on the interpretation of issues relating to 
technical terms falling in the specific field of the expert’s professional knowledge573.  
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D) The problem of Confidentiality in Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution 
Processes 
 
 
Among the main disadvantages of multi-step proceedings is confidentiality. As Prof. 
Boo mentions, in a multi-tiered dispute resolution process, confidentiality issues 
become even more complex with a seamless flow-through from a mediator's non-
adjudicatory role to that of an arbitrator. While in mediation mode, the concern is 
often centred on the parties' possible use or misuse of information obtained in the 
mediation for other purposes. In a multi-tiered process, the additional concern could 
well be the state-of-mind which one, in particular the mediator-turned-arbitrator 
(permissible in some jurisdictions, such as Singapore and China), may have in the 
metamorphosis from a non-adjudicatory role to an adjudicatory one. The idea of 
erasing things from one's mind, what was said, offered, or even simply suggested, is 
indeed an artificial one. Unlike a computer, one could not simply press a “delete” 
key or “empty trash can”. For this reason, the Singapore legislation has the following 
provision
574
:  
 
Where confidential information is obtained by an arbitrator or umpire from a party 
to the arbitral proceedings during conciliation proceedings, and those proceedings 
terminate without the parties reaching agreement in settlement of their dispute, the 
arbitrator or umpire shall before resuming the arbitral proceedings disclose to all 
other parties to the arbitral proceedings as much of that information as he considers 
material to the arbitral proceedings. 
 
Parties can disclose sensitive business information or say things that might constitute 
an admission in a litigation context only if they believe that those statements cannot 
be repeated. This is a fundamental advantage of many alternative dispute resolution 
processes, including conciliation
575
. As Professor Peter Robinson puts it, strict 
confidentiality has the effect of transforming a mediated settlement agreement into a 
“super contract”, because, once executed, it becomes impossible to challenge and is 
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open to abuse
576
. Abusive negotiation tactics, such as fraud or coercion, could be 
masked by a right of confidentiality
577
. 
 
On the other hand, the new Hong Kong Ordinance expressly prohibits parties from 
disclosing any information relating to the arbitral proceedings or the award, subject 
to the usual exceptions regarding disclosure to professional advisors or disclosure 
required by law. In addition, and marking another significant change from the 
previous regime, the default position under the new Ordinance is that court 
proceedings relating to arbitration are to be conducted in closed court. Parties with 
arbitrations seated in Hong Kong can therefore assume that duties of confidentiality 
will bind their proceedings without the need for any additional drafting in this 
regard
578
. 
 
In the United States, mediation confidentiality is protected on principles derived 
from evidentiary privileges, such as the privilege for communications between client 
and attorney and the privilege protecting settlement negotiations from disclosure in 
litigation
579
. This approach to confidentiality was not accepted in the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation. Instead, the drafters sought to 
establish a unique regime designed specifically for conciliation, including a list of 
matters as to which parties may not refer in subsequent proceedings, and exceptions 
to the confidentiality principle for “requirements of law” and “for the purposes of 
implementation or enforcement of a settlement agreement”580. 
 
Among the arbitration institutions, some (e.g., ICC, LCIA) recognize expressly that 
confidentiality has vague but ill-defined outer limits, noting exceptions as “required 
by law.” Others (e.g., AAA, UNCITRAL) say nothing about exceptions. Exceptions 
thus are entirely a matter of national law and presumably would include, for 
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example, any requirements that publicly traded corporations make public filings of 
certain types disclosing financially significant developments
581
.  
 
This author agrees with Mr. Carter that with respect to confidentiality, drafters must 
consider the extent to which they will seek to address this separately in clauses or 
agreements, as opposed to invoking standard conciliation rules and/or relying on 
statutory protections. States should decide whether and in what form to enact 
legislation
582
.  
 
 
E) Conclusion of Chapter IV 
 
Review of the major Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms most commonly 
employed in M&A transactions has shown that the methods offer qualities of 
flexibility and dynamism that can result in quick and cost effective results, which 
have proved popular in commercial practice. Variation in practice also exists 
concerning conciliation, mediation, med-arb and expert determination across 
different jurisdictions, but core elements of these procedures prove somewhat 
consistent.  
 
It has also been observed that the solution of multi-step dispute resolution 
proceedings have many problems like enforceability, binding or non-binding effect, 
and confidentiality. Analysis focused on multi-step processes where two or more 
ADR mechanisms are in place with arbitration, but the limitation of each mechanism 
has not been established.  
 
To counteract the problem where the scope of application of the different methods is 
not defined, there are many solutions proposed. One author has proposed that multi-
tiered ADR clauses should be sufficiently standardized by arbitration institutions
583
. 
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Court intervention, during the “consolidation” process is also proposed where 
suitable and convenient. However, in any case, the main issue warranting attention 
will be, and must be, the intent of the parties.  
 
One should bear in mind that, unlike in the field of arbitration, there are no 
harmonized rules regarding the proceedings, the power of the expert, and the 
challenge of the expert determination proceedings in ADR mechanisms. Therefore, 
multi-step dispute resolution clauses should be carefully drafted, by clearly 
demarcating ADR mechanisms and arbitration from each other, determining the 
interaction between the two proceedings, and defining the precise task and the 
powers of ADR mechanisms, the standards to be applied and the rules of due process 
which shall govern the proceedings. It is important that a multi-tiered clause 
precisely and clearly states the parties’ intention to resolve future disputes by 
arbitration, should the previous ADR procedure addressed in the clause fail. 
 
Where a clear multi-tiered clause is not provided, as should also be the case for 
consolidation, the intervention by the courts or arbitration institutions should be 
limited. The author believes that the “consent” of the parties will be the main 
indicator in clarifying the limits of each ADR mechanism and their escalation to 
arbitration.  
 
In proposing guidelines for multi-tiered ADR disputes resolution clauses in M&A 
transactions, it must be emphasised that again any guidelines must respect the 
consent of the parties. Therefore, where a precise clause is drafted, demarcating the 
operation and interaction of the different ADR methods will function and how the 
process will escalate to arbitration, guidelines will not be needed to offer assistance 
to the parties. Yet, such guidelines would determine where it would be appropriate 
for parallel ADR mechanisms to operate concurrently to best serve the continuation 
of the transaction. However, another issue is that an ADR mechanism’s results where 
non-binding can be challenged by an aggrieved party. Thus, guidelines must best 
serve the intention of the parties’ adherence to non-binding resolutions. Any 
guidelines proposed for ADR mechanisms must be wary not to standardise their 
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practice to the extent that ADR mechanisms’ flexible nature is negated and because 
of the varying practices seen across different jurisdictions which should be respected.   
 
In the last and largest chapter of the thesis, focus is drawn further on the notion of 
“consent” and it will be shown how “consent” can prevent the intervention of the 
courts.  
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CHAPTER V: ISSUES OF CONSENT IN M&A ARBITRATION 
 
 
A) Introduction 
 
Consent is the foundation of arbitration, and in general a court or an arbitral tribunal 
will refuse to treat a person or entity as a party to the contract, or at least to the 
arbitration clause if it has not expressly or implicitly consented to it
584
. Consent in 
most – but not all – cases will be expressed by the signature or by conduct of the 
person or entity concerned on a contractual document. But, on the other hand, as will 
be seen below, it is possible to become party to a contract without having signed the 
instrumentum and, on the contrary, the fact that a party has affixed its signature on 
the contract does not necessarily mean that it has consented to become a party to the 
agreement
585
.   
 
It is not always proper to equate the right and duty to arbitrate with the notion of 
consent to arbitration. Although a party’s participation in arbitral proceedings will 
often be based on (at least presumed) consent, it is not always the case. 
 
Consent does not usually raise any difficulty where in each other’s presence two 
parties agree in writing to arbitrate their disputes and where, when a dispute arises, 
the procedure is initiated by one party against the other. Excluding the case where 
arbitration is imposed by law
586
 or where consent is adhesive
587
, the question whether 
one or several parties to the arbitration have consented to the arbitral process comes 
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to the forefront each time objections are raised over the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal with respect to one or several of the parties to the arbitral process
588
. 
 
The party defending these objections, especially in M&A arbitration, tries to justify 
its position by invoking mechanisms of assignment and succession. Therefore, after 
analysing the identification of consent in M&A arbitrations, these mechanisms also 
will be analysed in this chapter. 
 
Further to the working hypothesis, this chapter addresses the question of how the 
transitory definition of consent significantly effects the M&A arbitration. Analysis 
will broach the other questions addressed in previous chapters within the context of 
consent. In addition to commenting on the state of existing rules, guidelines would be 
suggested to fulfil shortcomings. Therefore it is necessary to focus on the 
identification of consent from the chapter’s outset.   
 
B) Identifying Consent in M&A Arbitration 
 
Consent in international commercial transactions is usually evidenced by written 
instruments, typically with the execution of a formal contract by a corporate officer's 
signature
589
. Recurrent issues relating to the parties' consent include: the factual 
proof of consent, issues of implied or tacit consent, the treatment of competing forms 
or proposals exchanged by the parties, the consequences of poorly-drafted arbitration 
provisions (such as internally-inconsistent, indefinite or vague arbitration clauses, 
“optional” arbitration clauses, clauses with incorrect designations of arbitral 
institutions or rules), duress, and the effects of lack of notice
590
. 
 
It is also important to distinguish between the “written” form requirements applicable 
to arbitration agreements under many international conventions and national 
arbitration statutes,
 
and the question whether a party has consented to an arbitration 
agreement. It is possible for applicable “written” form requirements to be satisfied 
(e.g., there is an exchange of letters or telegrams, signed by the parties), but for the 
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extant documents to fail substantively to establish the existence of an arbitration 
agreement as a substantive matter (e.g., there is no arbitration clause contained in the 
writing(s), the putative arbitration clause is defective, or the parties have not in fact 
consented to the proposed clause)
591
. Conversely, it is also entirely possible for 
parties to have undeniably consented to arbitration (e.g., as evidenced by an 
unequivocal, undisputed oral agreement), but for their agreement to fail to satisfy 
applicable form requirements. In order to establish a valid arbitration agreement, 
both applicable form requirements and substantive consent requirements must be 
satisfied
592
. 
 
However, while it may be incorrect to argue that consent to arbitrate can only be 
proved by signature or an agreement in writing, it is equally incorrect to suggest that 
consent to arbitration agreements can be presumed or ascertained more easily than 
consent to any other procedural or substantive agreement; a suggestion occasionally 
adopted by tribunals and national courts
593
. Therefore, the assertion of implied 
consent requires the application of specific principles and techniques of 
interpretation which must reveal the “intention to arbitrate” with a degree of 
certainty, rather than probability
594
.  
 
Nonetheless, putting aside form requirements, it is settled that a party's consent to an 
arbitration agreement or a written instrument containing an arbitration clause can be 
expressed as a substantive matter by means other than a signature. Numerous arbitral 
awards and national court decisions have expressly declared this
595
.  
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When determining whether or not the parties actually agreed to submit their disputes 
to arbitration, arbitrators and the courts apply various principles of interpretation. In 
the light of these principles, they establish the degree of certainty required for the 
parties' consent to be effective as well as the scope of that consent
596
. 
 
In order to determine the existence of the parties’ consent, arbitrators will make 
recourse to the general principles of contractual interpretation
597
. (e.g. the principle 
of interpretation in good faith, and the principle of effective interpretation prove most 
valuable with respect to pathological clauses, i.e. incomplete, defective or 
contradictory clauses
598
. In the exercise of contract interpretation, the principle of in 
favorem validitatis cannot apply
599
.  
 
 
In the author’s opinion, interpretation of the arbitration clauses and/or arbitration 
agreements in M&A transactions should be related to the nature of the transaction. 
During the M&A transactions there are many different issues which should be 
considered. Chapter Three analysed the problem of parallel proceedings and the 
problem of consolidation. During this analysis it has been remarked that the consent 
should not be seen only as a condition for arbitration or courts, but also interpreted 
from the view of what is covered by the parties’ consent to arbitration. Therefore, the 
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be established from the surrounding circumstances); Judgment of 29 September 2000, 2001 Zeitschrift 
für Sport und Recht 247 (Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg) (arbitration clause contained in the 
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author believes that the “effective interpretation” of arbitration clauses in M&A 
transactions will be accomplished only when the interpretation has been done not 
only with the “express consent” but also with “implied consent” together with the 
common intention of the parties in conformity with the facts of the M&A transaction.  
 
B-1) Incorporation by Reference  
 
International contracts frequently seek to incorporate arbitration agreements or rules 
from other instruments. In some cases, an agreement will incorporate an arbitration 
clause from another contract. In other, an arbitration agreement may be incorporated 
from trade association rules, general terms and conditions, or other non-contractual 
sources. Provisions incorporating arbitration clauses from other instruments give rise 
to issues of both formal and substantive validity
600
. For the most part, the 
incorporation of an arbitration agreement should present few difficulties with regard 
to formal validity
601
, and the real issues will concern consent and substantive 
validity
602
.  
 
On the other hand, when contracts are concluded by reference to general conditions, 
the arbitration clause may not have been the object of specific attention by the 
parties, since the general conditions or any other document containing the arbitration 
clause may not be attached to the contract itself
603
. Furthermore, the parties may also 
conclude a contract without reference to an arbitration clause, but in a series of 
contracts which include an arbitration agreement
604
. Moreover, when a contract 
containing the arbitration clause is signed by only one party, it is widely accepted 
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that the written consent of the other party contained in a different document does not 
have to be signed
605
.  
 
In substance, incorporation by reference concerns the issue of whether an arbitration 
clause contained in general or standard conditions or in a document or contract 
(between the same parties or not) other than the main contract concluded between the 
original parties binds the latter or third parties or permits bringing all the parties to 
these agreements to the same arbitral proceeding
606
. 
 
Such incorporation by reference seems to be generally admitted by statute or case 
law in Western European countries. The requirement that an arbitration clause be in 
writing, whether by effect of a local statute or by application of Article II.2 of the 
New York Convention has been recently interpreted by most courts, including in 
Switzerland, in a more relaxed fashion. The issue has become rather whether the 
party against whom the clause is invoked was aware of the incorporation of the 
related conditions or documents containing the clause in the original agreement and 
had a real opportunity to know of their contents
607
. When deciding the issue, the 
courts take into consideration various elements, such as, whether the parties are both 
professionals, whether the contract is an isolated one, or whether there was an on-
going relationship between the parties, and whether the clause accords or not with 
trade usages
608
.
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In the United States, there is case law on this issue. When a contract containing an 
arbitration clause is incorporated by reference into a completely separate agreement, 
which does not contain an arbitration clause, a non-signatory to the former 
agreement, A, may nevertheless be required to arbitrate, if a dispute arises under the 
latter agreement
609
 which A has signed
610
.  
 
Where the consent of both parties to the arbitration clause was clear, in spite of the 
non-fulfilment of formal requirements, courts have also resorted to considerations of 
good faith and estoppel to uphold the arbitration agreement
611
.  
 
B-2) Consent to an Underlying a Contract Typically Constitutes Consent to an 
Arbitration Agreement 
 
The essential issue in determining the existence of an arbitration agreement is 
whether the parties have consented to that agreement (to arbitrate), as distinguished 
from having consented to the underlying contract. At least in principle, and also often 
in practice, it is entirely possible for a party to have consented to one of these 
agreements, but not the other
612
. There are numerous instances where this conclusion 
has been reached
613
. 
 
Nonetheless, in many cases, the only evidence of consent to an arbitration agreement 
will be a party's consent to the underlying contract, with no separate indications of 
consent to the arbitration clause specifically. In these cases, there will ordinarily be 
no reason to distinguish between a party's consent to the underlying contract and the 
arbitration clause. Nonetheless, there are important exceptions to these 
generalizations
614
.  
 
                                                          
609
 Carolyn Lamm and Jocelyn Aqua, Defining The Party – Who is a Proper Party in An International 
Arbitration before the American Arbitration Association?, 2002 Int. A.L.R., p. 87.  
610
 Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations, supra note 49, para. 59. 
611
 Lew, Mistelis, Kröll, supra note 333, para. 7-30.  
612
Born, Int. Comm. Arb., supra note 52, p. 661; Samuel, supra note 601,  p. 174 (“it can happen that, 
during contractual negotiations, the arbitral clause is unequivocally accepted by both parties and then a 
dispute arises as to whether agreement was ever reached over the substantive contract. In such a 
situation, it is submitted that the dispute concerned should be referred to arbitration for both theoretical 
and practical reasons.”).  
613
 Born, ibid. 
614
 Ibid, p. 662. 
201 
 
The autonomy of the arbitration agreement from the main contract is a legal concept, 
not a factual determination. Thus, it does not mean that acceptance of the arbitration 
agreement must be separate from that of the main contract. Neither does it mean that 
the arbitration agreement cannot follow the main contract where the latter is assigned 
to a third party
615
. 
 
 
B-3) Consent to Underlying Contract Not Required for Consent to Arbitration 
Agreement 
 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, consent to the parties' underlying contract is not 
necessarily required to establish consent to the associated agreement to arbitrate. 
Although rare in practice, the separability presumption permits consent to and 
formation of the agreement to arbitrate even without consent to or formation of the 
underlying contract
616
. 
 
It is of course true that parties do not ordinarily intend to agree only to an arbitration 
clause in the abstract, but to reject or not conclude the underlying contract
617
. Rather, 
the arbitration clause has an ancillary or “parasitic” function, which is closely related 
to the underlying commercial contract. This function argues, in general, against 
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suggestions that parties concluded a separate arbitration agreement, while not 
entering into an associated commercial contract
618
. 
 
Nonetheless, there will be instances in which the parties negotiate and agree upon the 
terms of the arbitration clause, even though they do not agree upon the terms of the 
underlying contract
619
. There are also good reasons to conclude that, in international 
commercial contexts, parties will wish their arbitration agreement to exist even 
without formation or validity of the underlying contract – precisely to ensure a 
neutral, expert procedure for resolving disputes about the formation of that contract. 
Analytically, it is therefore essential to distinguish between the formation of the 
underlying contract (and defects in that formation process) and the formation of the 
separable arbitration agreement, and to carefully consider the evidence and parties' 
likely intentions with regard to each agreement
620
. 
 
B-4) Consent on the related agreements 
 
Consent to arbitration may also be present if a contract does not contain an 
arbitration clause but forms part of a contractual network which includes an 
arbitration agreement. This happens where parties enter into a framework agreement, 
containing an arbitration clause, governing their future relationship within which 
they conclude a number of separate contracts
621
.  
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A seldom-applied, but potentially important, theory of non-signatory status is that of 
joint venture liability. Although not frequently invoked, some authorities have held 
that one joint venture partner's commitment to arbitrate disputes related to the joint 
venture binds other joint venture partners
622
. Similar results can be reached through 
principles of “civil conspiracy,” as applied in some national legal systems623. 
 
Provided that the circumstances reveal that the parties intended, at least implicitly, to 
empower the arbitral tribunal to resolve all disputes arising out of a single group of 
contracts, then the tribunal shall have jurisdiction to do so. The Paris Court of 
Appeals reached this conclusion in the case of an employment contract annexed to a 
protocol, which had been signed during the sale of a company and which contained 
an arbitration clause
624
. The French Cour de cassation also allowed an arbitration 
clause to be extended from one contract to a second aimed at formalizing the existing 
agreement between the parties
625
. 
 
The arbitration clause in the main contract may also extend to follow up or repeat 
contracts concluded in close connection and in support of a main contract. This is 
usually a question of interpretation; this may be the case if the subsequent 
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agreements amend or complete the main contract
626
, but not where the additional 
contracts go beyond the implementation of the main contract
627
.  
 
In cases where each of the contracts with the same objective contains its own 
arbitration clause, even where the parties have simply reiterated the same arbitration 
clause in each contract, there may be difficulty. Should a single tribunal be 
constituted to resolve all disputes arising from the contractual ensemble, or should 
there instead be a different arbitral tribunal for each contract? Once a dispute has 
arisen, and in the absence of an agreement between the parties on the point, the 
answer depends on the interpretation of the parties' intention at the outset. However, 
it is generally legitimate to presume that by including identical arbitration clauses in 
the various related contracts, the parties intended to submit the entire operation to a 
single arbitral tribunal
628
. 
 
The problem is aggravated where the arbitration clause differs from one contract to 
another. This occurs quite often in practice, in spite of the resulting difficulties. In 
order to avoid two or more tribunals reaching conflicting decisions, one might be 
tempted to conclude that the better solution would be to appoint a single arbitral 
tribunal, or to consolidate the two or more arbitrations. The difficulties liable to 
occur in the event of two parallel arbitrations are illustrated in the situation where 
one party refuses to fulfil its obligations under one contract on the grounds that its 
co-contractor failed to fulfil its obligations under a second contract. In the absence of 
an agreement between the parties, neither the arbitral institution, nor the arbitral 
tribunal constituted on the basis of one or other of the arbitration clauses, will be 
entitled to resolve the whole dispute. Only where both arbitrations take place in a 
jurisdiction in which the courts are entitled to consolidate related actions, such as the 
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Netherlands, or where two proceedings refer to the same arbitration rules allowing 
consolidation
629
, will it be possible to avoid the difficulties associated with having 
separate arbitral tribunals without further exploring the true intentions of the parties. 
Otherwise, if an award were made on the basis of the arbitration clause contained in 
one contract, but concerned issues found in another contract, the decision of the 
arbitral tribunal could be challenged on the basis that the tribunal ruled, at least in 
part, in the absence of an arbitration agreement. For the same reasons, where a 
contract containing a clause attributing jurisdiction to the courts is related to another 
contract containing an arbitration clause, there can be no extension of the arbitration 
clause to the first contract. Thus, an award made in 1983, ICC Case No. 4392, rightly 
refused to extend the scope of an arbitration clause contained in heads of agreement 
to a related agreement, on the grounds that the related contract referred to general 
conditions of sale which included a clause attributing jurisdiction to the courts. The 
arbitral tribunal considered that, irrespective of any implied acceptance of the 
conditions by the purchaser, the buyer's intention was clearly incompatible with the 
extension of the arbitration agreement and had to be complied with. The reverse is 
also true: the court with jurisdiction under the second contract would not be able to 
rule on the obligations arising out of the first contract without violating the 
arbitration clause contained in that first contract
630
. 
 
B-5) Defects of consent: Fraud (dol), mistake (erreur) 
 
Conversely, the mere fact that a document is signed does not necessarily establish 
valid consent by the putative signatory. In M&A arbitrations examples of dol arises 
in the case of misrepresentations, withheld information, or wrong information 
provided on material facts. Equally, if one party intentionally deceives the other 
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regarding the nature of what he or she is signing, there is generally no assent by the 
latter
631
.  
 
The same objection arises in cases of mistake as to the nature of a document
632
. In 
M&A transactions examples of mistake arises very often as to the value of the 
company. As discussed during Chapter Two, the value of the business of the 
company is one of the essential elements in purchase agreement. It should be 
indicated that recent ICC Cases No. 11961 and No. 12502 are reviewed in order to 
see how dol and mistake have arisen in M&A Arbitration.  
 
 
ICC Case No. 11961
633
 
 
The present case concerns the sale and purchase of the shares of a Luxembourg 
insurance company operating under the European Union's Freedom-to-Provide-
Services regime (FPS), the result of three Council directives (issued in 1979, 1990, 
and 1994) allowing insurance companies to offer their products in the European 
Union forgoing authorization in countries other than the country of their registered 
office and setting up an establishment in those countries. Following the introduction 
of the FPS regime, several EU Member States took measures to prevent funds 
flowing to offshore centers such as Luxembourg, where at the relevant time banking 
secrecy was protected-also in respect of insurance companies and the proceeds of tax 
evasion. France levied taxes on monies invested by French residents in insurance 
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products offered by Luxembourg insurance companies and provided for an 
obligation to declare contributions to foreign insurance policies or face a substantial 
penalty. The risks inherent to the pursuit of FPS insurance activities in France and 
Belgium, the countries involved in the case at issue, were referred to as “industry 
risks” or “general risks” in the award. 
 
By a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA), the Claimant purchased the shares in a 
Luxembourg insurance company (the Luxembourg company) from the Respondents 
– five companies of the same group (the Respondent Group) – with the aim of 
making it the central hub of its European insurance operations. The SPA was 
governed by Luxembourg law; it also contained a clause providing for ICC 
arbitration of disputes in Paris. 
 
A few years later, some of the Luxembourg company's senior management, staff and 
brokers were arrested in France in connection with criminal investigations into 
suspected money laundering and tax evasion, which allegedly involved the company 
prior to the purchase of its shares by the Claimant. Subsequently, senior members of 
the management of the Defendant Group and a related bank (the Bank) were also 
detained. 
 
The Claimant commenced an ICC arbitration, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief in respect of any past and future losses or damage resulting to the Claimant as a 
consequence of its acquisition of the Luxembourg company. The Claimant alleged 
that the Defendants' misrepresentations and failure to disclose material facts in 
respect of the transaction breached their contractual and non-contractual duties and 
that the Claimant suffered substantial and continuing injury as a result of the 
Defendants' actions. The Defendants sought dismissal of all claims; they also filed a 
counterclaim seeking damages on the ground that the Claimant breached a duty of 
confidentiality by divulging details about the arbitration to the press. 
 
The Arbitral Tribunal denied the Claimant's request to annul the SPA on grounds of 
dol (fraud) and erreur (mistake), but found that Defendants committed a culpa in 
contrahendo in the negotiation phase of the SPA by intentionally withholding 
information and were therefore liable for damages to the Claimant. The Tribunal 
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further dismissed the Defendants' counterclaim, finding that there was no duty of 
confidentiality between the parties. 
 
The Tribunal first confirmed its earlier Order dismissing the Defendants' application 
to stay proceedings pending criminal proceedings in France, holding that the issues at 
stake in each proceeding were fundamentally different and that there was no reason 
to consider that the outcome of the criminal proceedings might have an impact on the 
outcome of the arbitration. 
 
The Tribunal held that the relief sought by the Claimant was admissible even though 
the Claimant had contributed the shares in the Luxembourg company to the capital of 
another company in the Claimant's group. The arbitrators held that by so doing 
Claimant did not waive its right to seek the annulment of the SPA. Also, there would 
be no practical obstacles to the performance of an award ordering the annulment of 
the SPA, considering that it would be within Claimant's power to take the necessary 
steps for such performance. 
 
The Arbitral Tribunal then dismissed the Claimant's argument that the SPA was 
invalid on grounds of dol because the Defendant Group made misrepresentations or 
withheld information on material facts, with the intention of inducing the Claimant to 
enter into the SPA. The arbitrators first made a distinction between the “general 
risks” involving the conduct from Luxembourg of FPS activities in, particularly, 
France and the risks specific to the Luxembourg company (“the specific risks”). The 
former were well known at the time and a professional such as the Claimant could 
not ignore them. As to the latter, the Tribunal concluded that on the basis of the 
evidence on record, it was not proven that the Defendant Group's acts and omissions 
were motivated by an intent to deceive the Claimant. 
 
Nor was the SPA invalid because of an erreur as to the value of the business of the 
Luxembourg company (rather than the value of the shares sold). Based on the 
evidence, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the Luxembourg company did not 
cease to be viable and that no convincing evidence was submitted that the Defendant 
Group's misrepresentations made the Claimant's project to make the Luxembourg 
company the hub of its operations in Europe no longer possible. 
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The arbitrators held however that the Defendants committed a culpa in contrahendo 
by breaching their duty to disclose material information in respect of the “specific 
risks” of the Luxembourg company during the pre-contract sale process. The tribunal 
reasoned that the “Claimant was in a position to figure out for itself that the conduct 
of FPS business in France entailed certain risks, but could not have discovered, 
during the sale process, that the French Brigade de Recherches et d'Investigations 
Financières (BRIF) (Financial Research and Investigation Brigade) had issued 
several requests relating to deposits to the Luxembourg company's account with the 
Bank and to certain practices of the Luxembourg company's brokers”. Although it 
was uncertain at the time whether the BRIF Demands would lead to a criminal 
investigation, the Defendant Group should have informed the Claimant of those 
Demands. 
 
 
ICC Case No. 12502 
 
In the recent ICC Case
634
 No. 12502 of 2009, in which there was one claimant and 
two respondents, the first Respondent negotiated the sale of Company X and 
Company M, two French companies of the Respondent Group (the Companies), to 
the Claimant, a French corporation ultimately controlled by a Swedish corporation 
(the Claimant's Swedish parent company). The Claimant's Swedish parent company 
and the First Respondent entered into Heads of Agreement stating their mutual intent 
to carry out the transaction and confirming their agreement on the basic conditions 
therefor. The Heads of Agreement provided for a due diligence of the Companies 
and stated that if no “legally binding agreement” were signed on date X, the Heads 
would have “no further impact on the parties”. The parties also expressed their 
intention that the transaction be governed by French law, but that Danish law apply 
specifically to the Heads of Agreement. 
 
The Claimant's Swedish parent company sent an Enquiry List to the First  
Respondent requesting, inter alia, copies of all agreements limiting the business of 
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 Final award in case no. 12502 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Y. B. Comm. Arb. 2009 - Volume 
XXXIV, Kluwer Law International 2009, pp. 130 – 211.  
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the Companies and information on whether the Companies had violated any laws, 
regulations or permits. The due diligence took place over two months; Mr. H, 
managing director of Company X, had the task of collecting the necessary documents 
in respect of Company X. 
 
At the conclusion of the due diligence, the First Respondent and the Claimant 
entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) for the sale of the shares in the 
Companies. The SPA explicitly superseded any prior agreement, established an 
Estimated Purchase Price and the manner in which the Final Purchase Price would be 
determined, and contained warranties by the First Respondent in respect of the 
Companies – inter alia, that they were not a party to anti-competitive practices. The 
warranties would remain valid for eighteen months after closing; the First 
Respondent would further indemnify the Claimant for the consequences of any 
procedure commenced against the Companies by a third party for a period of three 
years from the closing. The Claimant had the duty to notify the First Respondent in 
writing of any event giving rise to the implementation of these provisions within 
thirty days from the date when the relevant division manager of the Claimant became 
aware of such event. The SPA further provided that it was governed by French law 
but that its “legal binding effect” was governed by Swedish Law. It further contained 
a clause for ICC arbitration of disputes. 
 
In a letter to the Claimant's Swedish parent company, the Second Respondent, 
another company in the Respondent Group and the direct parent company of the First 
Respondent, guaranteed the due performance of the SPA. 
 
Approximately one month after closing, Mr. Z, the new chairman of the board of 
Company X, attended a meeting of a trade association of which Company X was a 
member. He allegedly discovered that beyond its ostensible purposes of promoting 
the sales of the relevant product and of gathering useful statistics regarding the 
markets, the trade association was also used as a tool to carry out anti-competitive 
practices prohibited under Art. 81 of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (EC Treaty), such as price-fixing and market sharing. Company X 
allegedly stopped engaging in anti-competitive practices immediately after Mr. Z 
attended the meeting. One month later, the Claimant's Swedish parent company paid 
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the final instalment on the purchase price of the Companies. Neither the Claimant 
nor the Claimant's Swedish parent company notified the Respondents of Mr. Z's 
findings. 
 
Three years later, the EU Commission ordered Company X to undergo an 
investigation as to alleged anti-competitive practices and subsequently conducted an 
on-the-spot investigation (a “dawn raid”) at Company X's premises, seizing various 
documents. The Claimant submitted in the present arbitration that following the 
dawn raid it initiated an internal investigation and reached the conclusion that 
Company X had indeed participated, in at least three anti-competitive organizations 
during the period the First Respondent owned and controlled it. 
 
The Claimant's Swedish parent company then informed the First Respondent of the 
existence of the EU Commission investigation and stated that it considered the First 
Respondent responsible for any possible consequences of that investigation 
pertaining to the period before the acquisition of Company X. The Second 
Respondent replied that the warranty period provided for in the SPA had expired, 
whereupon the Claimant commenced the present arbitration proceedings, seeking a 
declaration that the First Respondent and the Second Respondent were liable for the 
loss suffered by Company X and/or the Claimant as a consequence of any fines 
imposed or any other measures taken by the EU Commission. 
 
While arbitration was pending, the EU Commission issued a Statement of Objections 
stating that it had found evidence of infringement of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty and 
indicating that it intended to render a decision finding that there had been such 
infringement and imposing fines. The EU Commission specified that, given the 
transfer of ownership of Company X from the Respondent Group to the Claimant 
Group, the First Respondent and the Second Respondent, on the one hand, and the 
Claimant's Swedish parent company and the Claimant, on the other, were jointly and 
severally liable with Company X. 
 
By the present Final Award, the arbitrators dismissed the Claimant's request for a 
declaration of the Respondents' liability, holding that the First Respondent did not 
commit acts of deceit (dol) in order to induce the Claimant to enter into the contract, 
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and that although the First Respondent did breach its obligations under the warranties 
in the SPA, the Claimant's claim was time-barred. 
 
The Arbitral Tribunal first held that it had jurisdiction over all claims, including 
claims for the alleged breach of the due diligence provision in the Heads of 
Agreement. The arbitrators found that the arbitration clause in the SPA, which 
referred broadly to all disputes “in connection with the contract”, encompassed all 
disputes concerning the negotiation and conclusion of the SPA, including the Heads 
of Agreement. It was irrelevant that the Heads of Agreement were between the First 
Respondent and the Claimant's Swedish parent company, whilst the SPA was entered 
into between the First Respondent and the Claimant: the parties specifically referred 
to the Heads of Agreement in the SPA – by providing that the latter superseded the 
former – so that the fact that one party was not the same, though belonging to the 
same group, was clearly immaterial to them. 
 
B-6) Implied or Tacit Consent  
 
Most legal systems recognize that a party's assent to contractual terms may be 
established by conduct
635
. If there is no evidence of an express agreement, courts and 
arbitral tribunals will often take into consideration the conduct of the party concerned 
as an expression of implied consent
636
 or, as a substitute for consent
637
. In most 
cases, however, the issue of conduct arises in relation to the role a party has played in 
the negotiation or performance of the agreement
638
. 
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 Born, Int. Comm. Arb., supra note 52, p. 666. See, e.g., UNIDROIT, Principles of International 
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 Hanotiau, Complex Arbitrations, supra note 49, para 73. 
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 Ibid, para. 74. See, e.g., DIC of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redev. Corp., Award No. 176-255-3 (26 
April 1985), 8 Iran-US C.T.R. 144, 160-162 (1985) (“it is widely accepted by municipal systems of law 
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In the context of groups of contracts and groups of companies that the issue of 
conduct as an expression of implied consent or as a substitute for consent is 
especially important. Unless the existence, in other contracts of the contractual chain, 
of a clause that is incompatible with the arbitration clause contained in the first 
contract, leads to the conclusion that there is no will of the parties to have all the 
disputes arising from the contractual relationship decided by one arbitral tribunal. 
Arbitrators will generally base their decision of this issue on the common intention of 
the parties to have their controversies brought together before – and decided together 
by – the same arbitral tribunal639. By way of illustration, in the first interim award in 
the Westland case
640
, the arbitral tribunal pointed out that:  
 
everything depended on the intention expressed by the parties in the 
arbitration clause. It is necessary and therefore sufficient that, in 
principle, they wished to bind themselves for the arbitrators to have 
jurisdiction at the same time in respect of them all and for one of 
them to be able to initiate proceedings against all the others within 
one set of arbitration proceedings. It thus matters little that there are 
several arbitration clauses when their content shows that they make 
up a whole in the minds of the parties. Such are the circumstances of 
the present case … The series of documents concluded constitute an 
indivisible whole and the four states thus truly demonstrated their 
desire to act together, by joining together under one name. The 
similarity of the clauses used in the various contracts can only serve 
to bear out this interpretation. It follows that the Tribunal is not 
merely competent as regards each of the states, AOI and ABH, but is 
justified in adjudicating upon their cases in one and the same 
award
641
.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
performance … Such a principle must be taken to constitute a general principle of law”); Judgment of 2 
December 1982, 1983 NJW 1267, 1268 (German Bundesgerichtshof) (contract affirmed through 
acceptance of other party's performance); Judgment of 20 February 2001, Consmaremma – Consorzio 
tra produttori agricola v. Hermanos Escot Madrid SA, XXVI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 858 (Spanish Tribunal 
Supremo) (2001) (“the silence or inactivity of a party with respect to an offer which directly or indirectly 
contains an arbitral clause has no effect, the Court's interpretation aims at ascertaining, from the 
communications and acts of the parties, whether they wished to include the arbitral clause in their 
contract …”); Athon v. Direct Merchs. Bank, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26841 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (agreement 
to arbitrate ratified by customer's use of credit card and continued payments over three years after the 
addition of the arbitration clause); Irving R. Boody & Co. v. Win Holdings Int. Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 378 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“ratification by failure to object … serves as the equivalent of prior authorization”); 
First Citizens Mun. Corp. v. Pershing Div. of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 546 F.Supp. 884, 
887 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (“Like any other contract, a contract containing an arbitration provision may be 
binding on the parties based upon their course of conduct.”) quoted in Born, supra note 52, footnote 553.  
639
 Hanotiau, ibid, para. 75. 
640
 Interim Award of 5 March 1984 in ICC Case No. 3879 in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Y.B. Comm. 
Arb. 1986 - Volume XI, Kluwer Law International 1986, pp. 127 - 133 
641
 Hanotiau, supra note 49, para. 75. 
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Several arbitral tribunals have invoked the existence of a community of obligations 
and interests among the parties to a group of contracts or among companies of a 
group that had all participated in the negotiation and performance of a project to 
decide that the arbitration clause included in some of the contracts could be opposed 
to all the parties or companies which had participated in the economic transaction 
through interrelated contracts
642
. 
 
For example, the existence of joint rights, obligations and interests was fundamental 
in the interim award on jurisdiction of an ad hoc arbitral tribunal dated 3 March 
1999. In that case
643
, the question arose as to whether the arbitration clause contained 
in the agreement between the claimant and the first defendant also bound the second, 
third, and fourth defendants. After a very long and careful examination of the facts, 
the arbitral tribunal answered in the affirmative, finding that the claimant could not 
have regarded its relationship with first, second, third, and fourth defendants other 
than as a relationship with various members of a partnership with joint and several 
liability with respect to the claimant. Within the framework of this partnership or 
consortium, the first defendant most certainly acted as a legal entity, but was run and 
financed by the three other companies, which were the only companies that could be 
solvent and, moreover, had full control over the management of the first 
defendant
644
. 
 
 
C) Consent on the Transfer of the Arbitration Agreement After M&A 
Transactions  
 
The first problem of consent in M&A transactions is undoubtedly the situation of the 
arbitration clause arising after the merger and acquisition transactions. In the 
introduction, the author demonstrated that there are two types of merger. In the first 
scenario the companies A and B create a new company under the name C without 
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dissolving. In the second scenario A and B cease to exist and they establish a new 
company C. In both scenarios, when A and B, both parties to a contract which 
contains an arbitration clause, transfer their rights and/or obligations to another 
person (Company C); the question arises as to whether the transferee will be bound 
by the arbitration clause contained in the previous main contract and under which 
conditions. There are many possible ways of transferring rights and obligations, such 
as assignment of a right or a contract, universal succession, subrogation
645
, 
novation
646
 etc.   
 
Merger and acquisition transactions are considered an example of “universal 
succession”647 or “universal transfer”648 in many books. Therefore, the author will 
focus more on the concepts of assignment (B-1) and succession (B-2). The author 
believes that even if that the forms and particulars of these legal constructs may vary 
in different jurisdictions and may be known under different names; in all cases, the 
transferee, i.e. a person that was not originally a party to the transfer contract, 
assumes the substantive claims, rights, and obligations of the transferor. 
Accordingly, from the view of arbitration two crucial questions arise. The first is 
whether the original contract signed before the establishment of the new company 
(Company C) will still be valid after the merger and/or acquisition; the second is 
whether an arbitration claim can be brought by or against the transferee, 
notwithstanding the fact that the transferee will not typically appear in the arbitration 
clause originally concluded between the transferors.  
 
Our analysis will start with the assignment of arbitration clauses, but it applies 
mutatis mutandis to succession, subrogation, and other forms of transfer.  
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 This frequently occurs in the case of insurers, who are subrogated to the rights of insureds. In these 
circumstances, the insurer is typically entitled to invoke (and is bound by) the arbitration provisions of 
the insured's underlying contract (from which the subrogated rights arise) quoted in Born, supra note 50, 
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C-1) Assignment   
International commerce and trade require that contractual rights and choses in action 
be capable of assignment
649
. Some early judicial decisions suggested that arbitration 
agreements were not capable of being transferred, apparently on the theory that they 
were “personal” obligations, which were specific to and binding upon only the 
original parties
650
. These decisions have been superseded, and it is now almost 
universally accepted that parties have the contractual autonomy to transfer or assign 
arbitration agreements, just as they have the power to assign or transfer other types of 
contracts
651
. Again, the touchstone in such cases should be the intention of the 
parties, both in the original agreement and in the assignment
652
. 
The effect of an assignment of a contract with an arbitration clause contained therein 
will be determined principally by reference to the law governing the assignment in 
question, as well as the law governing the arbitration agreement. If the arbitration 
agreement is assignable under the relevant laws, there will be a further question as to 
the particular form, if any, which the assignment must take. This requirement must 
not be confused with the writing requirement that applies to the arbitration agreement 
itself
653
. 
In principle, an assignment of a contract should have the effect of conveying the 
arbitration clause associated with the contract, as one associated part of the parties' 
agreement, to the assignee, at least, absent some sort of contractual or legal 
prohibition that renders the assignment ineffective
654
. In practice, it is seldom the 
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 Stephen Jagusch and Anthony Sinclair, The Impact of Third Parties on International Arbitration – 
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(hereinafter Jagusch, Sinclair, Impact of Third Parties). See also VV. Veeder, Towards a Possible 
Solution: limitation, Interest and Assignment in London and Paris, in Albert Jan Van den Berg (ed), 
Planning Efficient Arbitration Proceedings: The Law Applicable to Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series 
No. 7, Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 268.  
650
 E.g., Cotton Club Estates Ltd v. Woodside Estates Co. [1928] 2 K.B. 463 (K.B.) at 465: “Arbitration 
is a personal covenant between the contracting parties, and provides as to the manner in which the debt is 
ascertained” quoted in Brekoulakis, supra note 56, p. 29, footnote 1. 
651
 See Girsberger & Hausmaninger, Assignment of Rights and Agreement to Arbitrate, 8 Arb. Int. 121 
(1992). 
652
 Born, Int. Comm. Arb., supra note 52, p. 1188. 
653
 Redfern and Hunter, supra note 49, para. 2.47. 
654
 Born, Int. Comm. Arb., supra note 52, p. 1188, D. Girsberger: The Law Applicable to the 
Assignments of Claims subject to an Arbitration Agreement” in F. Ferrari and S Kröll (eds), Conflict of 
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case that an arbitration agreement is entered into intuitu personae. The contemporary 
assumption is that the mere presence of an arbitration clause in a contract does not 
presume it to be a personal covenant incapable of being assigned
655
, and an 
arbitration agreement is not so presumed
656
. On the contrary, there is now a 
presumption that an arbitration agreement may be assigned, and that assignees 
validly take the benefit of it
657
. 
Indeed, under French law, there is a presumption of “automatic” assignment of the 
arbitration clause together with the underlying contract
658
. Similarly, in the United 
States, most courts have held that, when a contract is transferred from one party to 
another entity, the arbitration clause passes along with the underlying contract
659
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“knew or should have known of the clause”); Donel Corp. v. Kosher Overseers Ass'n of Am., 2001 WL 
228364, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (assignee of contract may invoke arbitration clause in contract); Cedrela 
Transp. Ltd v. Banque Cantonale Vaudoise, 67 F.Supp.2d 353, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (assignee of 
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Especially New York law adopts this general presumption, albeit with certain limited 
exceptions
660
. The same is generally true in civil law jurisdictions
661
, including 
Switzerland, where recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal have confirmed 
that a valid assignment of the underlying contract automatically transfers the 
arbitration agreement
662
. A similar position has been taken in Japan, India, 
Sweden
663
, Germany and Greece, as well as by international tribunals
664
. As one 
authority explains, with reference to German law: 
“when a person becomes the holder of a general or a limited 
share in a partnership which had already been organized before 
he joined it, he will be bound by an ‘intra-partnership’ agreement 
which had been attached to the original partnership contract 
before he joined the partnership. It is wholly irrelevant whether 
he acquired a general or a limited share. It also does not matter 
on which legal basis his entry into the partnership rests: on a 
statutory succession (for example, as an heir, a receiver, or a 
liquidator), or upon a corporate transaction (for example, as a 
purchaser or a donee).”665  
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Nonetheless, in some jurisdictions, the autonomous nature of the agreement to 
arbitrate is occasionally asserted as a reason why the arbitration clause should not be 
transferred automatically with the underlying contract
666
. In England, although some 
authorities support the position that the arbitration clause is transferred automatically 
with the underlying contract, other authorities suggest that an agreement to arbitrate 
is not automatically transferred
667
.  
Two main arguments are usually suggested against the rule of automatic transfer of 
arbitration clauses. First it is argued that the rule of automatic transfer violates the 
principles of separability and “autonomy of arbitration agreements”, and it 
undermines the independent status of the arbitration agreement from the main 
contract
668
. For instance the Moscow District Court in the Aero Imp. Case held that:  
“However, if the assignment of the rights from the agreement is 
recognized valid, this cannot be extended to the arbitration 
clause. Based on the principle of autonomy of the arbitration 
clause, according to which an arbitration clause that forms part 
of a contract shall be considered as a procedural agreement 
independent of other terms of the contract, assignment of rights 
from the arbitration agreement is to be formulated especially by 
written agreement or by conclusion of a new arbitration 
agreement with Aeroimp”669. 
This argument should be resisted by reason of the principle of separability (which 
should be understood more as a legal fiction than as an inflexible legal construct) 
which has little relevance in the case of transfer
670
. The transferee substitutes the 
transferor and assumes its legal position all together and in exactly the same terms. In 
cases where these terms include an arbitration clause, the transferee will necessarily 
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be bound by it as well
671
. The arbitration clause is in effect attached to the assigned 
substantive right or claim of the transferor
672
, as it constitutes the procedural 
mechanism whereby the substantive rights of the contract will be enforced in case of 
default of a party
673
.  
The second argument against the automatic transfer of an arbitration clause is based 
on the view that an arbitration agreement not only provides for rights; it equally 
provides for obligations, including, for example, the obligation to refrain from 
initiating court proceedings
674
. Accordingly, when courts or tribunals look into the 
transfer of the benefit to arbitrate and the transfer of the burden to arbitrate, and 
examine each question separately
675
.  
However, it will not be fair or equitable to apply standards to determine whether the 
assignee can compel the debtor to arbitrate different from the standards to determine 
whether the debtor can compel the assignee to arbitrate
676
.   
Without delving into complex choice of law issues beyond the scope of this chapter, 
in principle two laws are most relevant to determine the effect of any assignment of a 
contract containing an arbitration clause: the law governing the assignment itself, and 
the law governing the arbitration agreement (which will typically be the proper law 
of the main contract)
677
. The law governing the arbitration agreement determines the 
assignability of the agreement; the conditions to which the assignment is subject, and 
the consequences of the assignment, at least as far as relations between the assignor 
and its initial co-contractor are concerned... By contrast, relations between the 
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assignor and assignee are governed by the law chosen by the parties for that 
purpose
678
. 
Particularly in common law jurisdictions, close attention is paid to the wording and 
intention of the original arbitration clause and the subsequent assignment contract, to 
determine whether the parties intended to assign the arbitration clause
679
. If the 
assignment agreement excluded the arbitration clause, then this will ordinarily be 
sufficient to prevent the assignee from becoming a party to that clause
680
. Non-
assignment clauses in relation to the substantive right are often considered to exclude 
any assignment of the arbitration agreement. An exclusion may exist where the 
agreement to arbitrate is entered into on the basis of a special personal relationship. 
Furthermore the assignment should not lead to a deterioration of the original debtors’ 
position. That would be the case, for example, where due to the financial situation of 
the assignee, the reimbursement for costs may be endangered
681
. There may also be 
circumstances in which assignment of an arbitration clause produces results 
inconsistent with the parties' intentions (i.e., a U.S. company agrees to arbitrate under 
CIETAC Rules in China with a German company, and then one of the parties 
purportedly assigns the agreement to a Chinese state-owned entity)
682
. 
An automatic transfer may also be excluded when the assignment takes place while 
arbitration proceedings are already pending. Under English law, for example, the 
assignee does not automatically become a party to those proceedings; a notification 
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to the other party and the arbitrators is required
683
. This may be of particular 
importance where the original party no longer exists. If the necessary notifications 
are not made in time, the tribunal may lose jurisdiction as one of the parties has been 
dissolved. Any award rendered in such a situation will be null and void
684
. An 
English Judgment involving a French Company introduced a GAFTA arbitration in 
London against a Swiss Company, and some months later, split among two new 
companies, which took over the assets and liabilities of the initial company, which 
was subsequently liquidated while the arbitration was still pending. One of the 
companies which succeeded it attempted to continue with the arbitration. The Court 
of Appeal recognised that the company which had succeeded the claimant and was 
referred to as the “assignee” was entitled to avail itself of the arbitration agreement, 
either by initiating a new arbitration or intervening in the arbitration already pending, 
but under the double condition that the assignment be notified to the arbitrators and 
the adverse party and that the assignee intervene formally in the arbitral proceedings; 
neither condition was fulfilled in the case at hand
685
. This judgment does not 
invalidate the rule that an arbitration agreement may be transferred to an assignee or, 
more precisely, to the successor of the company
686
.   
Exclusion of assignment of an arbitration clause can be either express or implied. 
The extent to which the assignor remains bound by the arbitration agreement is 
primarily an issue of interpreting the arbitration agreement. On the basis of an 
arbitration agreement contained in the shareholders' agreement arbitration 
proceedings could be initiated against a shareholder who had left the company, 
where the dispute related to a breach of contract in connection with leaving the 
company
687
. 
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If an assignment of an arbitration clause is validly effected, then the assignee will 
have rights (and obligations) under the clause. In addition, the original assignor may 
also retain such rights (either as to pre-assignment events or generally, depending on 
the terms of the assignment and any restrictions on assignability)
688
.   
As with other non-signatory theories, questions of assignment give rise to choice-of-
law issues. Commentators have noted the lack of uniform rules concerning the 
assignment of arbitration agreements
689
. In the absence of applicable international 
rules, arbitrators and commentators have tended to look to domestic legal regimes for 
a solution
690
. 
There is also a lack of uniformity between national legal systems as to which law 
should determine whether an arbitration agreement has been validly assigned. In 
some jurisdictions, the question is treated as a procedural matter to be determined by 
the law of the arbitral seat
691
. In other jurisdictions, the substantive law that governs 
the underlying contract has been applied to determine issues of assignability
692
. As in 
other contexts, the better view is that the validation principle should apply to the 
assignability of the arbitration clause, upholding the assignment if that is the result 
under either the law governing the assignment agreement or the arbitration 
agreement
693
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The validity of the assignment in M&A transactions may be more complicated 
depending on the intention of the parties. The complexity has appeared in a recent 
ICC case that will be studied in detail.  
 
ICC Case No. 12745
694
  
Mr. X – who was not a party to this arbitration but whose activities largely 
determined the relations between the parties – founded and managed an Italian 
company that bought advertising slots under “supplier agreements” and sold them to 
customers wanting to advertise. The by-laws of the company provided that Mr. X 
had a pre-emption right. 
Company Z International SA (First Respondent) – a non-Italian company jointly 
owned by Company Z SA and a wholly owned subsidiary of Company W SA 
(Second Respondent) – entered the relevant Italian advertising market by (i) 
incorporating a wholly owned subsidiary under the name Company Z Italia srl and 
(ii) acquiring an interest in Mr. X's company. Mr. X's company was renamed 
Company Z Italia SpA; First Respondent held 51 percent of its shares, while Mr. X, 
who was also the company's managing director, held 49 percent. 
The First Respondent and Mr. X entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) in respect of the sale. The MoU provided, inter alia, that Mr. X could oppose 
the first candidate chosen by the First Respondent for the position of managing 
director, if the First Respondent were obliged to revoke Mr. X for good cause; if Mr. 
X also opposed a second candidate and that candidate was appointed, then Mr. X 
would have the right to sell his interest in the company to the First Respondent (the 
Put Option). Also, the parties undertook not to sell their shares to a third party (with 
the exception of an affiliate company of the First Respondent) for a period of five 
years. 
The First Respondent subsequently entered into negotiations with Company ABC 
(Claimant) – a joint venture owned in equal parts by Company DEF and Company 
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GHI – for the sale of the First Respondent's subsidiaries, including Company Z Italia 
SpA. During the negotiations, which involved the subsidiaries, Mr. X expressly 
mentioned his pre-emption right and the commitment of Company Z Italia SpA's 
shareholders not to sell their shares for five years. Mr. X also pointed out the 
worrying financial situation of Company Z Italia SpA. (In Italy, the relevant 
advertising business is characterized by a high need of working capital.) 
The Claimant and the First Respondent eventually reached an agreement for the sale. 
The First Respondent would incorporate a new holding company (Holdco or the 
Holding) to which it would contribute all shares. The First Respondent would then 
transfer the shares in the Holding to the Claimant on a certain date, date B (the 
Closing Date). 
In preparation for the sale, the First Respondent entered into an agreement (Accordo) 
with Mr. X. The Accordo provided, inter alia, that Mr. X waived his pre-emption 
right on the condition that: (i) the Holding replace the First Respondent as party to 
the MoU as of the date (a far data) of the transfer of the First Respondent's 
participation in Company Z Italia SpA (the Participation) to the Holding; (ii) the 
Holding sell the shares in Company Z Italia SpA to a purchaser selected exclusively 
among Company GHI, Company DEF, the Claimant or any of their parent 
companies, subsidiaries or affiliates; (iii) the sale and purchase agreement between 
the Holding and the selected purchaser be signed not later than date B. The Accordo 
also provided that First Respondent grant to Company Z Italia SpA a temporary 
advance of € 3.5 million, to be paid according to an agreed schedule. The Accordo 
was to be no longer effective if it was not signed and received by the Parties within a 
certain date (date A) preceding date B. 
 
Shortly after the Accordo was signed, the Claimant entered into a Share Purchase 
Agreement (SPA) with the First Respondent and its parent companies, the Second 
Respondent and Company Z SA (collectively, the Respondents) for the sale of the 
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First Respondent's subsidiaries. Clause 12.10 of the SPA provided for arbitration of 
disputes by an ICC arbitral tribunal in Paris
695
.  
As agreed among the parties, the First Respondent incorporated the Holding and then 
entered into several share purchase agreements with it in respect of the shares in the 
First Respondent's subsidiaries. A share purchase agreement was also concluded, 
relevantly, in respect of the First Respondent's 100 percent interest in Company Z 
Italia srl and the First Respondent's Participation in Company Z Italia SpA (the 
Holding/First Respondent SPA). The Holding/First Respondent SPA provided that 
title to the shares had to pass to the Holding on date B-2 at the latest. The First 
Respondent warranted that Mr. X's pre-emption right had been waived by the 
Accordo. 
The Participation was transferred to the Holding under the Holding/First Respondent 
SPA by an act certified by a notary public in [an Italian city]. In the meantime, the 
First Respondent paid the temporary advances under the Accordo to Company Z 
Italia SpA. 
Closing under the SPA (transfer of the shares in the Holding to the Claimant) took 
place on date B+10. 
Following the Closing, Mr. X – who was still Company Z Italia SpA's managing 
director – showed a marked unwillingness to work with and under the new 
shareholder and took several steps that allegedly worsened Company Z Italia SpA's 
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financial situation. Inter alia, he terminated commercial agency contracts with 
several agents and outsourced part of the company's activity to Company J srl, an 
Italian company held by one of Company Z Italia SpA's former employees. Company 
J srl was appointed exclusive commercial agent to sell advertising space in the name 
of Company Z Italia SpA; it later appeared that Company J srl, while receiving an 
agent's fee, did not retrocede the amounts billed to and paid by the customers to 
Company Z Italia SpA. Company Z Italia SpA was thus emptied of all its assets and 
de facto liquidated, its business being, according to the Claimant, taken over by a 
company constituted by former employees of Company Z Italia SpA, in particular 
the same employee behind Italian Company J srl. 
Mr X. also claimed that he had not renounced his pre-emption right as one of the 
three conditions under the Accordo – that the Holding succeed the First Respondent 
as a party to the MoU before the date on which the shares in Company Z Italia SpA 
were transferred to the Holding – had not been met. He therefore commenced an 
action against the First Respondent, the Holding and Company Z Italia SpA in an 
Italian court, seeking an order declaring that the sale of the First Respondent's 
interest in Company Z Italia SpA was ineffective. His request was denied, 
whereupon Mr. X appealed. This proceeding was pending before an Italian appellate 
court at the time of the present award. 
Mr. X's claim was the source of the dispute that arose between the Claimant and the 
Respondents and led to the present ICC arbitration and award. When the Claimant 
became aware of Mr. X's claim, it notified the Second Respondent – in its capacity of 
agent for the guarantors (that is, the Second Respondent itself, Company Z SA and 
the First Respondent) – that the Holding had a claim against them for several 
breaches of the SPA, in particular, a breach of the representation and warranty that 
the First Respondent had the exclusive ownership of the shares in the First 
Respondent's subsidiaries, including Company Z Italia SpA. 
The Claimant then commenced ICC arbitration against the Respondents as provided 
for in the SPA. (Mr. X was not a party to the arbitration). The Claimant asked the 
arbitral tribunal to rule that the First Respondent: (i) failed to deliver to the Claimant 
(through the Holding) effective control over Company Z Italia SpA; (ii) breached its 
obligation to warrant the purchaser a peaceful possession of the shares of Company Z 
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Italia SpA, and (iii) breached its obligation to provide sufficient funding to Company 
Z Italia SpA until the Closing, as well as its obligation to cause Mr. X and the 
management and employees of Company Z Italia SpA to cooperate loyally with the 
Claimant. The Claimant also asked the arbitrators to rule that such breaches were in 
direct link of causation with the losses suffered by the Claimant due to the 
destruction of the business of Company Z Italia SpA, which was by then in 
liquidation. It further sought damages, interest and the costs of the arbitration and 
legal costs. 
The arbitral tribunal examined whether Mr. X waived his pre-emption right, as a 
precondition to determining whether the Respondents breached their obligations 
under the SPA. Mr. X claimed that he did not waive his pre-emption right because 
one of the conditions set out in the Accordo for a waiver had not been met, namely, 
the Holding had not replaced the First Respondent as a party to the MoU on the date 
the shares in Company Z Italia SpA were transferred to the Holding. The tribunal 
first held that it appeared from the Accordo in its entirety that the parties to it – Mr. X 
and the First Respondent – intended that the Holding's succession to the First 
Respondent as a party to the MoU be effective as from the transfer of Company Z 
Italia SpA's shares to the Holding and that the whole transaction had to be completed 
on or before date B. Hence, the substitution of the First Respondent by the Holding 
as a party to the MoU had to be effective on the date of the filing with the notary 
public at the latest. 
The tribunal then concluded that Mr. X's pre-emption right had not been waived 
because the MoU had not been assigned to the Holding, either expressly or by means 
of facta concludentia (facta concludentia being a party's conduct or mode of action 
that unambiguously points to a certain position so that another party may justifiably 
rely on such conduct). 
The arbitrators noted that French courts tend to apply the doctrine of adequate 
causation concurrently with the doctrine of equivalent conditions, or even alone, in 
cases where several causes may be taken into account. In light of the above, the 
tribunal examined whether the Respondents' breach of the SPA could be deemed the 
adequate cause of the loss incurred by the Claimant, that is, whether, by human 
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foresight, the collapse of Company Z Italia SpA could be anticipated as likely to 
result from the Respondents' failure to properly waive Mr. X's pre-emption right. 
The tribunal answered this question in the negative, finding that the cause of 
Company Z Italia SpA's collapse was Mr. X's conduct of the business after the take-
over. The Respondents' failure to obtain a proper waiver of Mr. X's pre-emption right 
offered Mr. X, who was clearly unwilling to work in the new structure and lacked 
confidence in the new management imposed by the Claimant, the possibility to make 
it more difficult for the Claimant to take effective control of Company Z Italia SpA. 
However, the Respondents' breach of contract was not the adequate cause of 
Company Z Italia SpA's winding up; it only facilitated Mr. X's possibly disloyal 
actions against the new shareholder. 
The interpretation of the Accordo leads to the conclusion that the parties to it 
intended that the succession of the First Respondent by the Holding as a party to the 
MoU be effective as from the transfer of Company Z Italia SpA's shares and that the 
whole ‘Transaction’ had to be completed on or before date B.  
 
“First, the English version of the Accordo agreed upon by the parties translates ‘a far 
data’ as ‘as of’. It is true that the Italian version of the Accordo must prevail in case 
of discrepancy (Art. 10). However, this translation, which is a contemporaneous 
document, gives a first and most authoritative indication of the parties' intention at 
the time of contracting. One may hope (perhaps naively) that the parties did read this 
English translation in due time and would have reacted if ‘as of’ did not square with 
their common and actual consent.  
“Second, it appears that the succession of the Holding as a party to the MoU was a 
primary condition laid down by Mr. X to consent to forfeit his pre-emption right on 
the First Respondent's interest in Company Z Italia SpA. This is easily 
understandable as the MoU did not only grant him a pre-emption right, but virtually 
secured his position of managing director of the company by obliging the First 
Respondent to buy him out if it intended to revoke him.  
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The effectiveness of the waiver of Mr. X's pre-emption right was in particular 
dependent upon the dissolving condition that the Holding ‘succeed to the First 
Respondent as a Party to the MoU’ (Art. 3(1) of the Accordo). It is common ground 
between the parties that, under Italian law, the contemplated substitution had to be 
operated by way of an assignment of contract. In other words, the First Respondent 
(the assignor) had to assign all its rights and obligations arising under the MoU to the 
Holding (the assignee). The parties also agree that Mr. X (the assigned party) had 
authorized beforehand the assignment of the MoU by concluding the Accordo. “As 
the Italian Supreme Court has confirmed it, it follows from the above provision that 
an assignment of contract authorized beforehand is not effective unless and until it 
has been notified to the assigned party or the latter has acknowledged it (Decision of 
the Italian Supreme Court of 25 August 1986). “In the instant case, Mr. X authorized 
the assignment of the MoU by concluding the Accordo. It remains to be determined 
whether the MoU was assigned to the Holding and, in the affirmative, whether such 
assignment was notified to or acknowledged by Mr. X on or before the transfer of 
Company Z Italia SpA's shares to the Holding, i.e. on or before the date of the filing 
with the notary public. “It is common ground between the parties that First 
Respondent did not expressly assign the MoU to the Holding. Therefore, the Arbitral 
Tribunal must ascertain whether the MoU was tacitly assigned by means of facta 
concludentia. As observed by the Respondents' experts themselves, a tacit 
assignment of the MoU would have had to be clearly and unequivocally 
understandable, including for Mr. X who was party to the MoU. 
“The Arbitral Tribunal made two additional observations in this respect. The first one 
is that it would not have been necessary for Mr. X (or his lawyer) to subject the 
waiver of his pre-emption right to the succession of the Holding as a party to the 
MoU if such effect had followed from the mere transfer of Company Z Italia SpA's 
shares. The second one is that the purchaser of Company Z Italia SpA's shares was 
not designated in the Accordo, Art. 3(11) of which provided that it had ‘to be 
selected exclusively among one of the following parties: Company GHI, Company 
DEF, the Claimant or any of their parent companies, subsidiaries or affiliates 
pursuant to Art. 2359 of the Italian Civil Code’ [ItCC]. Actually, the Holding, which 
was set up on date B-32, did not exist at the time the Accordo was concluded.  
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“The share purchase agreement may therefore not constitute a clear and unequivocal 
conduct of the parties showing their intention to assign the MoU. Moreover, the 
Respondents have not shown that such conduct would have been understandable for 
Mr. X and that Mr. X would have taken the Respondents' conduct as a notification of 
the assignment.  
“In light of the above, the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the MoU was not tacitly 
assigned to the Holding. Accordingly, there is no need to determine if, as a matter of 
principle, as argued by the Claimant, such a tacit assignment was prohibited by the 
MoU.”  
“Even if the MoU had been assigned to the Holding, such assignment would not have 
been effective on the date of the transfer of Company Z Italia SpA's shares to the 
Holding. “In the present case, the Arbitral Tribunal has reached the conclusion that 
the First Respondent and the Holding did not even enter into an assignment of the 
MoU by facta concludentia. Accordingly, there is no need to determine whether the 
assignment of the MoU was tacitly acknowledged by Mr. X. As a conclusion “The 
Arbitral Tribunal finds that the pre-emption right of Mr. X on the First Respondent's 
interest in Company Z Italia SpA had not been waived on the Closing Date.”  
In order to determine the assignment in M&A transactions, the author supports a 
concern to supplant the interpretation of the arbitration agreement, where necessary, 
with a careful assessment of all factors that might help a tribunal draw conclusions as 
to the likely a priori intent of the parties. Implied intent to promote efficient 
solutions is an important working hypothesis, as long as it is understood as one factor 
that needs to be looked at alongside others. As it is seen the concepts of assignment 
and succession has not been separated in M&A transactions.  
 
 
C-2) The Latter Superseded the Former and Succession 
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It is well-settled that an entity that does not execute an arbitration agreement may 
become a party thereto by way of legal succession
696
. The most common means of 
such succession is by a company's merger or combination with the original party to 
an agreement
697
. Questions of succession in international commercial arbitration 
arise most often in connection with companies, rather than natural persons
698
. 
 
Succession in a contract may occur through an assignment, or the sale of an ongoing 
business, the taking over by a new entity of all the rights and obligations of the 
assigned or sold business under its various contracts, or in the case of a merger 
between corporations. The effects of the assignment, sale of the business, or merger , 
i.e. whether the successor takes over or steps into, the rights and duties and the 
procedural position, will be governed by the substantive law applicable to the 
assignment, sale of ongoing business, or merger, or similarly in arbitration by the law 
governing the arbitration agreement
699
.  
 
In some legal systems, the merging company takes over all the relationships of the 
merged company and, therefore, also the contract containing the arbitration clause. If 
an universal succession is taking place, there is no obstacle to the merging company 
being bound by the arbitration agreement
700
. 
 
Under many national legal regimes, corporate or company law permits the merger or 
combination of two or more previously separate legal entities into either a new legal 
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entity or one of the pre-existing legal entities
701. The consequence of such “mergers” 
or “business combinations” is that the “merged” or “surviving” entity will be the 
owner of all the assets and liabilities (including contract rights and obligations) of the 
previously-existing entities
702
. The general rule is that arbitration agreements, like 
other contracts, endure to the benefit of universal successors of companies; for 
example, in a voluntary merger, or by operation of law. Such questions involve the 
status of a company and are thus generally to be resolved by reference to the law of 
its incorporation (or, in respect of natural persons, by reference to the law of 
succession)
703
. For instance, in ICC Case No. 2626 the arbitrators held that: 
 
“The dominant trend in case law holds that an arbitration 
agreement is not only valid between the parties, but can also be 
relied upon against their heirs, their legatees, their assignees, and 
all those acquiring obligations. The only exceptions are cases where 
the arbitration agreement is drafted in such a way as to exclude 
successors and assignees.”704.  
 
 
Furthermore, arbitrators concluded that “the conversion of a limited liability 
company, which had signed an arbitration agreement, into a joint stock corporation 
did not prevent the arbitration agreement from being relied upon against the 
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655, 659-60 (8th Cir. 1938) (in both consolidations and mergers “the new corporation acquires all the 
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company as it existed after the conversion”705. The joint stock corporation (Societa 
per azione) was held to be a proper respondent on the basis of universal succession 
under Italian law
706
. 
 
When such a combination occurs, most national laws provide that the merged or 
surviving entity succeeds by operation of law as a party to the contracts, including 
the arbitration agreements, of the previously-existing entities
707
. In the US case, 
Fyrnetics (HK) Ltd v Quantum Group Inc, Fyrnetics entered into a licence agreement 
with Quantum in relation to a biomimetric sensor that Quantum had developed and 
patented. Fyrnetics merged with Kidde and subsequently dissolved as a separate 
corporate entity. When a dispute arose over the licence agreement, Kidde filed a 
claim against Quantum before the US courts, notwithstanding the fact that the licence 
agreement contained an arbitration clause. Kidde argued that it was not bound by the 
arbitration clause in the licence agreement which had been signed and agreed by 
Frynetics, rather than Kidde. The Seventh Circuit rejected Kidde’s argument 
upholding the district court’s ruling that “when Kidde caused Fyrnetics to be merged 
into Kidde and then dissolved, Kidde voluntarily assumed the obligation of 
Fyrnetics’ license agreement. Kidde, which made claims that are partly those of 
Fyrnetics, could not escape application of the license agreement’s arbitration 
requirement by effectively legislating Fyrnetics out of existence
708
.  
 
In a more recent ICC Case
709
, an arbitral tribunal sitting in Paris was hearing a 
dispute between French claimant X and a Spanish respondent Company Y. After the 
determination of the arbitrators mission (acte de mission) X was succeeded by 
another Company, Z. The Arbitral Tribunal held that:  
                                                          
705
 Ibid, and see observations by Y. Derains. Compare with ICC Award No. 3742 (1983), European 
contractor v. Three Middle Eastern state owned entities, where the tribunal refused to rule on the 
consequences of the assignment to other entities of the assets of the state-owned entity that signed the 
arbitration agreement. The tribunal's grounds for so doing–the fact that the companies resulting from the 
reorganization were not included in the terms of reference–are unsatisfactory in the author’s view (111 
J.D.I. 910 (1984), and observations by Y. Derains) quoted also in Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, supra 
note 49, para. 715 and footnote 51. 
706
 Redfern, Hunter, supra note 49, para. 2.51, footnote 94. 
707
 Born, Int. Comm. Arb., supra note 52, pp. 1185-1186. Judgment of 13 June 1963, 1964 Rev. arb. 125 
(Paris Cour d'appel); Judgment of 9 June 1998, C. Srl v. L.S. SA, 16 ASA Bull. 653 (Swiss Federal 
Tribunal) (1998). See also  Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, supra note 49, para. 715 (1999); Redfern and 
Hunter, supra note 49, para. 2-51 (2009); Poudret, Besson, supra note 55, para. 290. 
708
 Fyrnetics (H.K.) Ltd v. Quantum Group, Inc., 293 F.3d 1023, 1029 (7th Cir. 2002). See Brekoulakis, 
supra note 56, para. 2.69. Born, ibid, p. 1186, especially footnote 238.    
709
 ICC Case No. 3281, 109 J.D.I. (Clunet) 990 (1982). 
235 
 
 
“It results from the terms of the minutes of the Shareholders meeting 
[approving the merger between Z and X] that Z is subrogated in all 
the rights and obligations of X, notably on those resulting from the 
arbitration agreement.”710.  
 
In that case there were different conclusions presented by successor. The conclusions 
of Company Z were different than the conclusions of Company X. However the 
arbitral tribunal held that:  
 
“the conclusions of company Z do not exceed the limits of the 
competence of the arbitral tribunal defined in the “acte de 
mission” and in contrary are contended  with the reduced the 
pretence mentioned initially by company X
711
. 
 
National courts
712
 and arbitral awards
713
 have held that the same result generally 
applies in other instances of corporate succession, when one entity assumes the  
rights and obligations of another entity as a matter of applicable national company 
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law
714
. For instance in the first interim award in the Westland case
715
, the arbitral 
tribunal pointed out that:  
 
[i]n certain circumstances, those who have not signed an arbitration 
clause are nevertheless bound by it (and can avail themselves of it as 
a means of objection, if proceedings are instituted against them before 
the ordinary courts). This is true for the successor in title or any other 
successor, for example whosoever may acquire rights over property or 
a concern with assets and liabilities of the nature referred to in article 
180 et seq. of the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations or for an 
assignee. It is thus that two awards given under the aegis of the ICC 
held that in cases of subrogation and of universal succession, the 
subrogated party and the successor were bound by an arbitration 
clause.  
 
In a more recent ICC Case
716
, an arbitral tribunal sitting in Paris and hearing a 
dispute between French claimant and Jordanian Respondents. Respondent 1 was a 
limited partnership organized under Jordanian Law; Respondent 2 was a corporation 
incorporated in Jordan. The issue to be resolved was whether Respondent 1 had 
ceased to exist or had been transformed into a different entity, or whether it had 
merged into a corporation which would have succeeded it in all its assets and 
liabilities. On the basis of the application of Jordanian Law, the Arbitral Tribunal 
concluded that Respondent 1 had been transformed into Respondent 2. Nevertheless, 
the Arbitral tribunal considered what would be the procedural consequences of such 
transformation or absorption. In the view of the arbitral tribunal, such matter is 
governed by the procedural law applying to the arbitration. Since the ICC arbitration 
rules governing the procedure do not contain any provision in this respect, the 
Arbitral Tribunal considered whether the parties had chosen the law governing the 
procedure.  
 
The Arbitral Tribunal held that the choice of law stipulation in the contracts giving 
rise to the dispute referring to French Law also extended to the applicable procedural 
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law, a circumstance corroborated by the fact that France had been chosen as the place 
of arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal was of the view supporting the application of 
French Law to the procedure parallel to the application of French Law to the 
substance that the prevailing view in France is that, despite the autonomy of the 
arbitration clause vis-à-vis the contract containing it, in most cases the parties intend 
to submit both to the same law except when there is a contrary indication
717
.  
 
The Arbitral Tribunal finally concluded that under French Law, both in case of 
transformation of a company into another or of absorption of a company by another, 
the rights and obligations under the arbitration clause and the right to use, or to 
participate or continue participating in arbitration proceedings remain in, or are 
acquired by, the company, resulting from the transformation or absorbing the original 
holder of such rights and obligations. Thus, it concluded that Respondent 2 was the 
only rightful party to the arbitration on the respondent side of the proceedings
718
.  
 
Most authorities have held that the national law governing the issue of succession 
also applies to a non-signatory's succession to an arbitration agreement
719
.  
 
According to Born, the better view is that, the validation principle applies, providing 
for succession to the arbitration agreement if that result would be obtained under 
either the law governing the underlying succession (e.g., the merger) or the 
arbitration agreement. Further, national law rules of succession would be subject to 
international prohibitions against discriminatory and idiosyncratic legislation. Thus, 
if local law provided that all obligations of a locally-incorporated company were 
transferred in a merger or other reorganization, with the exception of agreements to 
arbitrate (either generally or with foreign companies), that limitation would be 
ineffective under the Convention's neutrality and non-discrimination principles
720
. 
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By the effect of a universal or individual transfer (merger, demerger, succession, 
novation, subrogation, transfer of contract or transfer of debt), the actual parties to 
the arbitration clause (the new shareholders, the new owner of the company, the 
heirs, the transferees of the contract or the debt, the subrogated party) may be 
different from the ones who signed the clause in the first place
721
.  
 
It is commonly recognised that the universal successor is bound by the arbitration 
clause concluded by the person whom he succeeds, under the reservation of an 
agreement to the contrary, in particular where such a clause had a strictly personal 
character
722
.  Other cases of universal succession such as takeovers, merger of 
companies, or the acquisition of the assets and liabilities of a company cause the 
transfer of the arbitration agreement to the new owner or the new combined company 
in the case of a merger
723
.  
 
It is generally agreed that when X transfers to Y a contract containing an arbitration 
clause which it has concluded with Z, if a dispute arises, it is Y and not X that has the 
right to start the arbitration proceedings against Z, as the new party to the contract 
and therefore to the arbitration clause
724
. If, on the other hand, the assignment is 
invalid under the applicable law, only the original party has standing and only on its 
own behalf
725
. 
 
From a purely company law perspective, it is relatively clear that any new partner or 
shareholder will be subject to the arbitration provision in a company charter or a 
partnership deed, regardless of specific acceptance thereof. Exercising rights and 
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deriving benefits as a shareholder or partner within a corporate or partnership 
structure, which itself contains an arbitration clause, suffices to subject the new party 
to that clause
726
. As one authority explains, with reference to German law: 
 
“when a person becomes the holder of a general or a limited share 
in a partnership which had already been organized before he 
joined it, he will be bound by an ‘intra-partnership’ agreement 
which had been attached to the original partnership contract 
before he joined the partnership. It is wholly irrelevant whether he 
acquired a general or a limited share. It also does not matter on 
which legal basis his entry into the partnership rests: on a statutory 
succession (for example, as an heir, a receiver, or a liquidator), or 
upon a corporate transaction (for example, as a purchaser or a 
donee).
727”  
 
The same analysis applies to transfers of corporate shares
728
. New shareholders are 
automatically bound by the arbitration clause contained in a company's constitutive 
documents, simply by virtue of their status as shareholders, without the need for a 
separate agreement
729
. 
 
Equally, a party's purported acquisition of corporate shares or partnership interests – 
even if invalid – also generally subjects it to the corporate charter's or partnership 
deed's arbitration clause with regard to disputes over the validity of that acquisition. 
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The act of exercising rights attached to corporate shares or partnership interests is 
sufficient to subject the party claiming such rights to the arbitration clause associated 
with them
730
. 
 
National courts have generally rejected arguments that shareholders' disputes and the 
“internal affairs” of corporate governance are non-arbitrable. There is no reason that 
arbitral tribunals cannot satisfactorily resolve issues of corporate law, just as they 
resolve other legal issues. Nonetheless, in some jurisdictions, questions have arisen 
as to the arbitrability of particular matters (such as the validity of shareholder 
resolutions). In Germany, for example, there was disagreement regarding the 
arbitrability of the validity of shareholder resolutions, which was eventually resolved 
in favour of arbitrability, provided that all shareholders in the company are party to 
the arbitration
731
. Other types of disputes among shareholders to a German company 
are in principle fully arbitrable
732
. 
 
A more complicated situation arises from the sale of an ongoing concern, or where a 
subscription of capital takes place by a contribution in kind, consisting of the transfer 
of a ongoing concern. If the transfer of the contract is not provided for by the 
applicable substantive law, as a consequence of the sale of an ongoing business or of 
its contribution in kind, then respectively the purchaser and the corporation, to which 
the ongoing concern has been contributed, do not take over the arbitration clause or 
the arbitration submission. In those jurisdictions, like Italy, where the purchaser of a 
business takes over, except when agreed otherwise, the contracts entered into for the 
conduct of that business (provided they do not have a personal nature), the 
purchasing company should also take over the seller’s position in arbitral 
proceedings
733
. 
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D) Conclusion of Chapter V 
 
In the previous chapters it was determined that “consent” of the parties is the main 
obstacle in dealing with the problems of consolidation of parallel proceedings and 
how to clarify the limits of each ADR mechanism which escalade to arbitration in 
M&A transactions. It was determined that consent arose at the inception of M&A 
transaction and remains relevant throughout.  
 
The central importance of consent to this thesis culminates in the final chapter, where 
the manifestation of consent in M&A transactions is first focused on. There are many 
different ways how consent can become concrete, however, it has been seen that 
parties’ consent can also arise without written instruments. Therefore it is important 
to focus on the identification of consent. While consent by conduct or incorporation 
by reference is used by practitioners, however, applying this methods during M&A 
arbitration can be problematic. 
 
Moreover, in order to determine the existence of an arbitration agreement consent 
can be derived from consent to an underlying contract. This is highly relevant to 
M&A transactions given the numerous agreements involved. However the scope of 
this consent can come under scrutiny where it is present across different agreements 
giving rise to the issues of consistency and continuity. Further to this, research 
examines consent in related agreements. The lack of framework on related 
agreements discussed in Chapter Three, impacts upon consent to these agreements. 
Absence of a contractual network in M&A transactions causes increased 
complexities in issues of consent across inter-related arbitration agreements in 
different phases.  
 
Parties should pay close attention to the drafting of arbitration agreement or multi-
tiered dispute resolution clauses across their contractual network in order not to 
further lengthen or complicate the process. M&A transactions are often derailed by 
court petitions by aggrieved parties. Where an arbitration clause is provided for, as is 
the generally the case, the author disagrees that the intervention of the courts will be 
an appropriate solution. First of all, the intervention of national courts will be the 
main obstacle to the nature of arbitration as the chosen dispute resolution 
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mechanism, and secondly, even if there is an intervention, the courts too will focus 
on the intention of the parties and to the facts of the M&A transactions, resulting in 
proceedings parallel to arbitration. In this case, arbitration, as a private confidential 
and efficient way of resolving problems, will partially lose its effectiveness. 
Therefore, the author believes that “consent”, which is the foundation of arbitration, 
should prevent the intervention of national courts.   
 
From analysis of case law, it has been seen that arbitration tribunals have relied upon 
contract law principles in dealing with complex issues of consent. Most notably, in 
relation to defect in consent, such as fraud and/or mistake etc. As Prof. Hanotiau 
mentions in his Freashfileds Lecture in 2010, parties defending objections to consent 
often rely on classical mechanisms of assignment, agency, subrogation, estoppel, 
succession, third party beneficiary, weil piercing and alter ego
734
. This chapter, 
limited to the topic at hand, focused on assignment and succession, which more 
commonly appeared in M&A transactions, as well as the case of consolidation of 
parallel proceedings. 
 
In the case of assignment the party substituting the original signatory of the 
arbitration clause in the arbitration procedure invokes the mechanism of assignment 
of the contract containing the clause, or the assignment of certain rights under this 
contract. The transmission of the arbitration clause by application of this mechanism 
is not always based on express consent. If the entire contract is assigned, the consent 
of the assignee to arbitrate will be presumed from his consent to the substantive 
assignment. In some cases, however, the reasoning of the courts, for example, the 
French Courts, does not seem to be based on presumed consent but rather on the fact 
that the arbitration clause is deemed inseparable from the economy of the contract
735
.  
 
As a general rule it is accepted that unless there is some provision to the contrary, 
either in the statute or agreement of consolidation or merger, the consolidated or 
resulting corporation succeeds to the powers, privileges, and property of the 
constituents or merged corporation. For the question of whether the arbitration 
agreement is included in this power, the jurisprudence of many countries and 
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 Karim Youssef, Consent in Context, West, 2009, p. 86 and 90-91. 
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arbitration institutions answered positively. However, in the final chapter with the 
recent examples of ICC Cases quoted in detail, the author sought to prove that 
whether during the M&A transactions or after completing the M&A transactions (for 
instance after the merger of company A and B which established a new company C) 
in order to precise the survival of the arbitration clauses, focus should not only be on 
the general rules of assignment or succession (universal or individual), but also on 
the intention of the parties with the attention to the facts.  
 
For instance in ICC Case No. 11961, the arbitral tribunal uses classical theories of 
contract law including consent by conduct and they found conduct sufficient to 
determine the scope of SPA and rationae personae of the arbitration clause. They 
found SPA automaticlly invalid because of error but arbitral tribunal did not pay 
attention to other conduct between parties. However, in M&A transactions, erreur or 
other defects cannot stop the consent of parties, if they wish to continue to next 
stages of M&A transactions. Parties can continue to deal with the transaction and 
these defects will not have an effect for arbitration clauses. This case is also note-
worthy because it relies centrally on contract law principles neglecting arbitration 
rules on separability and arbitration rules on consent if any. Relying on contract law 
principles is understandable given the absence of specific rules on consent in M&A 
arbitration, however, whether this approach or the approach which embraces analysis 
all relevant factors will be used remains in question. Therefore, M&A arbitration 
guidelines can act as a road-map as to which method should apply in relation to 
consent.  
  
In a more recent case, ICC Case No. 12502, the Arbitral tribunal paid attention to the 
scope of arbitration clauses where more than one arbitration clause existed, 
employing the doctrine of the “latter superseded the former”. Focus is on the 
arbitration clause in the SPA in a broad sense relying on its text in relation to “all 
disputes in connection with the contract”. The tribunal inferred a connection between 
the SPA and the heads of agreement (letter of intent) despite the fact that the latter 
was concluded with different parties to the former. Bearing in mind the discussions 
in Chapter Three grounded on the fourth question in working hypothesis, this can be 
considered the high watermark in determining the “connection” in order to define 
multi-contact. The tribunal uses the broad definition of connection with the 
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presumption of consent with reference to “all disputes” rather than strictly relying on 
fundamental contract law principles. 
 
In another recent case, the ICC Arbitral Tribunal examined consent in terms of 
“assignment” and “succession”. In determining whether consent was present for 
assignment the Tribunal looked to whether consent was expressly provided or by 
facta concludentia. Amidst this determination succession was also considered in light 
of whether a full transfer of shares has occurred. Further to this determination the 
Arbitral tribunal considers whether the assignee has acknowledged or been notified 
in ascertaining whether consent is present. Firstly, the arbitral tribunal found that the 
doctrine of the latter superseded former could not apply in this instance, because the 
consent derived from the clear and unequivocal conduct of the parties in the SPA 
could not trump the prohibition of such consent in the memorandum of 
understanding. This relation between the SPA and MoU is similar to that of 
assignment and succession in so far that when interpreting an arbitration agreement it 
can be necessary to supplant careful assessment of all factors which point to the 
intent of the parties. This expansive approach is the result of a deficit in existing 
rules. The transitory definition of consent also contributes to this expansive 
approach, because its limits have not been defined.  
 
In examining these three recent ICC cases, there is no common approach to 
determining issues related to consent. The lack of common approach accommodates 
the complexity of M&A transactions by being fluid as to the peculiarities of specific 
individual transactions. There is, however, little predictability and defined procedure 
which parties and practitioners can rely upon.  
 
Given the absence of a definition of assignment and succession in arbitration rules, 
the practitioners have no choice but to consider all factors in an inclusive way. This 
notwithstanding and the fact that consent cannot be defined or determined in specific 
regulations generally, a structured procedure must be based on defined guidelines 
concerning assignment and succession.  
 
In the author’s opinion, this is the most important point especially in M&A 
transaction because; at the conclusion of the M&A process a new company can be 
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created independentlty from the companies which created it. This company will be 
liable on the arbitration agreement that the previous companies have signed. In 
absence of a rule in arbitration institutions, parties need some guidelines on this 
point, because rules can have disadvantages too. All aspects of M&A arbitration deal 
with consent, it is not possible to deal the “consent” problem with a rule, but 
guidelines can be pragmatic and beneficial. 
 
It cannot be argued that concept of consent is fixed. It is in constant development 
similar to the actual situations to which it must be applied. In recent years, situations 
surrounding M&A transactions are more complex than they were in the past, given 
the increased number of contracts involved. However, consent as a component of 
multi-contracts in itself has not changed fundamentally. Therefore, in line with Prof. 
Hanotiau’s ideas this author recommends a modern approach focusing on facts can 
give a better, more instructive understanding of consent in M&A transactions, which 
pays attention to economic realities, trade usages, and the complex dimensions of 
M&A transactions and connected agreements in multi-contract scenarios. This 
transitory concept of consent should no longer be restricted to express consent or 
presume existing rules, but account for various expressions and give increased 
importance to the conduct of the parties involved in M&A transactions.  
 
As a starting point to promulgate this modern understanding of consent, the author 
recommends “M&A Arbitration Guidelines”, leading parties of M&A in every stage 
of the transaction concerning dispute resolution and addressing some of the pitfalls 
highlighted in this thesis. Naturally, these guidelines would not be mandatory and 
imperative. However, the nature of these guidelines may become increasingly 
persuasive and applicable depending on the complexity of “consent” and on 
connected agreements or parallel proceedings which often arise in M&A 
transactions. Parties may avoid these guidelines by providing for contrary binding 
regulations on M&A arbitration, owing to the fact that their consent must be 
respected.  
 
These guidelines are revisited in the final conclusion with the outcome of each 
chapter’s finding. In summarising the main points of this thesis, the working 
hypothesis will be addressed and the fruits of research will be presented.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine arbitration in M&A transactions and focus 
particularly on the problem of consent in two different aspects in M&A transactions: 
first the “consolidation of parallel proceedings” during M&A transactions; second 
the problem of consent in “assignment” and “succession” after M&A transactions.  
 
The M&A process is complex and the sources and nature of possible disputes are 
numerous, yet not usually difficult to resolve. The first part of the author’s research 
focused on the theoretical approaches, such as terminology, different phases of M&A 
transactions, possible disputes arising out of M&A transactions, and the role of 
arbitration in such context. Because of the peculiarities of M&A transactions, there is 
often no clear answer for dispute resolution problems; different answers may be 
given to the same queries, inter alia depending on when the issue arises in the 
process
736
. In the author’s opinion, there are many different aspects and items which 
should be considered aside from the point in time a dispute or disputes arise in order 
to determine appropriate solutions. Therefore, when speaking of the problem of 
consent in M&A Arbitration, several approaches should be analysed, and several 
distinctions are needed.  
 
During comparative studies, it is remarked that mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers 
are not same notions. Their scopes are different from each other and these 
transactions are long and involve very complex issues. The author believes that 
examining the terminology of notions provided necessary insight and paved the way 
to finding responses to the questions posed in the working hypothesis. 
 
During the examination of comparative law, it was seen that complexity still exists in 
many national laws because of the non-existence of a clear definition of merger, 
acquisition, or takeover. Finally, research found acquisition as a commonly accepted 
“way” of merger, however, all the acquisitions are not concluded as mergers. In the 
definition of acquisition, corporate control is not mandatory, however, in order to 
define takeover it is necessary to acquire control. In this regard acquisition seems 
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broader than takeover. In tackling these varying notions, the author formulated a 
working definition of an M&A transaction with which to address the specific issues 
addressed concerning arbitration in M&A transactions.  
 
Consecutive Phases of M&A Transactions 
 
The first chapter undertook the study of the phases and processes of M&A 
transactions in order to create of foundation for the study of the interface of 
arbitration with this long and complex procedure. As a standard process, it can be 
divided into three periods demarcated by two main events of the transaction (signing 
and closing).  
 
It can be useful to distinguish these phases for various reasons, including inter alia, 
the fundamentally different legal regime that applies to each of them. This process 
can be divided into these stages: 
 
a) Negotiation phases 
b) Signing Phase 
c) Closing Phase 
d) Post-Closing Phase 
e) Representations, Warranties and Indemnification 
 
In order to resolve the disputes efficiently with arbitration, it is important to define 
and delimit the scope of review, determination and adjudication of an individual case 
in a precise manner and to avoid any conflicts or unnecessary overlap of the different 
dispute resolution methods. A special challenge for the parties and arbitrators will be 
to define and implement a procedure which allows complex issues to be resolved in 
the short time available, as the closing of an important transaction cannot be put on 
hold for too long
737
.  
 
In addressing its task of clearly defining the stages of M&A transactions, research  
for Chapter One  notably found a consistent deficit in rules specific to M&A 
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arbitration. This deficit in rules highlighted clear problems: the primary one being the 
issue of consent. Case law displayed that in the absence of a definition of consent in 
M&A arbitration or related rules; practitioners rely upon contract law principles, 
however, no defined procedure has been developed. It was concluded that there has 
emerged in recent years, a dynamic concept of consent which goes beyond contract 
law principles and considers all relevant factors. This expansive approach implies 
that consent cannot be reduced to codification. Related to this point the author has 
suggested a non-binding guideline on consent as applicable to the letter of intent and 
other such instruments in M&A transaction. Such a provision may infer the early 
manifestation of valid consent in the letter of intent on future instruments of the 
transaction where the parties have not provided otherwise.  
 
Arbitration and M&A Transactions 
 
In Chapter Two, it has been seen that arbitration is an effective dispute resolution 
mechanism in M&A at every stage of a transaction with features that make it an 
attractive alternative to court litigation, despite certain procedural particularities and 
pitfalls to look out for when drafting arbitration clauses. To avoid these difficulties, 
which are addressed and detailed in later chapters, attention should be paid to the 
careful drafting of an arbitration clause or agreement, preferably and necessarily 
done jointly between the transaction and the arbitration lawyers, or alternatively a 
model clause of a well-known arbitration institution should be chosen. Research for 
Chapter Two showed, however, that there is a lack of model clauses suitable for 
M&A transactions provided by the institutions, which often results in tailored clauses 
specific to particular transactions.  
 
During M&A transactions, arbitration has undoubtedly a great many positive aspects 
and problems. It was not the author’s intention to deal with all problems and issues 
concerning M&A arbitration, but particular aspects of arbitration such as frequent 
problems in price adjustment, expert arbitration, representations and warranties, put 
and sale options etc.  are studied
738
. Issues in M&A arbitration were examined using 
the chronological structure followed in Chapter One, thus in analysis of the pre-
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signing phase conflicts arising from the letter of intent and due diligence were 
addressed and in post-signing violation of covenants and non material adverse 
changes. Lastly, multi-party and multi-contract issues and their interrelation are 
concentrated. Analysis further highlighted the deficit in existing arbitration rules, 
allowing for in depth study of particular topics in forthcoming chapters. In this way, 
Chapter Two’s findings served as a bridge into Part two of the thesis.  
 
The most concrete finding from Chapter Two was that issues concerning arbitration 
are less problematic where well drafted clauses appear in the network of instruments 
in M&A transactions. Well drafted arbitration clauses in those instances can 
demarcate their scope of application as against each other or ensure consistency 
throughout.  
 
The lack of existing arbitration rules as applicable to M&A transactions was 
confirmed and reinforced the need for non-binding guidelines suitable to rectify this 
deficit.   
 
In the second part of the thesis, practical solutions to the theoretical foundations are 
examined. Research is limited to cooperation and coordination of parallel 
proceedings, multi-step processes and “assignment” and “succession” under the title 
of consent in M&A arbitrations.  
 
 
Coordination and Cooperation of Arbitral Proceedings in M&A Transactions 
 
In progressing to the second part of the thesis, Chapter Three addresses the third and 
fourth questions raised in the working hypothesis. Concerning the latter it has been 
observed that institutional rules are limited to multi-party and multi-contract 
arbitration. The thesis found that M&A arbitrations are not typical examples of 
multi-contract arbitration owing to the lack of definition of connection which is 
required for such rules to apply. While there is a relation across the instruments of 
the phases of M&A transactions, it cannot be consistently held that a sufficient 
connection will arise to satisfy the rules. Therefore, consolidation cannot be availed 
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of by the parties, which often leads to parallel proceedings being invoked by one or 
more of the parties. 
 
The central issue concerned where different arbitration clauses, or parallel 
proceedings in national courts or feature in a dispute, and how the cooperation of 
these proceedings would function in order to eliminate the contradictory decisions?  
 
Various solutions have been put into practice. These include: the possibility for 
national courts to appoint the same arbitrator to hear disputes; or the consideration of 
an “umbrella clause” by the parties739; or a stay of the proceedings for coordinating 
parallel or multiple proceedings, in particular in the examples of vertical disputes.  
 
To address the risks of multiple or parallel proceedings on the other hand, res 
judicata and lis pendens are among the solutions proposed in order to avoid 
contradictory decisions. These mechanisms have proven to have expansive 
procedural implications, and where parallel proceedings are involved it must be 
examined whether such proceedings refer to the same or related disputes. Where 
determined to be the same or related dispute the first award issued applies to the later 
related awards. This may be unsuitable for application in M&A arbitration arising at 
different phases where negotiations have continued during the transaction rendering 
earlier awards inapplicable to the current terms of the instruments of later 
negotiations.  
 
Research has also seen that the most common proposition is the consolidation of 
proceedings as an effective mechanism to avoid contradictory awards. However, 
without the parties’ consent, the possibility to consolidate different proceedings will 
depend on the provisions of the applicable arbitration rules and national 
legislation
740
. It is accepted that the obvious theoretical impediment for consolidating 
arbitral proceedings is that dispute resolution through arbitration is founded on the 
consent of parties; this means that absent consent, arbitration proceedings ought only 
be conducted between parties to the arbitration agreement. Perhaps for this reason 
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neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, even the 
2010 revision, contain provisions on the consolidation of arbitration proceedings
741
. 
Considering the importance of these rules, which are a resource for many countries, 
in the author’s opinion the significant issue is the importance of the “consent” of 
parties on the “autonomy of arbitration clauses”. Therefore, as seen in Chapter III, 
the consolidation of related court proceedings and arbitral proceedings raises 
important obstacles both on the conceptual and procedural level. Moreover, in M&A 
transactions, which are more complicated than the normal commercial arbitration 
procedures, “consent” will be essential.  
 
In order to deal with these obstacles, it has been reiterated throughout this thesis that 
guidelines should be proposed. Especially the author finds that a definition of 
connection would be highly beneficial in clarifying the relationship between 
instruments in M&A transactions which would define the scope of varying 
arbitration agreements or in the alternative promote consistency throughout. It is 
envisaged that the scope of application of arbitration agreements would apply to 
material elements to which they relate to.  
 
Guidelines setting-out terms for connection would consider inapplicable lis pendens 
and res judicata rules unless otherwise agreed by the parties, given their unsuitability 
to M&A arbitrations. Thus, the same legal ground criteria would not apply under the 
guidelines.  
 
The principle of party autonomy imposes that any consolidation necessarily depends 
on the agreement of all the parties involved. Therefore, in the author’s opinion, given 
the potential disadvantages of consolidation, and the lack of conformity with party 
autonomy, intervention by the courts in this respect should be limited. The author 
believes that any consolidation must entirely depend on the consent of the parties 
involved, in order to solve their disputes in the most efficient way.  
 
Again, guidelines can assist in the consolidation of parallel proceedings by 
expanding on the current rules’ reliance on the expression by the parties of their wish 
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to consolidate proceedings. The Guidelines would encourage consolidation based on 
the intent of the parties beyond written expression and consideration of the 
surrounding facts of the case.  
 
Multi-Step Processes in M&A Transactions 
 
Another solution which is employed in practice in order to avoid contradictory 
decisions of multiple or parallel proceedings is interrelating alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) proceedings
742
 with arbitration. Chapter Four concentrated on this 
interrelation of ADR with arbitration, specifically in M&A transactions, being unable 
to explore all ADR proceeding types.  
 
Concerning the fifth question of the working hypothesis, the chapter’s findings 
indicate while a hybrid staged process involving ADR with arbitration could serve as 
a practical mechanism in M&A arbitration, the issue of parallel proceedings was by 
no means eliminated by such a process. 
 
The mechanism operates by proposing varied ADR mechanisms for specific issues or 
as a primary stage of dispute resolution before ultimately resorting to arbitration or 
court proceedings. One advantage of the using different ADR mechanisms is that 
parallel proceedings can be managed and not necessarily interfere with the progress 
of a transaction, if different ADR methods are used simultaneously on matters 
relating to different phases of the transaction and progress along concurrent lanes.  
 
It has been remarked that issues arise as to the binding nature of ADR mechanisms. 
An aggrieved party may frustrate an ADR outcome by applying to a court or 
initiation arbitral proceedings. Similarly, problems are faced when seeking 
enforcement of ADR outcomes.   
 
While enforcement may be sought through the intervention of national courts, in the 
author’s opinion, however, this is not the most appropriate solution. Firstly, there are 
no harmonized rules regarding the proceedings. Therefore, courts will pay attention 
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to the drafting of these clauses in order to determine the operation of the ADR 
mechanisms and their related arbitration provisions, must pay attention to the 
intention of parties.  
 
In any case, “consent” will be the main issue to be taken into consideration in any 
case, and it is the author’s opinion that arbitration proceedings can better consider the 
“consent” of parties than national court proceedings. The private nature of arbitral 
hearings can offer a procedure which truly respects the intention of the parties, in a 
competent and efficient manner, while retaining respect for legality and public 
policy. 
 
Further problems arise given the lack of regulation of ADR mechanisms.  
Confidentiality and the undefined role of experts, conciliators, or mediators involved 
in the process have been identified important factors which could dissuade the use of 
ADR in a tiered approach with arbitration in M&A transactions. For example, when 
certain information arising in the mediation or conciliation phases is not protected by 
procedural guarantees, the likelihood of this information being introduced in later 
court or arbitral proceedings emerges. Similarly, practitioners representing the parties 
in these ADR mechanisms may become privy to information which renders their 
later involvement in formal proceedings into question.  
 
In proposing guidelines for multi-tiered ADR clauses to address the procedural issues 
involved, any guidelines must respect the consent of the parties. Therefore, where a 
precise clause is drafted, demarcating the operation and interaction of the different 
ADR methods, guidelines should not cloud the parties’ clear intentions. Guidelines 
should determine where it would be appropriate for parallel ADR mechanisms to 
operate concurrently to best serve the continuation of the transaction. Such 
guidelines should provide deirections for when ADR mechanisms’ non-binding 
results can be challenged by an aggrieved party and assist in the parties’ adherence to 
non-binding resolutions where that was intended by the parties.  
 
Findings thus concluded that multi-tiered dispute resolution clauses can go some  
way to addressing parallel proceedings in M&A arbitration, but similar to 
consolidation, clear expression of the parties’ intention to avail of these means must 
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be provided for. It is on this basis that parties consent as the principal issue must be 
finally dealt with in this thesis. 
 
Issues of Consent in M&A Arbitrations   
 
After determining the importance of “consent” of the parties, Chapter Five has 
shown that it is vital to prove identification and manifestation of consent. As a 
general rule, it is accepted that “consent” be expressed by written instruments, either 
directly or by incorporation by reference. Similarly, underlying consent can be 
derived from related agreements in the contractual network of M&A transaction. 
However, there are cases where consent is presumed to be implied.  
 
The recent ICC Case law has shown diverging approaches to consent by varying 
tribunals. Whereas most rely on contract principles in the absence of definition of 
consent, others have taken the approach to consider the entire surrounding 
circumstances of the case in ascertaining consent.  
 
Further to these findings the author is in agreement with the conclusion that there 
now exists a transitory definition of consent which expands on reliance on contract 
principles alone. In accordance with the second question posed in the working 
hypothesis, we have seen that this transitory definition of consent, while preferable, 
also acts to stave off efforts at codifying the regime. This leads one to wonder 
whether the inconsistent approach of tribunals to date can adequately be addressed. 
Given this finding it is held that consent cannot be codified by rules per se thus 
guidelines should support the emerging transitory definition and supplement the lack 
of rules while assisting the regime of consent in M&A arbitrations.  
 
On the other hand, Chapter Five focused on “assignment” and “succession” after the 
merger and acquisition transaction has been completed. The introduction has shown 
that merger can arise in two different ways: firstly when companies A and B create a 
new company C without dissolving; and secondly when A and B cease to exist and 
they establish a new company C. In both scenarios, the question arises where A and 
B are parties to a contract containing an arbitration clause which transfers their rights 
and/or obligations to the new company (Company C), will the transferee will be 
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bound or not by the arbitration clause contained in the previous main contract and 
under which conditions. The logic of consolidation and succession is the same. It is 
accepted as a general rule that, unless there is some provision to the contrary, -either 
in the statute or agreement of consolidation or merger-, the consolidated or resulting 
corporation succeeds to the powers, privileges, and property of the constituents or 
merged corporation.  
 
On the question of whether that includes arbitration clauses or agreements as well, it 
was observed that there is no specific rule defining the assignment and succession. 
Therefore, the consent of the parties will need to be interpreted. Particular doctrines 
namely the latter superseded the former have been used in practice but were often 
shown to be inapplicable in M&A transaction scenarios. However, especially in 
M&A arbitrations, mere interpretation is not sufficient to prove the consent of 
parties; it should also be endorsed by the facts of transactions and the fluency of 
different phases. Interpretation of consent for assignment and succession can be best 
assisted by guidelines on the matter also. This can be achieved using indicators of the 
parties’ consent which will impact on their obligations and responsibilities and 
meanwhile take account of all relevant facts.   
 
As mentioned above, this thesis focused on the transfer of arbitration agreements in 
M&A transactions and first of all “assignment” has been studied. In order to 
determine the assignment in M&A transactions, the author supports a concern to 
supplant the interpretation of the arbitration agreement, where necessary, with a 
careful assessment of all factors that might help a tribunal draw conclusions as to the 
likely a priori intent of the parties. This method is necessary for “succession”, 
because in doctrine and comparative studies, it is accepted as a general rule that 
unless there is some provision to the contrary, either in the statute or agreement of 
consolidation or merger, the consolidated or resulting corporation succeeds to the 
powers, privileges, and property of the constituents or merged corporation. 
Therefore, it is accepted that the arbitration agreement succeeds to the company. The 
author believes that the automatic application of this rule may be problematic for 
M&A transactions. In the author’s opinion during the M&A transactions focus 
should not only be on the general rules of assignment, or succession (universal or 
individual), but also on the intention of the parties, with attention also on the 
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concrete fluency of the facts. On that point the author disagrees that the intervention 
of the courts will be an appropriate solution because the intervention of national 
courts will affect the autonomy of arbitration agreements in a negative way, and 
secondly, even if parties are agreed on court intervention, national courts will also 
have to check and refer to the “consent” of the parties in any case.   
 
*** 
 
In M&A arbitrations, it is strongly advised that lawyers do their arbitration related 
drafting work at the negotiation stage. This is suggested because arbitration clauses 
in merger transactions present unique problems in arbitration procedure.  
 
It is commonly suggested that on the one hand a well-drafted arbitration clause can 
alleviate many problems by tailoring the process to the transaction. On the other 
hand, a poorly drafted clause will create a myriad of tangled problems at every stage 
of arbitration.  These problems relate to a two-fold question: the selection of the type 
of arbitration and the corresponding lex arbitri and the shaping of the arbitral 
disputes related to merger transaction
743
.  
 
In spite of this, many problems occur during M&A arbitration. Furthermore, there 
are not many studies on specific topics in this field.  
 
The issues that have been analysed throughout this work amount only to research on 
specific points of M&A arbitration. There are lots of topics which should be 
examined entirely in different studies. For instance, arbitrability is of the utmost 
importance. As a classically sensitive area, it raises several questions relating to the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal itself, and competition and anti-trust law, which 
are complex matters. If the merger involves competition and anti-trust law issues, 
mandatory provisions of the domestic law of the venue in these areas, if any, must be 
carefully studied before deciding on that location as the seat of arbitration
744
.  
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The extension of arbitration clauses in M&A transactions is also a further important 
topic which should be studied. This is particularly an issue in situations with group 
company structures and transactions and especially conditions for piercing the 
corporate veil should be analysed in detail.  
 
The application of fast-track arbitration in M&A disputes can also be one of the 
issues for future researchers to study. In practice, there are number of substantial 
arbitration cases where fast-track and expedited procedures have been applied 
successfully to monitor and enforce undertakings in merger control proceedings, and 
in certain EU exemption cases, within very short time frames. If arbitration has 
worked and continues to work in such complex circumstances as merger control 
issues, there are good reasons to assume that arbitration could also be tailored to 
satisfy the needs of the parties in solving their disputes
745
.  
 
The ambition of this thesis was to highlight arbitration in merger and acquisition 
transactions, and especially the role of consent in parallel proceedings during M&A 
transactions and beyond completion in arbitration agreements or clauses in the 
“assignment” and “succession” stages. While doing this the author aimed to remind 
readers that the resolution of a dispute by private judges without the parties’ consent 
is not arbitration
746
. It has been shown that given the transitory definition of consent, 
guidelines in this area would best serve practitioners in the area, where such 
guidelines were to receive widespread acceptance in the practice of M&A arbitration. 
This author would hope to see such guidelines emerge in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
745
 Segesser, supra note 54, p. 54.  
746
 See Lew, Mistelis, Kröll, supra note 333, para. 5-21. 
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